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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
DISASTER CAPITALISM: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN 
by 
Ransford F. Edwards Jr. 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ronald W. Cox, Major Professor 
Natural disasters are uniquely transformative events.  They can drastically 
transform physical terrain and the lives of those unfortunate enough to be caught in their 
wrath.  However, natural disasters also provide an opportunity to reflect on past failures 
and, at times, a clean slate to correct those shortcomings.  This project takes a political 
economic approach and recognizes natural disasters as occasions for agenda-setting on 
behalf of transnational commercial enterprises and market-oriented policy elites.  These 
reformers often use the post-disaster policy space to articulate long-term development 
strategies based on market fundamentalism, and, more importantly, advance a set of 
policies consistent with their particular interests.  This dissertation delves into that 
process and identifies the actors, their preferences and the policy outcomes. 
Using the business conflict model alongside changing transnational processes, this 
project identifies and traces post-disaster policy making in the Caribbean Basin. It also 
explores and provides a more nuanced explanation of its effect upon and within certain 
socioeconomic groups.  What becomes apparent is that natural disasters are opportunities 
to first fracture national economies and then integrate them into transnational processes 
viii 
of capital accumulation.  Given that economic viability is increasingly determined by 
assimilation into the global production processes, reformers in both developed and 
developing countries use disasters as occasions for re-orienting national economies 
towards this end.  It is within this distorted integrative process that disaster capitalism is 
located.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This project locates natural disasters within the broader context of international 
political economy. In particular, I am interested in examining how governments 
formulate policy in the immediate aftermath of natural disasters. Specifically, do natural 
disasters create an unchecked policy space for governments to enact contentious 
economic reform policies?  To what extent does a natural disaster event allow powerful 
economic and political actors to advance a narrow policy agenda? In order to answer 
these questions I will investigate the political economy of natural disasters by careful 
analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data.  The results of which will provide 
evidence to either support, refute, or qualify the hypothesis that natural disasters create a 
window of opportunity for elites to pursue policy agendas that might otherwise be 
politically problematic or difficult. 
A major focus of this project is what Naomi Klein calls disaster capitalism, or the 
free-market orientation of post-catastrophe reform policy.  From the outset, it is worth 
noting that disaster capitalism is as much about the economic marginalization that 
precipitates a disaster, as it is the capital-driven strategies to hasten recovery and 
restoration.  This study will address the predominance of neoliberal programs in the post-
disaster policy space. The first substantive chapter submits to rigorous statistical 
examination Klein’s contention that corporate interests and government technocrats have 
used natural disasters as opportunities to pass reforms that would be otherwise politically 
difficult. Subsequent case studies identify particular regional trade strategies used in 
Central America and the Caribbean to usher in neoliberal policies and revitalize a crisis 
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of capital accumulation that beset US corporations in the 1970s. This project ultimately 
shows that in cases where a natural disaster did occur, embedded economic nationalists 
were challenged by insurgent transnational capitalists to influence post-disaster policy 
direction.  
While this is a study about the policy responses to natural disasters, there is, 
however, a role for ex ante investigations into the cause of policy reforms.  Institutional 
dynamics, particularly in terms of the existing policy-making process, has an important 
impact on policy formulation and outcome.  Considering the policy-making process is 
essential because legislated economic reform policy is the product of a complex set of 
prior interactions. The degree of bureaucratic cohesion, executive autonomy, interest 
group access and the overarching international environment all serve to determine the 
course, range and vigor of policy reforms.    
Yet, if public policy is determined by the above pluralism, why then do a narrow 
sector of transnational capitalist interests seemingly dominate the post-disaster policy 
space?  What is it about a natural disaster that makes it conducive to market liberalization 
and the globalization of the production process?  The immediate answers must involve a 
discussion of first, the condition of crisis and secondly, the “neoliberal turn” of the 1980s. 
What becomes apparent is that the hastened advance of trade and capital liberalizations, 
privatizations, deregulations, and state retrenchment under the rubric of neoliberalism 
deserves a more nuanced explanation that takes into account the aforementioned policy-
making dynamic and a period of crisis.   
Crisis is indeed a reoccurring theme in this study, but, by itself, crises do not 
engender change. The destruction caused by natural disasters do, however, create 
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commercial opportunities that are seized upon by capitalists best mobilized to exploit 
existing business divisions and the interruption of policy moderation. Similarly, as 
witnessed in the financialization of the US economy, economic crisis became the 
condition under which elite coalitions simultaneously fractured and mobilized.  Old 
arrangements disintegrated to be replaced by a configuration of new (and old) actors 
given policymaking voice during periods of public disenchantment or disorientation. 
Neoliberalism was thus a response to the failings of regulated capitalism, most notably 
declining profitability for US corporations.   
The combination of the power of labor to turn higher productivity into wage gains 
and the manifestation of government policy targeting the occurrences of recessions and 
high unemployment resulted in weaker profits for US corporations, particularly in labor-
intensive industries. This sustained period of declining profitability during the 1960s led 
to the ascent of a transnationally-oriented, exclusionary pact of policy elites that peddled 
a swift shift to market fundamentalism in efforts to quash labor, supplant state 
interventionism, and revive classical liberalism. Besides its penchant for reworking the 
regulationist state, as a policy governing international trade, neoliberalism encouraged the 
unabated movement of goods, services, money, and acquisition of property across 
national borders. This feature of international neoliberalism is important in understanding 
my particular conceptualization of disaster capitalism and the conflict between national 
and transnational businesses. To that end, this chapter begins by laying out the theoretical 
foundations of disaster capitalism within the hegemony of international neoliberalism and 
changing transnational processes. 
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The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to a review of the relevant literatures 
that link disaster to political, economic and social transformations. I will begin by 
detailing the concept of disaster capitalism as formulated by Naomi Klein, and then 
provide a reconceptualization that highlights the co-variation between natural disasters 
and macroeconomic liberalizations. Next, I will offer critical appraisal of pluralistic and 
public choice models most often used to explain policymaking.  I will then examine the 
usefulness of an alternative theory of global capitalism that identifies a transnationally-
oriented faction of local elite as primary drivers of post-disaster neoliberalism and state 
reconstituting.  Closing the chapter will be a brief discussion of the statistical model and 
case studies.  
 
The Shock Doctrine1 
Naomi Klein identifies the Chicago School of neo-liberal economics and its 
iconic figure Milton Friedman as providing the framework for disaster capitalism. It was 
Freidman’s own belief that “[i]f a government activity is to be privatized or eliminated, 
by all means do so completely. Do not compromise by partial privatization or partial 
reduction.”  Friedman contended that doing so will only enable those most negatively 
affected by the reforms to eventually succeed in forcing reversals (Freidman 1990: 11-
14).  The concept of shock therapy - with its root in crude electric shock treatments for 
patients diagnosed with mental disorders - was co-opted into economic arguments that 
                                                      
1 Klein uses shock, disaster and crises as interchangeable concepts with little distinction.  For the 
purpose of this study, a disaster is defined as the sudden (or progressive) natural event and crises 
as the consequence of some form of human interaction (before or after the event). I will, however, 
consider shocks and disasters as interchangeable concepts.   For a more detailed discussion about 
the subtleties between the two see Faulkner (2001: 136-138). 
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favored one fell swoop when reforming “sick” economies.  Rigorously employed in the 
former Soviet Republics, the logic of shock therapy was to use the disarray inherent to 
regime change to advance economic reorganization (Sachs 1995; Haynes and Husan 
2002). The honeymoon period afforded to incoming democratic regimes thus made tough 
reforms an easier sell to the affected public (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 152). As 
opposed to gradualism, or piecemeal reforms, shock therapy suggested rapid and radical 
transformations of economic policies (Friedman 1990; Popov 2000). The bitter medicine 
had to be administered through a series of austere structural adjustments often at odds 
with popular sentiments. 
Given the basic outline of shock therapy, disaster capitalism is the instrumental 
use of disasters to usher in radical capitalist economic policies. Naomi Klein (2007) 
furthers that “every time a new crisis hits – even when the crisis itself is the direct by-
product of free-market ideology – the fear and disorientation that follow are harnessed for 
radical social and economic engineering” (49).  The caveat here is that disasters are also 
considered a function of market distortions, business cycles, and unequal development.  
Klein is, however, more keen on the observation that “each new shock is midwife to a 
new course of economic shock therapy” (49).  For Klein, shocks, which come in the form 
of wars, financial crisis, coup d’état, terrorists attacks, and natural disasters, are taken 
advantage of by reform-minded technocrats, politicians and transnational capitalist forces 
to pursue neoliberal economic policies.  Disaster capitalism thus relies upon a series of 
interrelating shocks: The initial shock is the disaster event.  This leads to public shock, 
characterized by fear and disorientation.  The third jolt is in the form of shock therapy 
and the pursuit of neoliberal policy reforms.  Finally, as the public gathers its bearings, 
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the state’s security apparatus maintains acquiescence to the new orthodoxy by utilizing 
actual shock techniques (McSherry 2002: 43; Klein 2007).2 Shock therapy, it appears, 
was merely a precursor to a more programmatic disaster capitalism. 
 
Crises as Opportunity:  Louisiana, Haiti, and Indonesia 
Naomi Klein draws a straight line from the ideological war on big governments to 
the instrumental use of catastrophes as triggers for neoliberal policy reforms.  In countries 
or municipalities where strong public pressure stalls any meaningful attempt at deep 
economic liberalization or deregulation, post-disaster confusion provides a window of 
opportunity for state agents and corporations to exploit new markets.3  While there exists 
little scholarly attempts to investigate the polemics of opportunism (Gunewardena and 
Schuller 2008; Schuller and Morales 2012) the literature does offer anecdotal support to 
the notion that natural disasters can create opportunities to reinvigorate local economies 
                                                      
2 In her 2007 book, Klein compares covert electroshock experiments carried out by C.I.A 
operatives in the 1950s to the “shock therapy” of economic reform being formulated at the 
Chicago School of Economics by Milton Friedman.  The application of electrodes to stubborn 
patients to help facilitate “reprogramming” could also be applied to Keynesian economies in need 
of rapid market liberalization. Both methods found harmony in Chile (and Latin America in 
general under the codename: “Operation Condor”) during the repressive regime of Augusto 
Pinochet. To view the declassified documents see:  CIA, KUBARK Counterintelligence 
Interrogation, July 1963.  
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/index.htm#kubark 
 
3 A precursor to the subsequent examples may have taken place in Mexico City to the middle-
class residents of the Tlatelolco housing complexes.   Following the 1985 earthquakes, discord 
between Tlatelolco residents and the government arose regarding plans to relocate residents to 
another area of the city.  The government also began the process of privatizing the apartments.  
Prior to the disaster, residents merely owned a certificate of real estate participation with much of 
the maintenance and upkeep the responsibility of government agencies. The change of property 
rights would void these contracts and make the units of the condominiums subject to the norms of 
the housing market (Walker 2009: 194-209). 
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through an aggressive, tourism-led development strategy (Robinson and Jarvie 2008; 
Faulkner 2001; Murphy and Bayley 1989).   
In his construction of the new transnational model of accumulation, William 
Robinson (2001) identifies tourism (along with maquiladora4 production, non-traditional 
agricultural exports and remittances) as the new dynamic economic activity that will link  
developing countries to the global economy (539).  For Robinson, tourism and hospitality 
is at the core of the new transnational service sector.  Benefitting from trade and financial 
liberalization, as well as pacification and integration, “tourism has become the fastest 
growing economic activity, and even mainstay, of many Third World economies” (545).  
Growth prospects for international tourisms have enticed local and transnational elites to 
create and take advantage of opportunities to build and expand on international travel for 
purposes of leisure or otherwise. 
 
Hurricane Katrina and Louisiana 
An even more blatant example of the circumvention of public policy in favor of 
narrow interests took place in 2005 following Louisiana’s catastrophic encounter with 
Hurricane Katrina. In this case, crisis is exploited on behalf of what Klein would call the 
“disaster-capitalism complex” or the privatization and contracting out of disaster 
response.5  While the scope of the disaster necessitated the use of private contracting 
                                                      
4 The word maquiladora is derived from the term maquila, which refers to the process of 
assembly and production primarily dependent on unskilled and semi-skilled labor.  The factory 
that houses this manual and light machinery assembly system or mass production process is 
referred to as a maquiladora. 
 
5 Some of the largest no-bid contracts went to firm that were used by the government in Iraq:  
Halliburton’s KBR (military base construction), Blackwater (provided security for FEMA 
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firms, the frenzy of firms pouring into Louisiana and Mississippi to secure largely no bid-
contracts was encouraged by the relaxation of longstanding labor protections.  Shortly 
after the failure of Louisiana’s levy system, the federal government overturned The 
Davis-Bacon Act and Executive Order 11246.6  The 1931 Davis-Bacon Act called for 
federal contractors “to pay their laborers and mechanics not less than the prevailing wage 
rates and fringe benefits for corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed 
on similar projects in the area.” The 1965 Executive Order 11246 is an affirmative action 
provision that “prohibits federal contractors and federally assisted construction 
contractors and subcontractors…from discriminating in employment decisions on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”7 The temporary annulment of these 
two laws - described as necessary to speed up the recovery process - allowed for 
contractors to reap enormous profits within this vacuum of deregulation.  The ability to 
focus strictly on profit maximization led to numerous cases of prejudicial contracting, 
discriminatory employment practices, and the abuse of health and safety standards.  It 
was not until affected groups were able to mobilize, coupled with the public censuring by 
civil rights alliances, that these regulations were reinstated (Bennett 2006; Olam and 
Stamper 2006; Button and Oliver-Smith 2008; Schuller 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                              
operations), Parsons (bridge construction), Flour, Shaw, Betchel, and CH2M all received 
contracts to provide mobile homes for evacuees.  These contracts totaled about $3.4 billion (Klein 
2007: 50). 
 
6 Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 8, 2005). The act has been suspended on 
several occasions in response natural disasters.  For the most recent proclamation see: No. 6491, 
57 Fed. Reg. 47,553 (Oct.14, 1992). The Davis Bacon Act was suspended following Hurricanes 
Andrew and Iniki that devastated areas of Florida, Louisiana, and Hawaii respectively. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/proclamations. 
 
7 United States Department of Labor. http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws. 
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Underdevelopment and the Haitian Earthquake 
According to Klein, shocks are not solely attributable to natural occurrences, but 
rather, result from a series of deliberate policy decisions.  Often, unequal developmental 
patterns resulting from the implementation of neoliberal policies help to create a set of 
vulnerabilities that are borne out during a disaster event.  Notwithstanding the divisions 
created by unfettered markets, there are also cases where economic boycotts become 
active foreign policy tools.  Countries at odds with prevailing international norms have 
often encountered various trade embargoes and sanction regimes to encourage 
compliance, sow subversion or exercise deterrence (Barber 1979: 370-373).  The 
literature does provide some compelling evidence as to why the proscription of aid, 
investment, and finance to bring about political disintegration has more often failed 
(Galtung 1967; Pape 1997 & 1998).  The brinksmanship involved (between sender and 
recipient) in trade embargoes often exacts a costly toll on the most vulnerable in the 
population.  This was the case for Haiti between 1991 and 1994.   
In an effort to conditionally restore the presidency of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the 
United States, through the United Nations Security Council (resolutions 841, 875, 917) 
and Organization of American States (OAS), subjected Haiti to a comprehensive trade 
embargo that specifically targeted fuel and all merchandise imports (save immediate food 
and medicine aid) and blocked the exportation of Haitian merchandises.  Compounding 
the neoliberal project started in Haiti a decade earlier, the Clinton administration went 
further by restricting financial transactions and commercial flights between Haiti and the 
United States (Executive order # 12920).   The net effect of these combined actions was a 
10 
strangulation of the Haitian economy, exemplified by sharp declines in wages, 
employment and income (Gibbons 1999: 4-18).   
Klein does an excellent job of outlining exactly how these macroeconomic 
dislocations, far from producing political disintegration, leads more forcefully to the 
disintegration of public infrastructure, which is a precursor to crisis.  Klein’s critique 
resonates with a strand of dependency theory that identifies the vulnerabilities a society 
encounters because of overt economic sanctioning (Olson 1979: 479-485). For example, 
in detailing the conditions that helped precipitate the ruinous Haitian earthquake, Klein 
asserts that the most recent aid embargo (freezing of funds earmarked for education, 
public health, and infrastructure improvement) leveled at Haiti in dispute of the re-
election of Aristide, is a continuation of sanctioning policies, dating as far back as 1806, 
aimed to isolate the nation: 
Each payment to a foreign creditor was money not spent on a road, a 
school, an electrical line. And that same illegitimate debt empowered the 
IMF and World Bank to attach onerous conditions to each new loan, 
requiring Haiti to deregulate its economy and slash its public sector still 
further. Failure to comply was met with a punishing aid embargo from 
2001 to 04, the death knell to Haiti's public sphere (Klein 2010). 
 
 
Indonesian Floods 
One of the underlying conditions that cause disasters, according to Klein, is due to 
the decades of experimental economic reform programs emanating from Washington 
under the banner of structural adjustment.  The weakening of social safety nets, reduction 
in public services, mass privatizations and overall reduction in government responsibility 
created in places like Jakarta “clichés of lopsided development, as glittering shopping 
malls with indoor skating rinks [were] surrounded by moats of open sewers” (Klein 2007: 
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48). The resulting imbalance between growing private consumption and stagnant 
investment in public infrastructure led to preventable flooding that engulfed a majority of 
the Indonesian capital city (Texier 2008).8  The result is often a self-reinforcing narrative 
used to justify deeper rounds of liberalization, privatization and hollowing out of state 
capacity.  The disaster functions to expose the weakness of the public sector to maintain 
infrastructure. Voice is given to radical reformers who tout deeper devolution, 
contracting-out of services and for-profit reconstruction, management and operation of 
public facilities (Klein 2007).  
The previous examples provide a basic portrayal of disaster capitalism as it 
corresponds to natural disaster events. The overturn of established legal statutes in 
Louisiana is an ex post approach to disaster capitalism.  That is, the disaster and ensuing 
crises function to create opportunities for an increased reliance on market forces in both 
mitigation and reconstruction.  The crises resulting from failing public infrastructure in 
Haiti and Indonesia are examples of ex ante interpretations of disaster capitalism.  In 
these cases, prior neoliberal regimes, whether in the form of sanctions or development 
patterns created vulnerabilities that resulted in catastrophe.  In the following chapter I 
seek to conceptualize disaster capitalism using the ex post formulation. With developing 
countries as a unit of analysis, disaster capitalism is the instrumental use of natural 
catastrophes to pursue contentious economic liberalization policies. For the case studies, 
the core of the observations will include the interplay between US-based, nationally-
oriented corporations with connections to political elites from apparel and textile 
                                                      
8  Mydans, Seth. 2007. “After String of Disasters, Indonesians Ask: Why Us?” New York Times, 
11 February. 
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producing states, and transnationally-oriented elites with linkages to transnational 
corporations, business forums, and lending institutions. 
 
Conceptualizing Disaster Capitalism 
The previous section made plain Naomi Klein’s theory of disaster capitalism.  
Herein, I proceed to define the parameters of this project. The focus of investigation is 
Klein’s assertion that major disasters provide a “blank slate” on which to scribe upon the 
outlines of rapid economic transformation; a reorganization that emphasizes neoliberal 
economic principles including liberalization, privatization, and an overall diminished role 
of the state.9   
Conceptually, disaster capitalism relies upon a series of actions that take place 
after a disaster event.  This includes (1) the displacement and disorientation of affected 
populations, (2) the prompt centralization of decision-making power: often via a state of 
emergency, (3) a call for immediate international aid and an appeal for long-term 
assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs), and (4) the relaxation or repeal 
of particular socio-economic regulations and the legislation of others (Klein 2005 and 
2007).  
   
 
 
                                                      
9 Other examples of crises include the neoliberal regimes that occurred during the military 
regimes in Chile and Argentina.  The process of democratization in Poland, Russia, and South 
Africa created opportunities for radical reformers to institute and consolidate liberal economic 
policies.  The latest Iraq war is used as an example of creating a blank slate for the “disaster-
industrial complex” and the Asian financial collapse of the late 1990s allowed private 
multinationals in-roads into that regions previously state-dominated financial system. 
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Displacement and Disorientation 
Olson and Gawronski (2010) argue that public perceptions of government 
institutions and political leaders are greatly influenced by their response to natural 
disasters.  Disasters, they contend, are unique, transformative events that reveal the 
government’s ability to protect its citizens. This occurs through a series of actions 
beginning with disasters as Maslowian shocks that collapses a population’s higher order 
needs (love, belongingness → esteem → self-actualization) to one of basics, such as food 
and shelter.10  Second, government failures are highlighted by a combination of modern 
media’s propensity for the dramatic, as well as the viral pace of information diffusion 
attributed to social media.  Finally, the heightened attentiveness and sensitivity on the 
part of victims and spectators increases the expectations for the benevolent behavior of 
public officials in dealing with the existing crisis. Whereas properly managed disaster 
response can instill confidence and strengthen regimes, poorly managed disasters can 
undermine public perceptions of legitimacy.  Negative opinions of government 
preparation and response can turn natural disasters into political crises (Olson 2000; 
Olson and Gawronski 2010: 207-208).11 
                                                      
10 See also Wisner et al. (2004: 100-101) 
 
11 The politics of disasters literature is perhaps the body of work most closely related with disaster 
capitalism.  The premise here is that an “exogenous shock” produced by an unanticipated event 
like an earthquake can also produce political shocks that may result in regime replacement or 
collapse.  For such an example see: Bommer, Julian. 1985. “The Politics of Disaster—
Nicaragua.” Disasters 9(4): 270-278. Author provides a linkage between the fall of the Somoza 
regime and a series of protests following natural disasters.For another example of regime collapse 
see: Preston, Julia, and Samuel Dillon. 2005. “Opening Mexico.”The Making of a Democracy. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  The Authors examine how the 1985 Mexican City 
earthquake led to an increased protest movements culminating in democratization.   The thread of 
reasoning is followed in: Walker, Louise E. 2009. “Economic Fault Lines and Middle-Class 
Fears: Tlatelolco, Mexico City, 1985” in Aftershocks: Earthquakes and Popular Politics in Latin 
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While I do agree that disasters may create a revisionist history of previous public 
policy (Gunewardena 2008) and heightens scrutiny of immediate post-disaster actions 
(Olson and Gawronski 2010), these concerns fall outside the realm of macroeconomics. 
Furthermore, the affected public may have a difficult time linking disasters to structural 
economics. Moreover, the expansion of export-processing zones and apparel production 
sites are easily couched in the narrative of post-disaster reconstruction and sustainable 
development found in many Action Plans presented to international donor and lending 
agencies.   
The inherent ‘shock’ associated with disasters, as noted by Olson and Gawronski, 
puts the affected communities emphasis back onto “essential material needs” (2010: 4), 
thereby sheltering policymakers from the public scrutiny associated with sweeping 
economic reform policies like privatizations, capital liberalization, and cuts in long-term 
government spending.  Disasters create a shock in the public realm, a kind of 
disorientation where policy space is made available and must be acted upon immediately 
before the public regains their collective clarity and sense of normalcy.   
                                                                                                                                                              
America, ed. Jurgen Buchenau and Lyman L. Johnson. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press 184-221. In this case the author makes a more nuanced argument that the independent 
organization and incitement of civil society by a middle class community after the Mexico City 
earthquake helped spur Mexico on the path of democracy.Theoretical and empirical rigor are on 
display in Olson, Richard Stuart. 2000. “Towards a Politics of Disaster: Losses, Values, Agendas, 
and Blame.” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 18 (2): 265-286. 
According to Olson disasters are unequivocally political because they “invariably increase the 
number of demands on a political system as well as the novelty and complexity of those demands 
while at the same time wreaking havoc on system response capabilities. Disaster therefore 
become political crises quite easily.”(267)  and Drury, A. Cooper and Richard Stuart Olson. 1998. 
“Disasters and Political Unrest: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management 6(3): 153-161. Is an empirically test of  the supposition that disasters may lead to 
political unrest.Quiroz, Alejandro Flores, and Alastair Smith. 2010. “Surviving Disasters.” 
Working paper. Department of Politics, New York University. In conjunction with the precepts of 
selectorate theory, these authors show how leadership  coaltion size matters in staving off post-
disaster discontent.  Democracies with large coalitions are more likely to survive post-disaster 
unrest. 
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Prerogative Power 
The consolidation of power in the face of disasters is less disputed.  The exercise 
of prerogative power is an intrinsic obligation of the state.  The onset of natural disasters 
and subsequent state of emergency is a trigger for legitimate arbitrary state action.  These 
special circumstances often empower policymakers to articulate positions of national 
purpose, reaffirm its monopoly of violence (in terms of securitization), and exercise fiscal 
regulation (Brown 1995: 176).12 Sudden-onset emergencies are often automatic triggers 
for international relief agencies, many under the banner of the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  Yet still, the growth of international 
organizations to allocate aid has neither circumvented recipient power in so far as 
choosing to accept assistance, nor has it attenuated bilateral allocations (Harmer and 
Cotterell 2009).  Disaster capitalism is enabled by bilateral (NGO and to a lesser extent 
multilateral13) humanitarian aid allocation. This is so because the strategic use of aid 
requests is an occasion for national and transnational commercial interests to advance 
policy preferences. 
 
                                                      
12 The guiding principle of prerogative power was most plainly articulated by John Locke (1690): 
“[P]ower in the hands of the prince to provide for the public good in such cases which, 
depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable laws could not 
safely direct.” Locke goes on to say that “[T]his power to act according to discretion, for the 
public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes against it, is that which I called 
prerogative: for since in some governments the law-making power is not always in being and is 
usually too numerous, and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to execution…[T]his power, 
whilst employed for the benefit of the community and suitably to the trust and ends of the 
government, in undoubted prerogative, and is never questioned.”(“Second Treatise on 
Government.” Chapters XIII-XIV, section 158-160). 
 
13 Multilateral aid disbursements through UN based agencies are also likely to reflect the strategic 
economic interests of its majority partner: the United States. 
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Humanitarian Assistance 
Humanitarian aid as a tool for statecraft and the advancement of private interests 
is under-theorized in the literature.  To that end, Hans Morgenthau (1962) provided one 
of the more lucid typologies of the foreign aid enterprise.  For Morgenthau, humanitarian 
foreign assistance, along with subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and foreign aid for 
economic development are all occasions for donor nations to exercise foreign policy.  
And though Morgenthau identifies humanitarian aid (extended to nations which are 
victims of natural disasters, such as floods, famines and epidemics) as the most benign, 
he does recognize that “it can perform a political function when it operates in a political 
context.”  He goes on to clarify that this type of aid prevents the collapse of the existing 
political order, in effect “maintaining the status quo, without, however, as a rule, 
increasing its viability” (301-302). Since then Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) have 
gone on to theoretically advance some of Morgenthau’s assertions regarding the political 
function of humanitarian aid allocation.  For example, conditioned upon the Cold War 
and alliance politics, Drury et al., (2005) found that US humanitarian relief in response to 
natural disasters does indeed have a political component that also includes factors like 
regime type and public salience.  This study receives support in Fink and Redaelli (2011), 
which finds -- for US, Japan, Germany, the UK and Norway -- that bilateral aid 
allocations tend to favor oil exporters, geographically closer, former colonies, as well as 
countries less politically aligned.14  The idea here is that the allocation of humanitarian 
aid can also serve important strategic purposes. For example, following Hurricane Mitch, 
                                                      
14 For this last distinction, Drury et al. (2005) find the opposite effect in the United States, that is 
– the United States, particularly during the Cold War period, would dedicate much more relief 
resources to nations that shared their strategic goals and ideological affinities.   
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successful trade legislation targeting affected Central American states now focused on the 
need to alleviate the effects of the natural disaster through specific reconstruction and aid 
packages attached to the law. Without a disaster, prior iterations absent calls for disaster 
relief and humanitarian assistance failed to pass Congress. 
 
 (De)Regulation 
Public disorientation, centralization of power and calls for international assistance 
are all precursors to the most crucial feature of disaster capitalism – policies of 
liberalization and deregulation that favor a distinct set of transnational interests. This was 
the case in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch where fiscal regulations, particularly in 
attempts to privatize the state-owned telephone company, were part of a larger struggle 
between military, civil, and transnational interests. 
Honduran officials used the catastrophe wreaked by hurricane Mitch as an 
opportunity to overturn long-time restrictions of foreign investments. For example, 
immediately following the disaster the entire country was designated an export-
processing zone. In December of 1998, the Honduran Congress passed the first of two 
votes that amended a ban on foreign ownership of coastline properties.  Coastal villagers, 
small-scale commercial fisheries and aquaculture enterprises were displaced in favor of 
tourism development plans that featured multinational hotel chains and a greater 
emphasis on the subsidiary hospitality and service sector.  Within the first two months 
after hurricane Mitch, the Honduran Congress passed a series of legislative decrees that 
included tourism development goals as well as plans at agricultural reform and 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  These declarations were part of a larger 
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set of privatization projects aimed at liberalizing the Honduran economy.   Reforms 
included an overhaul of the mining code, foreign access to the renewable energy sector, 
along with concessional operation of airports, seaports, and highways.  The government 
also used the disaster to speed up the privatization of the National Electric Company’s 
distribution system, band B cellular service, and the state-owned Honduran telephone 
company (HONDUTEL).15  Benedicte Bull (2004) details the privatization and 
deregulation of the telecommunications sector emphasizing the role played by local 
economic elites. While the privatization of HONDUTEL has been attached to 
conditionality loans since 1995, there was little movement toward that end prior to 
hurricane Mitch.  Bull argues that it was local, regional, and transnational alliances that 
ultimately determined the liberalization of the telecommunications sector.16  
  The previous section provided a conceptualization of disaster capitalism based 
on the displacement and disorientation of affected populations, centralization of 
authority, calls for international assistance, and increased socio-economic legislative 
activity all stemming from the onset of a natural disaster.  The next section will convey 
assessments of arguments concerning society and state-centered explanations of 
neoliberal reforms.  This appraisal will conclude with an endorsement of transnationalism 
as a driving force behind disaster capitalism.  I will argue that an approach that stresses 
the interests of transnational capital has better explanatory capacity in explaining policy 
choices after disasters than competing perspectives. Developing country’s experience 
                                                      
15 Office of the United States Trade Representative. 1999 National Trade Estimate-Honduras. 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/1999/asset_upload_f
ile261_2824.pdf Accessed November 5, 2012. 
 
16 Beyond interest groups, Bull points to an individual actor: Jamie Rosenthal a Honduran 
politician with various business interests including banking, tourism, and media.  
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with disaster capitalism is more likely to reflect their position in the global supply 
network and their degree of integration into transnational processes of capital 
accumulation.   
 
Transnational Coalitions: Beyond Society and State 
This project posits a direct relationship between the occurrence of natural 
disasters and neoliberal economic reforms.  In order to explore that causal mechanism it 
is first important to acknowledge the principal theories pertaining to policy reforms.  
Unfortunately, the existent literature on policy reform lacks the depth to match its 
breadth.  In recent years, political scientists, economists, and political economists have all 
struggled to articulate a unified theory of policy reform.  This is the consequence of 
numerous international, national, institutional and sectoral actors interacting to determine 
the focus and scope of economic reform programs (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Haggard 
and Webb; 1993; Williamson 1994; Rodrik 1996; Tommasi and Velasco 1996; Drazen 
2000).    
The international economic system can determine the policy options afforded to 
reformers (Maxfield 1990; Kahler 1992).  External shocks, structural adjustment and 
business cycles in industrial countries all served to advance liberalizing reforms. The 
ideological dominance of neoliberalism has also limited policy options available to 
executives in developing countries.   Secondly, the degree of bureaucratic cohesiveness 
and expertise can either streamline or obstruct reform programs (Callaghy 1989).  
Bureaucratic reforms that championed efficiency and responsiveness to political 
principals seemed ripe for developing countries with strong executives, centralized 
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governments, and embryonic administrative law (Manning 2001: 299).  However, an 
embedded bureaucracy could also become “a powerful and well-positioned interest 
group, aligned against reform and capable of obstructing the implementation of 
adjustment programs” (Haggard and Web 1993: 152).    Third, the amount of executive 
autonomy can affect the decision to reform (Grindle 1996).  Reformers with a longer time 
horizon are more likely to advance contentious policy reforms.  The delayed benefits of 
structural adjustment programs do not always incentivize self-interested politicians. 
Finally, powerful pressure groups condition reforms due to the potential distributional 
outcomes (Frieden 1991). The potential windfall for winners, hardship for losers or 
uncertainty of outcomes impacts whether reforms are implemented and, if so, their degree 
of rigidity (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Philip 1999; Drazen 
2000).   
The purpose here is not to be exhaustive in the review of the wide body of 
literature on economic reform but rather to get the reader a sense of the range of the 
debate.  The following section will focus on the role of powerful pressure groups in 
originating and cementing policy reform.  I will begin by surveying the literature on 
interest groups.  Then I will highlight their strengths and weaknesses for studying crisis 
induced economic reform in developing countries. 
 
Pluralism, Public Choice and Policymaking 
Interest group formation is often the instinctual response to the wants and needs 
of a variety of sectors and classes. These groups function to articulate preferred policy to 
decision-makers.  Historically, the arena for interest group interactions was limited to a 
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select few influential elite.  Successive waves of democratization have worked to 
deconstruct these elite-based traditions of influence, however.  Citizen involvement in the 
form of group articulation is symptomatic of not only pluralism, but more importantly, 
social differentiation (Lipset 1963).  Some groups are issue-specific while others work 
for broader changes.  Some are apolitical and function as socially binding forces, while 
others bypass government institutions and work to directly influence public opinion.  
Finally, some interest groups are institutionally malleable and enduring while others 
fleeting (Almond 1958; Almond and Coleman 1960; Duverger and Wagoner 1972).   
Democracy functions, say pluralists, through the aggregation of self-interested 
individuals into self-interest groups. This approach to society-centered theories spawned 
elite-based models that posit eventual oligarchical domination of society despite 
democratic practices (Michels [1915] 1962).  In disagreement, pluralists contend that 
public policy is generally equitable and determined by the configuration of power 
between interest groups (Dahl 1961).  While pluralists do acknowledge the role of wealth 
and strategic interests in getting politicians to listen, they emphasize that the balancing of 
interests contributes to the neutrality of government. This in turn enables the stability of 
democracy (Lijphart 1977).  
Pluralism is ultimately secure in the notion that a healthy democracy has a direct 
relationship with a high degree of interactions among competing groups. Moreover, with 
adequate organization and lobbying, all groups are afforded some measure of access to 
decision-makers.  In this society-centered model, the role of the state is circumscribed to 
ensuring an impartial environment for interest group competition, and policy 
administration (Skocpol 1985). That being said, pluralist theory could not explain the 
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existence and persistence of wasteful economic policies (Lindblom 1977), and political 
decisions that appeared to invite conflict (Mills [1956] 2000).  Among other things, 
pluralists began to recognize the growing power of politicians and their roles in helping 
to create situations of increased inequality and economic distortions (Dahl and Lindblom 
1976; Bates 1981; Lindblom 1982).  
Partly because of the inadequacies of pluralist theories and partly because of 
waning influence of sociologists in political science, the introduction of economic 
principles to the study of politics called for a re-evaluation of behaviorism’s hegemony 
(Barry 1978).  The advance of public choice theory was a significant theoretical assault 
on pluralist claims of effective policymaking.  Public choice theorists had only to point to 
the gulf between observed and theorized outcomes (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). The 
problem, as outlined by public choice theorists, is that with some general agreed upon 
rules, usually majoritarian, government becomes the de facto (albeit inefficient) provider 
of basic public goods.  It furthers that majority-voting rules allow varied coalitions of 
voters to get their specific interests advanced, often at the expense of the population of 
taxpayers (Tullock 1959).  The linchpin to this is the various institutional (particularly 
constitutional) configurations that allow self-interested politicians to be directly 
influenced by pressure groups.  The result is increased rent extractions from a community 
of taxpayers, to a narrow set of interests (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974; Bhagwati 1982; 
Grindle and Thomas 1991).  
Ultimately, the failure of pluralist theories to account for unproductive policies is 
based on their disregard of the importance of the state, its decision-making institutions, 
and the actors therein. More importantly, public choice theory exposed the weakness of 
23 
pluralist theories to cope with the veracity of a neoliberal hegemony that began in the 
mid-1970s. Because it dealt with government failure, as opposed to market failure, public 
choice theory had natural affinities with the ideological underpinnings of neoliberalism 
(Harvey 2005).17 Public choice theory negates the notion of a neutral state and aims to 
explain why the allocation of economic rents are innately partial, given the influence of 
self-interested politicians and bureaucrats. Yet, even this approach is ultimately an 
inadequate framework for explaining policymaking processes in developed or developing 
countries. Moreover, the highly dependent nature of developing countries make them 
susceptible to hegemonic forces of developed states and their particular strands of 
capitalism.  
 
Social Structure of Accumulation and Neoliberalism 
What the pluralist and public choice theories fail to take into account is the 
observation that these various alliances of interests work through state structures, but 
state structures themselves are ultimately determined by the organizing principles of 
capitalism. As David Kotz (2015) argues, in a democracy, state policy is narrow and can 
be subject to whimsical changes and adjustments.  However, forms of capitalism are 
coherent and much more stable over time. Therefore, types of capitalism will give rise to 
certain types of policies, and those policies themselves are limited by only the stability 
and coherence of capitalism. This would explain the general stability of US policy over 
                                                      
17 According to Harvey (2005) “state interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a 
bare minimum because, according to the theory [of neoliberalism], the state cannot possibly 
possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful 
interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for 
their own benefit” (2). 
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extended periods of time. It would also explain the downstream policy preferences 
afforded to developing countries. Therefore, the current inclination of neoliberal 
capitalism only encapsulates a specific epoch of capitalism, a period of capitalism 
characterized by the domination of capital over labor.   
For example, under neoliberalism, the declining bargaining power of labor was 
antithetical to the previous era of state-directed, regulated capitalism. In this period, 
spanning from the end of World War II to the 1970s, there existed a compromise between 
capital and labor where labor was able to transfer increased productivity into real wage 
gains. Government policy helped facilitate this alliance through the active provision of 
public goods and various forms of consumer, labor, and environmental protections (50-
51). This resulted in a tacit agreement that government policy would guard against 
recessions and high unemployment. The tenuous alliance between labor and capital was a 
result of the ascendency of a form of regulated capitalism that dominated that particular 
era. Crisis, some real, some aggrandized, and some perceived, brought about a change in 
this relationship. This crisis also changed the relationship between developed and 
developing countries and the range of policy prescriptions afforded to developing 
countries to correct their own structural problems. 
In the US, declining profitability, the dissemination of classic liberalism through 
conservative think tanks, and pleas to loosen environmental and social regulation by 
prominent business associations, all helped usher in neoliberal capitalism. Domestically, 
this meant tax cuts on businesses, privatizations, cuts in government spending and 
welfare programs, and the deregulation of businesses. As it related to developing 
countries, trade policies and development aid were often conditioned on decreased state 
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involvement in monetary and fiscal policy, freeing up the movement of goods, services, 
and capital between countries, the development of export processing zones, and making it 
easier for foreign individuals and corporations to acquire property (Kotz 2000). More 
importantly, increased competition within bureaucratic structures and the international 
commercial environment helped drive the reconstitution of capitalism in the 1970s. It was 
during this period that “intensifying conflict between big business in the United States on 
the one hand and U.S. labor, U.S. citizens, poor countries, and capitalists in other 
developed countries on the other rendered the social structure of accumulation no longer 
effective” (Kotz 2015: 67). Much of this dissertation highlights and traces this new 
competitive environment as it relates to the globalization of apparel production. And 
though dominant, the depth and spread of neoliberalism was uneven throughout the 
developing world. Countries adopted some principles and resisted others, despite the 
insistence of international financial institutions and agencies connected to US hegemony.  
That idea, US hegemony, is important because this project follows the spread of 
international neoliberalism from its core, to the periphery, through the contours of trade 
relationships the United States has had with pre-capitalist societies in the Caribbean 
Basin. In the US, the resulting policies have also had an uneven impact on capitalists and 
have pitted those tied to the previous era of regulated capitalism against those tied to new 
modes of accumulation linked to financialization and transnational production processes. 
This has also been the case in the developing world. The resistance from 
developmentalist governments and domestic business associations, within these societies 
shows the constraints on neoliberal capitalism and why natural disasters have become 
critical junctures of policy change.  
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Policies that made it easier for US corporations to move manufacturing activities 
overseas in conjunction with the development of export processing zones are a result of 
purposive policies that took place within the context of neoliberal capitalism. It is thereby 
important to acknowledge neoliberalism as the dominant organizing principle behind 
policymaking in the US and the developing world.  
Honduras, for example, had a history of both a weak state and civil society.  As 
Robinson (2003) points out, “[i]n Honduras, both the subordinate and the dominant 
classes were historically the least developed in Central America, and the state and 
economy the most backward.” These weaknesses led to “the vulgar domination of the 
country by foreign companies” (118-119). The construction of US backed polyarchy 
helped develop “an alliance and convergence of interest among the dominant groups and 
US-transnational forces against the popular sectors and their advancing struggle in 
Central America” (122).   
To spur the evolution of domestic pressure groups, international financial 
institutions and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
committed to the creation of policy networks via the establishment of various think tanks 
and private sector organizations (Bull 2004: 239). These alliances initially conformed 
with modes of production aligned with regulated capitalism that dominated throughout 
the post-war era. However, as neoliberalism emerged as the hegemonic principle of 
economic organization, new transnational alliances were required to direct export-led 
growth. Where the intransigence of nationally-oriented groups proved too large of a 
hurdle, USAID funded exported-oriented business associations replaced them. These new 
transnational associations became an important part in securing bilateral regional trade 
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agreements that included provisions to open commercial sectors aligned with 
transnational imperatives (Cox 2008; Bull 2004: 240). 
International neoliberalism and the transnationalization of production are useful 
as a starting point to examining policy reforms under conditions of crises.  This is so 
because crisis is an occasion where old coalitions fragment under declining economic 
conditions. This becomes an opportunity for the emergence of new actors and policy 
players.  New alliances are forged and alternative policy regimes realized.  This project 
limits society-centered explanations, extends on instrumental state-centered approaches, 
and ultimately argues that disasters are crises that are also influential in rearranging 
alliances, particularly transnational ones. 
 
Disaster Capitalism and Transnational Processes 
Robinson (2004) argues that globalization and the emergence of transnational 
processes forces us to reconsider our conceptualization of the state. Robinson’s 
reconceptualization relies on the emergence of a politicized transnational capitalist class 
and the mobility of capital across national borders.  According to Robinson, the 
disintegration and decentralization of the production processes has occasioned “the 
unprecedented concentration and centralization of worldwide economic management, 
control, and decision-making power in transnational capital and its agents” (9).  This is 
evidenced by a rather small set of the world’s largest corporations exhibiting cross-
cutting ownership networks dominated by a core of financial institutions (Robinson 2004: 
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47; Carroll 2010: 100; Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston 2011).18 States do matter, but state 
policy is largely influenced by the particular form of capitalism holding hegemonic sway, 
in this case neoliberalism (Kotz 2015).  Furthermore, the de-emphasis of the state is a 
logical approach to a globalization that promises to integrate the entire social, political, 
economic and cultural structure into a global configuration.  To that point, Robinson 
furthers that “[t]he emergence of a truly global economy brings with it the material basis 
for the emergence of a single global society, including the transnationalization of civil 
society, of political processes, and of cultural life” (2000: 90).       
The ascent of international trade regimes conditions states to refrain from 
pursuing policies aimed at protecting national industries and, likewise, national industries 
must increasingly become transnational in order to ensure investment capital. Nowhere is 
this more crucial than in developing countries where governments must balance popular 
sentiments against the necessity of foreign capital investment.  On one side is the 
transnational corporations, armed with the inside option of investing elsewhere, it dictates 
investment subsidies, employment legislation, and tax regimes.  On the other side are 
leaders who are punished or rewarded based on their record of creating and sustaining 
high levels of employment. The results of these negotiations often favor transnational 
corporations due to a combination of a credible threat created by the ability to relocate 
investments and limited outside options available to governments. This threat of 
relocation:  
 
                                                      
18 Vitali et al. (2011)  introduce groundbreaking methodology to measure the network of 
transnational corporations.  One of the more intriguing discoveries is that almost 40% of 
economic value of all TNCs are held by core of 147 TNCs. Of those, 75% are financial 
intermediaries (6). 
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nullifies any potential labour militancy, since workers place a positive 
utility on attaining/retaining employment…such a process is more likely 
in integrated markets—such as NAFTA and the EU—and with ‘freer’ 
trade agreements, since it is easier for transnationals to co-ordinate a 
strategic response to any labour militancy…[c]onsequently there has been 
increasing political and fiscal pressures upon nation states, downward 
pressure upon wages and rising income inequalities (Cowling and 
Tomlinson 2005: 46-47). 
 
The tabula rasa created by a natural disaster can be a motivating opportunity for 
states, directed by transnational interests, to reinsert their national economies into the 
larger global economy. Therefore, disaster capitalism, as the amalgamation of catastrophe 
and markets, is better understood within the context of a changing capitalist political 
economy.  This new economy is global in nature and is structured by networks of social 
groups integrated into transnational processes.   The consequence is that the polarization 
of social groups has eclipsed the polarization of national economies and domestic 
development is increasingly being determined by the degree of differentiation a social 
group can achieve to secure its participation in global labor markets (Stonich 1993; 
Robinson 2001).   
When viewed from this perspective, disaster capitalism no longer resembles an 
anomalous occurrence of opportunity meeting crisis.  Rather, it is part of accumulation 
processes consistent with over forty years of structural changes in the global capitalist 
system. The merger of corporate and state interests is evident in the ideological 
dissemination of neoliberalism, which has given fundamental support to the continuous 
deregulation of the financial sector, the elimination of capital controls, and the weakening 
of organized labor. The porosity of national borders to mobile capital gives organized 
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capital the ability to shape production networks and take advantage of profit-making 
opportunities, including those brought about via natural disasters.  
The sequential process of public disorientation, power centralization and 
regulation and the role of international and transnational aid agencies create opportunities 
for economic liberalization under the banner of neoliberalism.  The goal of neoliberalism 
has been two-fold.  The first is the construction and implementation of regulatory 
frameworks conducive to global capitalism. The second is designed to fracture national 
economies and reorient them towards a project of global integration. Therefore, I expect 
states to pursue neoliberal reforms immediately after a disaster event (Hypothesis 1).   
Disaster capitalism is argued here as a function of transnational processes in part 
caused by global financial integration and capital mobility.  In such a process, “national 
productive apparatuses become fragmented and integrated externally into new globalized 
circuits of accumulation” (Robinson 2003: 13).  However, not all productive apparatuses 
are equal and it would thus be erroneous to treat all capitalists as a unified interest group 
with transnational aspirations and associations.  It is thereby necessary to recognize 
sectoral-based differences between capitalists as well as the role played by prominent 
globalizing actors to include corporate executives, professionals, bureaucrats, and 
politicians; as well as integrating agents working through think tanks, business 
associations, NGOs and leading institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, NAFTA and 
USAID.  
The fundamental claims of this dissertation are that natural disasters are used to 
shift public policy towards a neoliberal alternative with little public support.  Secondly, 
these policies tend to disadvantage nationally-oriented businesses and, in turn, reflect the 
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preferences of an internationally-oriented faction of businesses.  The recognition that 
capitalists are a dominant policy actor, yet, not a uniform set of elites, is crucial to this 
project.  This is so because state policy is determined as a function of conflicting business 
interests (Gibbs 1991; Cox and Skidmore-Hess 1999).  As a consequence, the differences 
between the national and international orientation of businesses as well as the intensity of 
labor in relation to capital in the production process can be used to explain post-disaster 
state policy. 
Financial globalization ensures that increased capital mobility affects distinctive 
socioeconomic groups differently.  In addition, because increased financial integration 
affects the distributional outcome of national macroeconomic policies, these groups will 
organize along sectoral lines.  As financial assets become more mobile, this crucial 
component of economic activity will likewise favor mobile asset sectors.  For example, in 
the US, capital mobility will advantage capital-exporting sectors and transnationally-
oriented firms more so than it would domestic manufacturing firms, like agricultural or 
mining with predominantly fixed assets (Frieden 1991).    
On the recipient side of capital-exportation are capital-importing sectors in 
countries like Haiti and Honduras.  The capital-importing sectors will organize to take 
advantage of capital investment opportunities afforded by the crises-induced fracture of 
national economies in developed countries.  These sectors will align themselves with 
transnational allies both domestically and internationally and will ultimately lobby for 
increased capital liberalization policies.  Their success will be determined largely by the 
degree of labor subjugation, interest group cohesion, structured access, and institutional 
rigidity.  Of all these factors, the condition of crisis, caused by a natural disaster, is 
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postulated to positively impact policy success for neoliberal reformers. If the revamped 
crisis hypothesis holds and acute crises do provide a policymaking vacuum, it is likely to 
be filled by those commercial elites more firmly plugged into the global economy.  
This project will focus on these two types of capitalists.  The first group is 
nationally-oriented with fixed-capital asset.  The second is more embedded into global 
supply networks and rely on the increased financialization of capital.  The latter group 
can also be considered transnational capitalists. Advantaged by the free movement of 
capital across countries, this group is more likely to pursue and profit from post-disaster 
neoliberal policies.   That being the case, I would expect those actors benefiting from 
post-disaster economic reform to be the transnationally-oriented faction of capital most 
aligned with the preferences of international capital (Hypothesis 2).  
Disaster capitalism operates through this two-step phase of global capitalism.  The 
first is the hastily constructed neoliberal regime to follow a period of public 
disorientation.  The second is the consolidation and regimentation of political and 
economic transnationalism and the polarization of the working class worldwide.  Taken 
together, these hypotheses contend that neoliberal programs serve to orient national 
economies to the larger global economy, or, as what William Robinson (2003) would 
assert: neoliberalism is the policy “grease” of global capitalism.19  This new mode of 
capital accumulation has ultimately offset declining profits symptomatic of limited 
investment opportunities in the 1970s by forging networks of globally-oriented elites 
within and across borders. 
                                                      
19 Robinson, William. 2003. “Social Activism and Democracy in South Africa: A Globalization 
Perspective.” Ponencia al Congreso de IDASA, Cape Town. 
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Overview of Chapters 
In this project, I will present both cross-national case studies and large-n 
statistical analyses of natural disasters and policy trends across three decades of 
observations. Chapter 2 will be a wide empirical exploration of panel data to include a 
variety of variables, observed over a series of years for individual developing countries. 
Chapters 3 and 4 will be dedicated to deeper case studies involving Haiti and Honduras 
respectively, and the politics of global apparel assembly. In both countries, post-disaster 
reform policies were spearheaded by transnationally-oriented business elites, who, under 
the financial and ideological tutelage of USAID, worked to integrate their particular 
sectors of accumulation into the larger global economy.  Chapter 5 will conclude this 
dissertation with a discussion of results and avenues for possible future research.  
The substantive core of this project is the case study investigations.  These will 
provide a historical overview of the policymaking environment in each country, including 
detailed discussions on the important economic actors, their interactions with the state, 
civil society and the transnationalization of production processes - most notably that 
originating in the United States.  The United States is crucial to this investigation due the 
impact of its policies on capital-importing nations stemming from the political and 
economic affiliations with US-based transnational corporations and agencies. 
 
Conclusion 
 The dominant paradigms for explaining policymaking processes in developing 
countries have been based on society and state-led approaches.  However, by choosing 
two states with distinct dissimilarities in terms of executive autonomy, bureaucratic 
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cohesiveness, civil society and interest group development I allow for enough variation in 
explanatory variables.  If, under these varying social and institutional arrangements, we 
get similar post-disaster policy outcomes, disaster capitalism is afforded greater 
theoretical support through transnationalism.  
Finally, natural disasters are uniquely transformative events.  They can drastically 
transform physical terrain and the lives of those unfortunate enough to be caught in its 
wrath.  However, natural disasters also provide an opportunity to reflect on past failures 
and, at times, a clean slate to correct those shortcomings.  This project takes a political 
economic approach and recognizes natural disasters as occasions for agenda-setting on 
behalf of transnational commercial enterprises and market-oriented policy elites.  These 
reformers often use the post-disaster policy space to articulate long-term development 
strategies based on market fundamentalism, and, more importantly, advance a set of 
policies congruent to their particular interests.  This dissertation delves into that process 
and identifies the actors, their preferences and the policy outcomes. 
Using the business conflict model alongside changing transnational processes, this 
project identifies and traces post-disaster policy making in the Caribbean Basin. It also 
explores and provides a more nuanced explanation of its effect upon and within certain 
socioeconomic sectors and groups.  What becomes apparent is that natural disasters are 
opportunities to first fracture national economies and then integrate them into 
transnational processes of capital accumulation.  Given that economic viability is 
increasingly determined by assimilation into the global production processes, reformers 
in both developed and developing countries use disasters as occasions for re-orienting 
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national economies towards this end.  It is within this distorted integrative process that 
disaster capitalism is located.  
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CHAPTER 2: DISASTER CAPITALISM, A PANEL ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Do major disasters help explain neoliberal economic reforms? In recent years, 
developing countries have been particularly affected by natural disasters. According to 
the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the University of Louvain 
(Belgium) and their Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), between 1980 and 2010 
natural disasters in developing countries have accounted for roughly 2.3 million deaths, 
affected another 5.6 billion, and caused an estimated $667 billion in economic damages.20 
Over a similar 30 year period, developing countries have also been going through a 
consolidation of their political systems through contested transitions (Robinson 1996) and 
at the same time institutionalizing security and legal structures to disseminate the 
ideology of private property, free trade, and economic liberalization (Harvey 2005).  
This chapter aims to locate disasters within this process of global political-
economic restructuring and the re-articulation of class relations between capital and 
labor. To begin doing so, I empirically test the supposition of disaster capitalism, or the 
notion that major disasters provide a ‘blank slate’ on which to scribe upon the outlines of 
rapid economic transformation, which emphasizes neoliberal economic principles 
                                                      
20 EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be. In the EMDAT 
database “Killed” refers to persons confirmed as dead and persons missing and presumed dead. 
“Affected” signifies people requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency, i.e. 
requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, immediate medical 
assistance, and the appearance of a significant number of cases of an infectious disease 
introduced in a region or a population that is usually free from that disease. “Estimated Damage” 
refers to the economic impact of a disaster usually consists of direct (e.g. damage to 
infrastructure, crops, housing) and indirect (e.g. loss of revenues, unemployment, market 
destabilization) consequences on the local economy. Estimated damage is given in US$ (‘000) 
and for each disaster, the registered figure corresponds to the damage value at the moment of the 
event, i.e. the figures are shown true to the year of the event. 
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including: liberalization, deregulation, privatization and an overall diminished role of the 
state (Klein 2005 and 2007).  
Within the literature, it is recognized that disasters are a function of both 
locational happenstance and political-economic disposition (Wijkman and Timberlake 
1984). On the one hand, a lack (or abundance) of precipitation, low lying coastal areas, 
proximity to active tectonic plates or being in the path of hurricane belts21 all contribute 
to an increased risk of natural hazards (Kahn 2005: 280; Hewitt 1997). On the other hand, 
the magnitude of the geophysical, hydrological, or meteorological hazard does not 
necessarily co-vary with the subsequent disaster outcome. To that end, natural disasters 
are often determined by a series of actions (or inactions) taken by a state before, during 
and after an event (Olson 2000; Comfort et al. 1999). The pragmatic conclusion is that 
while geography matters, subtleties such as population density, quality of infrastructure, 
location and intensity of economic activity, and the capacity of preventative and aid 
intervention mechanisms additively affects societal vulnerabilities resulting from a 
natural hazard (Arnold et al. 2006). In this manner, natural disasters are as much a feature 
of social, political, and economic structures as they are of geographic endowments. 
One of the larger purposes of this project is to begin developing a political 
economy of natural disasters. In so doing, the subordination of a disaster’s geographic 
consideration must also reflect the subordination of space in the new global economy. 
Disasters are indeed locational; however, location matters less as processes of 
                                                      
21 Hurricanes are large-scale closed circulation systems unique to the western Atlantic and eastern 
Pacific characterized by a clockwise wind flow. Typhoons are similar storms for the western 
Pacific, and Cyclones are storms located above the Indian Ocean and South Pacific that rotate 
counter-clockwise. 
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accumulation are increasingly flexible worldwide. The increased mobility of capital 
across national borders has drastically altered the conception of ‘national economies’ 
while revealing the vulnerability of working class populations. 
Finally, we have known for some time that natural disasters can be politically 
transformative in terms of altering elite coalitions and affecting regime change (Drury 
and Olson 1998; Olson and Gawronski 2003). Yet, to this author’s knowledge, there have 
been no large sample, cross-national studies to test if the occurrences of natural disasters 
correlate with neoliberal reforms. This study aspires to become the first of its kind. Yet, 
its explanatory scope should be tempered by the observation that true explanatory models 
are immensely complex, saturated in history and maintains an infinitely dense network of 
causation and reverse causation (Coppedge 1999). The purpose of the research is thus 
relatively simple: to provide a working framework to begin generalizing these rather 
complex relationships.  
Given these ambitions, foundational steps must be taken to substantiate whether 
there is a discernible relationship between natural disasters and neoliberalism across both 
time and space. The following section will begin by recapitulating the theoretical 
foundations of disaster capitalism as well as surveying the existing literature. The third 
section introduces my empirical model. The statistical experiments are conducted and the 
results are discussed in the fourth section. The fifth section concludes this chapter. 
 
Disaster Capitalism: An Analytical Framework 
The inspiration for this project is what Naomi Klein (2007) calls disaster 
capitalism, or the free market orientation of post-catastrophe reform policy. Klein 
39 
contends that disasters – man-made or of the natural type – are used by governments to 
advance unpopular, liberal economic regimes. The disaster event or “shock”, a brief 
period of public disorientation, and power centralization combine to create a policy 
window of opportunity, while the unpopularity derives from an acceptance of austerity 
and a negation of economic populism.22  
The concept of “shock” is a re-occurring theme in Klein’s work. This is so 
because shock therapy – with its root in crude electric shock treatments for patients 
diagnosed with mental disorders – was co-opted into economic arguments that favored 
one fell swoop when reforming ‘sick’ economies.23 Klein identifies the Chicago School 
                                                      
22 This model does share some affinity with the basic tenets of the crisis hypothesis: (1) Reforms 
are designed by technocrats, who generally have a coherent strategy vis-`a-vis purely political 
figures; (2) during crises citizens are more open to new ideas and can be more accepting of 
reform; (3) dealing with the distributional fallout of reforms, compensation schemes must be 
crafted to soothe those most affected; (4) sequence and speed of reforms matter. Sequence matter 
for distributional conflict, while speed matters in terms of dealing with adjustment costs, rapid 
reform is desired (5) political autonomy matters as well as independence from judiciary etc. (6) 
external support from IFIs like the IMF and World Bank can help launch and sustain reform 
programs as well as provide technical support (7) coalitions matter and quick use of them while 
still intact is also advantageous (8) disorientation wears off quickly, reforms should be put in 
place before opposition regroups and meaningful reversals can take place (Edwards and Steiner 
2000). The above is the outline of the ‘crisis hypothesis’, yet, disaster capitalism operates under 
similar conditions to which you may want to add: (a) the displacement and disorientation of 
affected populations, (b) the prompt centralization of decision-making power: often via a state of 
emergency, (c) a call for immediate international aid and an appeal for long-term assistance from 
international financial institutions (IFIs), and (d) the relaxation or repeal of particular socio-
economic regulations and the legislation of others (Klein 2005 and 2007). 
 
23 In her 2007 book, Klein compares covert electroshock experiments carried out by C.I.A 
operatives in the 1950s to the ‘shock therapy’ of economic reform being formulated at the 
Chicago School of Economics by Milton Friedman. The application of electrodes to stubborn 
patients to help facilitate ‘reprogramming’ could also be applied to Keynesian economies in need 
of rapid market liberalization. Both methods found harmony in Chile (and Latin America in 
general under the codename: ‘Operation Condor’) during the repressive regime of Augusto 
Pinochet. To view the declassified documents see: CIA, KUBARK Counterintelligence 
Interrogation, July 1963. http://www.gwu.edu/˜nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/index. 
htm#kubark 
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of neoliberal economics and its iconic figure Milton Friedman as important vehicles in 
helping disseminate this ideology. It was, after all, Friedman’s own belief that ‘[i]f a 
government activity is to be privatized or eliminated, by all means do so completely.’ 
Compromising by partial privatization or partial reductions would only enable those most 
negatively affected by the reforms to eventually succeed in forcing reversals (Friedman 
1990: 11-14). As opposed to gradualism, or piecemeal reforms, shock therapy suggested 
rapid and radical transformations of economic policies (Friedman 1990; Popov 2000). 
Rigorously employed in the former Soviet Republics, the logic of shock therapy was to 
use the disarray inherent to regime change to advance economic reorganization (Haynes 
and Husan 2002; Major 1991; Papava 1996).24 The honeymoon period afforded to 
transitional regimes made the bitter medicine of austerity more palatable and easier to 
embed into the narrative of struggle and self-determination (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 
152). This study pays particular attention to natural disasters, and argues that the shocks 
produced by these catastrophic events are instrumentally used to advance neoliberal 
reforms and transnational corporate interests.25  
                                                      
24 Other examples of crises include the neoliberal regimes that occurred during the military 
regimes in Chile and Argentina. The process of democratization in Poland, Russia, and South 
Africa created opportunities for radical reformers to institute and consolidate liberal economic 
policies. The 2003 Iraq war is used as an example of creating a blank slate for the ‘disaster-
industrial complex’. Finally, the Asian financial collapse of the late 1990s allowed private 
multinationals in-roads into that region’s previously state-dominated financial system. 
 
25 Klein uses shock, disaster and crises as interchangeable concepts with little distinction. For the 
purpose of this study, conceptually, a disaster is defined as the sudden (or progressive) natural 
event and crises as the consequence of some form of human interaction (before or after the 
event). Beyond this discussion, I too largely use shocks and disasters as interchangeable concepts. 
For a more detailed discussion about the subtleties between the two see Faulkner (2001: 136-
138). 
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While the breadth of scholarly attempts to investigate the polemics of disaster 
capitalism is rather small (Gunewardena and Schuller 2008; Schuller and Morales 2012), 
the depth of this literature does offer substantial support to the notion that natural 
disasters can create unique economic opportunities for transnational businesses, 
international aid agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs) (Schuller 2012). It 
has also informed our framing of disasters by highlighting the increased role of private 
actors in disaster response activities, the windows of opportunity afforded to 
policymakers, and the adoption of neoliberal programs based on privatization, trade 
liberalization, and deregulation (Schuller 2008: 17 – 27).  
 
Disaster Capitalism in Action 
Consider, for example, the middle-class residents of Tlatelolco housing 
complexes following the 1985 Mexico City earthquake. Initial disagreement between 
Tlatelolco residents and the Mexican government arose regarding plans to relocate 
residents to another area of the city. However, more egregious for the residents was the 
government beginning the process of privatizing the apartments, subjecting the public 
housing to the norms of the housing market. Among other things, the change of property 
rights would void a prior agreement that made maintenance and upkeep largely the 
responsibility of government agencies (Walker 2009: 194-209). 
 In another example, after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the Sri 
Lankan government activated its ‘buffer zone’ policy of resettlement. This policy was 
predicated on permanently moving affected populations (local fishing villages) further 
inland and away from the coastlines. This decision aligned with the government’s coastal 
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development strategy and the preferences of multinational hotel developers 
(Gunewardena 2008; Shaw et al. 2010: 20-22).26 In more recent times, the mere 
evocation of landslide risks in Kadifekale, Turkey was used to justify the removal of low-
income, migrant settlements in favor of recreational zones and urban transformation 
projects (Saraçoğlu and Demirtaş-Milz 2014).27  
The core of this conceptualization is reliant upon the observation that countries or 
municipalities where strong public pressure stalls any meaningful attempt at deep 
economic liberalization or deregulation, post-disaster confusion provides a window of 
opportunity for state agents and corporations to exploit new markets. Below I begin 
specifying the empirical model. 
 
 
 
                                                      
26 Tourism, for example, is integral to what William Robinson (2001) considers the new 
transnational service sector. With the potential to link quaint developing countries to the global 
economy, recent bouts of liberalization, as well as pacification and integration has encouraged 
post-disaster, tourism-led development strategies (Robinson and Jarvie 2008; Faulkner 2001; 
Murphy and Bayley 1989). 
 
27 This is the case for Kurdish migrants who made up the majority of the town of Kadifekale in 
Izmir, Turkey. Designated a landslide zone “The plan, in simple terms, involved the demolition of 
houses in Kadifekale and the deportation of migrants in this area to the newly built high-rise 
apartments in Uzundere...The deal was that the Izmir Metropolitan Municipality would buy the 
apartments built in Uzundere and then sell them to those people whose dwellings were in the 
landslide zone and earmarked for demolition. The property owners in Kadifekale would receive a 
sum of money from the municipality as compensation for the expropriation and demolition of 
their houses for an amount depending on the ‘value’ of the building. This value was determined 
by a group of specialists composed of architects and engineers who examined the houses to be 
demolished. The designated amount typically was a lot lower than the price of apartments built in 
Uzundere. Consequently, if the property owner agreed to buy an apartment in Uzundere, he/she 
would have to pay the remaining sum to the municipality in installments to be deposited monthly 
over a number of years. If the property owner did not agree to buy an apartment in Uzundere, 
he/she would be paid the designated amount in cash.” (181-2). 
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Research Design 
A total of 30 Latin American and Caribbean countries are observed on a yearly 
basis between 1995 and 2012, making for a total of 540 possible observations. The data is 
unbalanced with a time-invariant variable (country), a unit of time (year), and a set of 
time-varying outcomes (reform, crises [natural and macroeconomic], institutional and 
structural constraints). 
 
Dependent Variable 
Neoliberal Reform. The Index of Economic Freedom (Index), an annual joint publication 
by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation, will provide the core 
operationalization of neoliberal policy reform. Compiled from a composite of various 
governmental and private sector sources, the Index provides one of the more 
comprehensive troves of time-series, country-level data on economic disposition. The 
Index covers four main components of economic freedom including rule of law, 
government size, regulatory efficiency and open markets. Composed of ten specific 
measures of economic freedom, the Index assigns a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 
100, where 100 represents maximum freedoms. The 10 economic freedoms are grouped 
into four broad categories or pillars of economic freedom: Rule of Law (property rights, 
freedom from corruption); Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending); 
Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom); and Open 
Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). Each of the freedoms 
within these four broad categories is individually scored on a scale of 0 to 100. A 
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country’s overall economic freedom score is a simple average of its scores on the 10 
individual freedoms.28 This overall freedom score will be my main dependent variable. 
 
Figure 1 explores some of the patterns of neoliberalism over the last two decades. 
Looking at some of the data patterns, it appears that measures of neoliberalism have 
significantly decreased in countries like Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela, with 
moderate decreases in Ecuador and Panama. In terms of significant increases, Suriname 
stands out, with more moderate increases in places like Chile and Haiti. Countries like 
Belize and Costa Rica have been relatively stable. The discontinued line graphs in 
                                                      
28 http://www.heritage.org/index/about 
45 
Dominica, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines reflects missing time-series 
data.  
Heterogeneity in the dependent variable is examined via Figures 2 and 3. Both 
display the variation of neoliberal scores across countries as well as years. Using this 
graph, one can identify an outlier country such as Cuba (Figure 2), as well as note that 
neoliberal scores are generally stable over time (Figure 3). 
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Independent Variable 
Disasters. The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) at the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters  compiles data on the incidence and corollary of over 16,000 
global disasters from 1900 to present. The EM-DAT loosely defines a disaster as a 
circumstances or incident that overwhelm local capabilities, resulting in an appeal to 
national or international assistance. Particularly, these events are characterized by loss of 
human lives, extensive damage to property and population displacement. The causes of 
these disasters are: geophysical (earthquake), meteorological (storm), or hydrological 
(flood).29 Specifically, EM-DAT defines a disaster as a unique event that has had ten or 
                                                      
29 Cases that are identified as resulting from drought will be excluded from the sample because, 
while they do classify as disasters and arguably have a meaningful impact on subsequent macro-
economic policy, they fail to capture the abrupt change in conditions that is prevalent in the 
disaster capitalism theory and germane to the aforementioned categories. Additionally, biological 
disasters, or those related to exposure to germs and other living organism, will also be excluded 
from case selection. I am purposely avoiding widening my scope of study to include emergency 
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more people killed, one hundred or more people reported injured or displaced, a 
declaration of a state of emergency, or a call for international assistance. Figure 4 
graphically expresses these disaster events. There are no distinct patterns, save Mexico’s, 
Brazil’s and Colombia’s relatively greater frequency of natural disasters. 
 
I approach this base conceptualization with some amount of apprehension due to 
the relatively minimal standards that EM-DAT attaches to classifying disasters, and the 
                                                                                                                                                              
situations caused by wars, insurgent activities and other conflict induced disasters. The immediate 
focus of this research will treat only the occurrence of natural disasters as an explanatory variable 
for the occurrence of neoliberal economic reforms. Therefore, disasters will be limited to: 
earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, blizzards, flood, and volcanic eruptions. 
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self-reporting aspect of data collection.30 To help correct these potential shortcomings 
and following the prompting of Quarantelli (2000) and Neumayer and Plümper (2007), I 
will operationalize my disaster variable according to relative losses, as opposed to 
absolute estimations the raw EM-DAT data would assume. That is to say, instead of 
looking at total estimates of casualties, a better proxy for scale of crisis would be to treat 
these measures as a ratio of the total population. Using the per capita ratio for affected 
populations will parse out the relative impact of disaster events. The disaster variable will 
thus be measured as natural disaster related casualties per capita.31 
                                                      
30 EM-DATs input derives from reporting done by UN agencies, the International Federation of 
Red Cross and self-reporting by affected governments. In this case, the longitudinal study may 
suffer from the infancy of the collection process and a more systematic problem of under- and 
over-reporting. In other cases, like Haiti, casualty figures may have been exaggerated. There is 
evidence to suggest that USAID may have suppressed findings that estimated casualty rates were 
well below the government’s initial estimations of 316,000. In a unpublished report on behalf of 
USAID, Timothy T Schwartz et al., (2011) suggests total casualties fell between 46,190 and 
84,961. To see the various arguments including an alternative estimated casualty total of 158,679 
please see: Kolbe, Athena R., Royce A. Hutson, Harry Shannon, Eileen Trzcinski, Bart Miles, 
Naomi Levitz, Marie Puccio, Leah James, Jean Roger Noel and Robert Muggah. 2010. 
“Mortality, Crime and Access to Basic Needs Before and after Haiti Earthquake: A Random 
Survey of Port-au-Prince Households.” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 26 (4): 281- 297. For 
additional commentary as to why inflating casualty rates where a boon to contract and donor 
based NGOs see:. Reiff, David. 2011. “Grave Inflation: A new report in the Haiti earthquake 
reminds again that, for aid groups, more casualties means more funding.” Foreign Policy June 9.; 
Peralta, Eyder. 2011. “Report: Death Toll of Haiti Earthquake Much Lower Than Government 
Said.” National Public Radio (NPR) March 31. 
 
31 Affected populations or economic damage as a ratio of total population and gross domestic 
product, respectively, can also theoretically be used to measure disasters. For example, Haiti’s 
2010 earthquake resulted in an estimated $8 billion in total damages. A little over a month later, 
in Chile, an earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused an approximate $30 billion worth of 
economic damages. In absolute terms, Chile’s economic loses were almost four times the amount 
of Haiti’s. However, the story is better told if we consider the relative impact of damages. Haiti’s 
2010 GDP of $6.6 billion means that the earthquake damages accounted for roughly 120% of the 
countries entire income. While Chile’s 2010 GDP of approximately $217 billion, meant the 
earthquake and tsunami had an economic impact of an estimated 14% of total income. That being 
said, these estimates are widely inconsistent in EM-DAT. Preliminary tests showed moderate 
covariation between all three measures (per capita ratio for casualties, affected populations and 
damages as a percentage of GDP). See Table 4 in the Appendix section. 
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Control Variables 
Why do countries pursue reform policies? This is an important question because I 
intend to evaluate the occurrence of natural disasters alongside established and competing 
explanations of policy change. It is thereby practical to construct my multivariate model 
by first assessing the existing scholarship that posit explanations for policy reform.  To 
that end, the body of literature dedicated to answering the aforementioned question is vast 
and cuts across several fields of inquiry. For example, political economists have, to 
varying degrees, identified hyper-inflation, balance of payments, foreign debt and other 
indicators of monetary and fiscal crises as determinants of neoliberal economic reforms 
(Williamson 1994; Tommasi and Velasco 1996; Rodrik 1996; Drazen and Easterly 2001). 
However, identifying a set of macroeconomic variables conducive to reform does little to 
flesh out the causal mechanism of policy change. This is because the policymaking 
process takes place within a highly contested and immensely complex arena (Nelson 
1990).  
To that end, institutional explanations have made strides in identifying key actors, 
their preferences, as well as normative constraints. Mapping this game of veto players 
and political survival within cooperative rule-making and enforcement structures have 
enabled researchers to explain and predict a number of policy outcomes (Nordhaus 1974; 
Hibbs 1977; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Schnuknecht 2000; 
Vergne 2009). Not to be discounted, there is also a belief that national policymaking is 
increasingly trivialized. More precisely, state policymaking autonomy is weakened as a 
result of economic globalization, the pervasiveness of international institutions and the 
organization of states according to the rationale of global production processes (Robinson 
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1996; Ross and Trachte 2000). Considering these various explanations, I conceptualize 
and operationalize a series of macroeconomic, institutional and international variables. 
 
Macroeconomic 
Debt. External Debt is often used to investigate the crisis hypothesis. Under conditions of 
sustained growth, private sector interests and politicians alike often stand pat and opt for 
the status quo. However, as the work of Przeworski and Limongi (1997) suggest, as little 
as one year of economic crisis is enough to produce significant political effects in terms 
of regime survival (168-9). With soaring national debt, status quo coalitions begin to 
unravel and agents of macroeconomic change become empowered. Increased external 
debt burdens should increase the likelihood of neoliberal economic reforms. However, as 
noted above, it is conceivable that during periods of acute crisis, the debt burdens may 
quantitatively increase to help cope with immediate post-disaster management and 
reconstruction. Total external debt is measured as the sum of public, publicly guaranteed 
long-term debt, private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term 
debt (or all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on 
long-term debt). This data was acquired from the World Development Indicators and 
Global Development Finance (2013). 
Inflation. Price instability and inflation gives caution to commercial activity and foreign 
investments due to uncertainty over prices and asset values. The result is often an erosion 
of real wages, reduction of economic activities and a crisis of capital accumulation. 
Countries with high rates of inflation are more likely to adopt capital liberalizations to 
combat expansionary fiscal policies and budget deficits. Yet, to combat inflation, 
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governments are encouraged to make cuts in public spending. The empirical evidence is 
somewhat muddled regarding the relationship between economic reform and high 
inflation. While inflation should lead to market corrective policies, inflation is only 
injurious if it reaches some critical juncture. For example, Drazen and Easterly (2001) 
point out that ‘measuring, “reform” by subsequent inflation performance, high-inflation 
countries are more likely to undertake stabilization than moderate-inflation countries. 
That is, the correlation between inflation today and inflation tomorrow is not 
monotonically positive, but turns negative for high inflation’ (135 – 136). With the 
critical juncture being between 150 - 200 percent per year, reform should be initiated at 
extremely high levels of inflation. The only country to approach this range was Suriname 
in 1995, when the inflation soared to 236 percent. Not surprisingly, the following year 
they had an inflation rate of -1 percent. In 1999, Suriname’s inflation again crept to 99 
percent, only to have it decrease to 59 percent in 2000. The only other country to 
approach what Drazen and Easterly (2001) may call an inflationary crises was Ecuador in 
2000. In that year, the inflation rate ballooned to 96 percent. It was reduced to 37 percent 
in 2001. Therefore, low and medium rates of inflation is expected to be negatively 
correlated with neoliberal reforms. Inflation will be measured by using the log of the 
consumer price index (CPI), which reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to 
the average consumer acquiring a basket of goods and services. This data is acquired 
from the World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (2013).32 
                                                      
32 It is also important to consider logging the inflation values due to meaningful difference 
between the smallest and largest values. In our case an inflation rate of 236 may upwardly bias 
the results. Additionally, a 10 point inflation increase from 2 to 12 percent has much more of an 
impact than a ten point increase from 226 to 236 percent. I used both the baseline and the logged 
variable. It had minimal impact on the estimates. Reported herein are the logged estimates. 
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Institutional 
Regime. Regime type matters in the ability to initiate and consolidate reform programs 
(Skidmore 1977). The direction, however, is not empirically established (Oneal 1998). In 
terms of developing countries, on one end of the regime type spectrum are those who 
claim that democratic regimes are more consistent with trade and capital liberalization 
(Milner and Kubota 2005). The opposing position sees authoritarian leadership, and their 
ability to co-opt, curtail or suppress popular interest group demands as a pre-requisite for 
economic liberalization (O’donnell’s 1973 & 1978; Wade 1990 & 1993). To help sort 
through these divergent theoretical claims I will resort to using the Polity IV measures of 
regime types. The polity scores are an amalgamation of ‘six component measures that 
record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and 
political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of 
governing authority’.33 
Honeymoon. Political business cycle may determine the timing of expansionary and 
stabilization programs. The condition of economic crisis interacts with self-interested 
politicians to create windows of opportunity for economic reform. As opposed to the 
current disaster theory, these reform windows tend to close and open in and around 
electoral cycles. The instinctual logic states that regimes approaching an election are 
more likely to pursue popular expansionary policies. However, following the election, 
policymakers are granted a honeymoon period of sorts, which allows them to pursue 
necessary stabilization programs (Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Ludger 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
33 Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr. (2013) ‘Polity IV Project: Dataset 
Users’ Manual’. Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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Schuknecht 2000). For the purpose of this study, I will embrace the political business 
cycle model, speculating that neoliberal economic reform is more likely to occur soon 
after a new government comes to power. The earlier these reforms are carried out, the 
easier it becomes to blame the outgoing government (whether real or aggrandized) for the 
economic ills (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). This honeymoon period, thus, clears the 
way for the advancement of sweeping reforms and rationalizes any immediate austere 
consequences that may be associated with it. Therefore, the longer an executive has been 
in office, the less likely they are to pursue neoliberal policy reforms. In testing this 
relationship, I use Beck et al’s. (2001) measure regarding the years an executive has years 
left in the current term. Thereby, a “0” is scored in an election year, and n-1 in the year 
after an election, with n = length of term. 
Divided Government. The concept of divided government is a little more straightforward. 
Contentious economic reform policy (like any reform policy) is easier to carry out if the 
legislature is also allied with the executive party (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). We are to 
expect more resistance if the legislature and executive are divided. Consequently, if the 
executive’s party has command of all significant houses of government, neoliberal 
reforms will be easier to advance through the legislature. This variable will be measured 
dichotomously for a given year (1 = executive’s party controls the legislature, 0 = divided 
government) (Beck et al., 2001). 
 
International 
IMF. As a lender of last resort, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has routinely 
made loans to countries struggling with balance of payments problems. As a condition for 
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their financial assistance, the IMF encourages recipient countries to embark upon 
corrective structural reforms that will enable not only immediate relief but also sustain 
long-term economic growth. Therefore, countries that have borrowed funds from the IMF 
are more likely to reduce government spending and commit to capital and trade 
liberalization. IMF data was gathered from the World Bank, international debt statistics.34 
Use of IMF credit will be measured as a percentage of GDP. Table 1 provides some basic 
descriptive statistics and summarizes my variables. 
 
 
 
                                                      
34 Use of IMF credit denotes members’ drawings on the IMF other than amounts drawn against 
the country’s reserve tranche position. Use of IMF credit includes purchases and drawings under 
Stand-By, Extended, Structural Adjustment, Enhanced Structural Adjustment, and Systemic 
Transformation Facility Arrangements as well as Trust Fund loans. SDR allocations are also 
included in this category. Note: Data related to the operations of the IMF are provided by the IMF 
Treasurer’s Department. They are converted from special drawing rights into dollars using end-
of-period exchange rates for stocks and average-over-the-period exchange rates for flows. Data 
are in current U.S. dollars. World Bank, International Debt Statistics. Catalog Sources: World 
Development Indicators 
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Empirical Model 
Panel or longitudinal data is a form of time series and cross-sectional data that 
contains measurements on the same entities over several periods.35 Benefits of panel data 
over time-series or cross-sectional data sets include larger number of data points, 
increased degrees of freedom, reduced collinearity among independent variables, and 
sequential observation of data. By following countries over time as they change domestic 
institution and macroeconomic positions one can more accurately model a recursive 
structure to examine adjustment (Hsiao 2003). Given the panel shape of the data, the 
current model is specified from the basic linear presentation: 
Yit = α + βiXit + μit  i = 1;…,N; t = 1,…, T    (1) 
where double subscripts on the variables X represent both the time-series and cross-
section component of panel data. The individual country is represented by i, whereas t 
denotes the time variant, in this case – year. Consequently, X is the country-year 
observation on a set of K (macroeconomic, institutional, and international) explanatory 
variables. α is the constant and β is K x 1. The error term is understood as: 
μit = ui + vit    (2) 
where ui represents the unobservable country-specific effects, while vit represents the 
usual disturbances in a regression. Using panel data allows for the control of exogenous 
shocks through the time effect and omitted variable bias through the country effect. The 
full empirical model is specified as follows: 
 
                                                      
35 The terms longitudinal and panel are used interchangeably and represent an extended 
application of ‘panel data’, which has historically connoted the repeated survey of individuals 
over time (Frees 2004: 2). 
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Neoliberal Reformt = α + β1Disastert-1 + β2Debtt-1 + β3Inflation t-1 + β4Regime t-1 + 
                               β5Honeymoon t-1  + β6Divided Government t-1  + β7IMF t-1  + μit   (3) 
The lagged independent variables (t-1) implies the amount of time it takes independent 
variables to affect perceptions of neoliberalism. Though we should be cautious about 
assuming uniform lags across countries, this is reasonable considering the theory posits 
rapid liberalization within a window of opportunity. Ultimately, causality is easier to 
interpret because lagged independent variables means that changes in year t-1 shows its 
effect on the dependent variable at time t. 
 
Results 
I will begin by discussing the parameter estimates of a variety of basic models 
displayed in Table 2. The first column (1) represents pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
without fixed or random effects. The main assumption here is that there is no difference 
in intercepts and slopes across countries and time periods. In this model, the 
interpretations are pretty straightforward. The constant suggests that if all other variables 
(disasters, debt, inflation, regime type, divided government, honeymoon period, and IMF 
obligations) are set to zero, each country is expected to have a neoliberal score of 5.1. 
While the primary independent variable has a positive relationship with neoliberal 
reforms, the relationship does not approach statistical significance. The independent 
variables that do have a significant relationship with neoliberal reforms are inflation, 
regime type and IMF indebtedness. Holding all other variables constant, whenever a 
country’s inflation increases by one unit, the total neoliberal score is expected to decrease 
by .205 units. Similarly, all things being equal, democracies are more likely to pursue 
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neoliberal policies. Finally, IMF indebtedness makes it less likely for countries to partake 
in neoliberal reforms. This model moderately fits the data, with the adjusted R2 
suggesting that 39.5% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by variation 
in the independent variables. However, each country may have initial neoliberal scores 
(y-intercept) that vary significantly between countries, as well as error terms that vary 
across country and/or year. The pooled OLS is not ideal because it does not capture any 
unobserved heterogeneity between countries and across time. Models (2) (3) and (4) 
begin to account for these assumptions.  
Model (2) represents the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model. In theory, 
by adding a dummy variable for each country I am controlling for any fixed effects 
associated with individual countries. Another way to look at this is that the effect of the 
independent variables Xn can then be considered ‘pure’ and unaffected by any potential 
unobserved heterogeneity. The effect of any particular country is absorbed by its 
respective dummy variable. Model (3) is also a country-specific fixed effects model. This 
model achieves the same results as model (2), save for slight variations in the constant 
term and F-statistic. This model estimates within group estimators without creating an 
unwieldy amount of dummy variables. Model (4) is a random effects estimation. While 
the fixed effects models of (2) and (3) control for all time-invariant differences between 
countries, it cannot be used to examine time-invariant causes of the dependent variable. 
When considering country-specific effects in model (2), natural disasters become 
statistically significant showing a direct relationship. Debt also becomes significant in the 
fixed effects models (2 & 3) implying that country’s in arrears are more likely to pursue 
neoliberal reform policies.  
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The fixed effects approach assumes that unobserved variables are time invariant. 
Therefore, any changes in the dependent variable over time are due to similar varying 
predictor variables and not the fixed ones. A random effect supposes that variations 
across countries are uncorrelated with included explanatory variables and is random. 
Simply put, variables that do not change over time cannot cause change over time. It is 
constant for each country. For example, the coefficient on regime type approaches 
significance in the random effects model (3), partially because in many cases, regime 
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type does not vary across countries. In examining the data, it becomes evident that in 
several cases this theoretical variable does not indeed vary substantially across time. For 
example, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Suriname and 
Uruguay, all maintained a consistent polity score between 1995 and 2012 (within 
variation = 0). While others, such as Argentina ( = 7.78, s = .42), Dominican Republic 
( = 7.83, s = .71), El Salvador ( = 7.22, s = .43), Honduras ( = 6.78, s = .43), 
Nicaragua ( = 8.3, s = .49), and Trinidad and Tobago ( = 9.89, s = .32) all experienced 
minor change, suggesting that the regimes have been more or less stable across the time 
dimension. One benefit of utilizing the random effects model is gaining the ability to 
include these time-invariant variables.  
Given that simple pooled OLS (model 1) are likely to produce biased coefficient 
estimates, which model is better? Fixed (model 2 & 3) or random (model 4)? The 
Hausman specification test determines if country specific effects are uncorrelated with 
other explanatory variables. If correlated, the random effects model is no longer the Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimate (BLUE). After conducting the Hausman test, the χ2 was 132.92 
(p > χ2= .0000), leading me to reject the null and conclude that a fixed effects model does 
not violate the Gauss-Markov assumption. It is consistent and produces non-biased 
estimations. Table 3 represents the two-way (both country and year) fixed effects models 
after a series of post-estimation diagnostics to ensure more robust findings.  
Some of these post-estimation diagnostics included a Modified Wald test for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity. After concluding heteroskedasticity (p > χ2= .0000), all 
model estimations included the ‘robust’ option to control for violation of the assumption 
of constant variance in the error term. I also include time effects in the final estimation 
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due to a rejection of the null that all years (dummies) coefficients are jointly equal to zero 
(F = 2.37; p >F = .0025). The final model is a two-way model including a set of both 
country and year dummy variables. Model (1) is a basic bivariate regression. Model (2) 
includes only the macroeconomic variables. Model (3) adds the institutional variables. 
The final full model (4) contains the international variable. Estimations includes only 
complete cases and data losses are evidenced by the decreasing number of observations 
as we go from bivariate (471) to full multivariate (301) model.  
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Across all models the disaster variable shows a positive and significant 
association with neoliberalism. The bivariate results suggest that for a given country, a 
unit increase in disasters (operationalized as casualties per capita) is expected to result in 
an increase of a country’s neoliberal score. This relationship is statistically significant 
and consistent across all models. These results suggest that the theory is consistent with 
the view that neoliberal reforms are more likely after a natural disaster. Of most 
importance is the observation that it is reliably significant when juxtaposed against 
established explanations of policy change. 
For the macroeconomic variables associated with the crises hypothesis, a 
country’s external Debt does not show a significant relationship. However, the coefficient 
for Inflation is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that as inflation increases, 
countries are less likely to pursue economic liberalization. Rajapatirana et al. (1997) 
points out that there is no standard reaction to economic crises. In truth, some countries 
may respond to crises by further embedding themselves in inflationary policies, thereby 
having high inflation does not necessarily signal a crises (Drazen and Easterly 2001; 
Edwards 2000). Also, it may be instructive to test for interactions with disasters and 
macroeconomic crises (inflation and debt). The assumption here is that countries 
experiencing a macroeconomic crisis are also more likely to use disasters as an 
opportunity to reform the economy. Preliminary test for these, not reported here, are 
inconclusive. Disasters remained significant when interacted with debt, but lost 
significance when interacted with inflation. The institutional variables are not statistically 
significant as theoretically expected. That outcome may have an analytical explanation. 
Because these variables are shown not to vary much across countries or time, using both 
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country and year dummies may have attenuated their influence. For example, the Regime 
variable responds to the removal of country and year dummies and is positive and 
statistically significant across estimations. Neither the Divided Government nor the 
Honeymoon variable were statistical significance.  
Of ultimate importance, however, is the direct relationship between natural 
disasters and neoliberal reforms. It is theorized that institutional dynamics, 
macroeconomic disposition and the overarching international environment all serve to 
determine the course, range and vigor of policy reforms.   The relationship between 
natural disasters and neoliberal reform cuts across all competing explanations, giving 
natural disasters noteworthy explanatory leverage.  
 
Conclusion 
This analysis finds some interesting results, particularly a cautious affirmation of 
disaster capitalism. By looking at 30 countries for a span of 18 years, the data does 
indeed show a positive and significant relationship between natural disasters and 
neoliberal reforms. This relationship is consistent across all models and competing 
explanations. Moreover, the observation that natural disaster remains significant while 
established explanations are either inconsistent of nonexistent, leaves more support for 
disasters and the following analysis of transnational coalitions as driving forces behind 
reform policies. These generalized findings are an important step in determining that a 
natural disaster does correlate with an increased propensity to adopt neoliberal policies. 
There is more to be said, however, about just how policies are formulated and to whom 
the spoils accrue. An examination of trade policies enacted in response to a series of 
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disasters reveals the continued shift of power from the traditional textile protectionist 
bloc to more globally-oriented apparel producers. The remainder of this dissertation 
traces these conflictual business interests within the context of global supply chains, 
transnational capitalism, and enduring US national economic interests.  
Chapter 3 will be an examination of US trade policy following the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti. Chapter 4 will delve into Hurricane Mitch and its effects on regional 
trade policy affecting the Caribbean Basin and Honduras in particular. A key point of 
emphasis for both chapters is the role nationally-oriented transnational alliances played in 
securing trade exemptions that secured both countries in apparel production networks 
managed by US lead firms. The natural disaster represented an opportunity for a new 
coalition of transnationals tied to global network of apparel production to affect these 
laws in favor of their specific interests. Ultimately, both the 2010 Haitian earthquake and 
the 1998 Hurricane Mitch represented a redefinition of the countries’, and to a larger 
extent the regions, role in the apparel commodity chain; a role within a global network 
largely defined by low-wage, sweatshop production. 
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CHAPTER 3: HAITI, FROM HOPE TO HELP 
 
The Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti that we 
are presenting to our partners in the international community indicates the 
requirements to be fulfilled so that the earthquake, devastating as it was, 
turns into a window of opportunity so that, in the Head of State’s words, 
the country can be reconstructed. This is a rendezvous with history that 
Haiti cannot miss.  
 
– Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti 
Government of Haiti 
March 2010 
 
I remember somebody saying a crisis is a terrible thing to waste. It is true, 
the opportunity has been thrust upon us. 
 
– Georges Sassine 
Textile businessman with multiple executive posts: 
SONAPI, ADIH, GB Group, and CTMO-HOPE. 
March 2010 
 
[t]o launch reconstruction projects designed to rebuild the nation in the 
aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, the Government of Haiti (GoH) should 
consider embarking upon legal/regulatory/institutional reforms designed to 
improve the nation’s overall business environment. The most effective 
policy tool for the short and medium terms to carry out the needed reforms 
is the establishment of a national Integrated Economic Zones (IEZ) 
regime. 
 
– Integrated Economic Zones in Haiti 
International Finance Corporation 
December 2011 
 
 
Introduction 
 
With 80% of the population living in poverty, over 50% living in abject poverty, 
and rural migration adding to the hordes of unemployed already in cramped urban spaces, 
catastrophe and crisis inevitably met in the streets of the Haitian capital. The catastrophe 
was a familiar one, political instability and violence had brought about yet another 
foreign occupation; this time by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
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(MINUSTAH). The crisis—often dovetailing with Haiti’s history of political instability—
was a reaction to a global increase in agricultural commodity prices and the country’s 
own experience with neoliberal interventions. By the Spring of 2008, with the unease 
over the current political situation growing and the drastic price increase in staple 
products now being felt by consumers, UN Peacekeepers and discontented Haitians 
violently clashed in the city streets. When the whirring of stones and rubber bullets 
subsided and the tear gas and soot from burnt out cars dissipated, Haitians began to once 
again remove the rubble and pick up the pieces of a fractured society.36 
About 20 months later, on January 12, 2010 a 7.3 magnitude earthquake shook the 
cities of Léogâne, Carrefour, Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, Petit-Goâve and other surrounding 
towns. In about 35 seconds, a series of concentrated tremors reduced much of the 
political37 and economic core of Haiti to rubble. However, this was a different type of 
rubble. Not the type Haitians have come accustomed to digging out of since its 
independence. Not the figurative rubble, this was rather the actual accumulation of 
crumbled concrete, wood, drywall and glass. This meant that before Haiti could be 
reconstructed and put on the path to sustained economic development, her ‘rendezvous 
with history’ had to begin with first removing the debris that chocked the very streets 
where security forces and restless Haitians clashed just months earlier. Removing 
                                                      
36 Delva, Joseph Guyler and Jim Loney. (2008) ‘Haiti’s government falls after food riots’, 
Rueters, 12 April. These riots were also called the ‘Clorox food riots’ because many described the 
hunger pains as having the burning sensation one would get from consuming bleach. 
 
37 Lacey, Marc. (2010) ‘Haiti’s Icon of Power, Now Palace for Ghosts’, The New York Times, 22 
January. 
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between 25 and 78 million cubic yards38 of crumbled building materials seemed an 
arduous task for the ill-equipped island-nation. As it has so often been in the past, 
international actors would play a significant role in Haiti’s convalescence. 
South Florida-based AshBritt Inc., which specializes in debris removal, disposal 
and emergency cleanup following natural and man-made disasters, was one of the first 
companies to secure $20 million rubble removal contracts from the Haitian government 
and their international partners.39 A favorite of both the US federal government and the 
Army Corps of Engineers, AshBritt has been able to secure over $1 billion of no-bid and 
limited-competition contracts for debris removal projects following Hurricane Katrina 
(Louisiana and Mississippi) and Sandy (New Jersey). However, not soon after securing 
their cleanup contract from the Haitian government, AshBritt and GB Group (a 
diversified group of industrial and trading companies), were being sued by the former 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Unified Relief and Response 
Coordinator Lewis Lucke for breach of contract. In recent years, AshBritt has become 
quite familiar with these types of litigious actions. The company has been caught up in 
several lawsuits, mostly filed by oft-used subcontractors who claim the company has 
failed to pay for completed work.40 The company has also had to contend with 
                                                      
38 This reflects the estimated amount of rubble varying widely among several sources. 
 
39 Figures show that reconstruction contracts have overwhelmingly gone to US based firms. 
Particularly Beltway contractors (from DC, Maryland and Virginia) who in 2010 had received 
39.4 percent of the nearly $200 million in contracts, compared to 2.5% going to Haitian 
contractors. ‘Haitian Companies Still Sidelined from Reconstruction Contracts’, Center for 
Economic and Policy Research, 19 April 2011; accessed at: http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-
reconstruction-watch/haitian-companies-still-sidelined-from-reconstruction-contracts  5, May 
2014. 
 
40 Ugolik, Kaitlin. (2011) ‘AshBritt Can’t Shake $2M Katrina Cleanup Contract Suit’, Law360, 
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accusations and investigations into contract waste, overcharging the government and 
using their political connections to secure no-bid contracts.41 
The Lewis Lucke lawsuit was unique because of what it claimed and who it was 
coming from. Shortly after beginning his second stint in Haiti for USAID, Lucke stepped 
down from his post of Relief Coordinator and went into consulting on behalf of AshBritt 
and GB Group. Within months of this partnership, two contracts, combined to be worth 
about $20 million for rubble removal, were secured. Not much later, however, Lucke was 
in court suing both companies for about $500,000 claiming breach of contract. In his 
lawsuit, Lucke asserted that he was not compensated enough for helping these companies 
navigate Haiti’s government bureaucracy as well as a stipulation in his contract that 
called for a bonus if he were able to secure contracts over $6 million.42  
Lewis Lucke may be the personification of disaster capitalism, par excellence.43 
Since 1990, he has served within or directed various large-scale USAID economic 
development programs in South America, Africa and the Middle East. He served under 
former President George W. Bush in Iraq as USAID Coordinator of Reconstruction.44 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 August; accessed at: http://www.law360.com/cases/4d564f531bcd535902000006 8 June 2014. 
 
41 Bricketto, Martin. (2013) ‘NJ Lawmaker Wants Treasurer Subpoenaed Over AshBritt Deal’, 
Law360, 7 February; accessed at: http://www.law360.com/articles/413648 8, June 2014. 
 
42 Fox, Ben. (2010) ‘Ex-US official sues contractor in Haiti for fees’, The Associated Press, 31 
December; accessed at: http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9KF42PO2.htm 23, 
March 2014. 
 
43 Bloomberg Businessweek courtesy of The Associated Press: 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/; Center for Economic and Policy Research: 
http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/lucke-guy-former-usaid-official-
continues-lobbying-for-contractors-in-haiti  
 
44 The White House: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/lucke-bio.html  
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Along with being responsible for contract appropriations towards rebuilding bombed out 
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and securing contracts like that for the Betchel Group, 
(a multibillion-dollar contract to dredge the Umm Qasr seaport)45 Lucke was also the 
senior reconstruction adviser to retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, who was the civilian 
administration of Iraq directly following the 2003 US invasion.46 
Contract dispute aside, Lucke was back in Haiti by the end of 2010. This time he 
was now a board member of MC Endevour Inc., a subsidiary of CENTIUUM Holdings 
Inc., a company that specializes in “engineering, architecture, construction, and 
development of smart-home and sustainable community projects” and natural disaster 
resistant building systems.47 Sufficiently satisfied with his role in the rubble removal 
process, Lucke returned to Haiti to survey the reconstruction effort in his new role with 
MC Endeavor. Company CEO Tim Algier in a press release summing up Lucke’s 
qualifications and contributions said: 
Ambassador Lucke served as the U.S. Response Coordinator for the Haiti 
earthquake, leading the United States’ $1.0 billion to date relief and 
recovery program, and having him on our reconstruction team is very 
valuable to us. His contacts and international experience will give us the 
opportunity to really make a difference in both addressing the homeless 
situation and helping to improve the Haitian economy.48 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
45 Vardi, Nathan. (2003) ‘Recon Man’, Forbes, 26 May. 
 
46 Henriques, Diane B. (2003) ‘A Nation at War: Reconstruction; Bechtel’s Subcontracts Are 
Expected to Include Non-U.S. Companies and Employ Iraqis’, The New York Times, 19 April. 
 
47 http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/snapshot/snapshot.asp?ticker=MSMY  
 
48 ‘Lucke Guy; Former USAID Official Continues Lobbying for Contractors in Haiti’, Center for 
Economic and Policy Research, 12 April 2011. http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-
reconstruction-watch/lucke-guy-former-usaid-official-continues-lobbying-for-contractors-in-haiti 
;‘MC Endeavors Director U.S. Ambassador Lewis Lucke Travels to Haiti to Survey 
Reconstruction Programs after New President Elected’, April 12, 2011. http://www.4-
69 
 
The above is a quintessential example of disaster capitalism. A nexus of foreign 
governments, private companies, NGOs, think tanks and individuals coalescing around a 
disaster event to offer their expertise, services, or simply peddle their wares 
(Gunewardena and Schuller 2008; Kleinman 2014). The Haitian earthquake created 
opportunities to experiment with new farming techniques, building methods, social 
arrangements, cultural expressions, economic policies, and political institutions. Cross-
cutting linkages between neoliberalism, US national interests, and capital accumulation 
are pursued, while critique of flagrant profiteering is anesthetized by the obvious need to 
mitigate economic insecurity and social dislocation (Dupuy 2010; Schuller and Morales 
2012). 
Naomi Klein (2007) introduces us to disaster capitalism: an instrumental use of 
catastrophes, man-made or natural, to instigate and establish radical economic policies. 
Klein’s work focuses on neoliberal ideologues and ideologies, contempt for the modern 
welfare state, and the pollination of US trained technocrats to policymaking positions in 
global financial institutions and developing countries. Klein advances a type of 
accumulation by disorientation49—capital accumulation and a discontinuity in public 
surveillance where individuals, private companies, agencies, NGO’s, political parties, and 
                                                                                                                                                              
traders.com/news/MC-Endeavors-Director-US-Ambassador-Lewis-Lucke-Travels-to-Haiti-to-
Survey-Reconstruction-Programs--13600006/  
49 This is a play on “accumulation by dispossession” as outlined by Harvey (2003). According to 
Harvey, this is the most aggressive form of capital accumulation in response to structural changes 
in the global economy. This includes an advance over what he considers primitive processes of 
accumulation characterized by “predation, fraud and thievery” – a hallmark of the colonial 
through imperial era of the early twentieth century. In the current era of financialization, the 
enhanced form of accumulation looks more like currency speculation, raiding of pension funds, 
ponzi schemes, asset stripping via mergers and acquisition, and debt incumbency (139). 
70 
elite blocs converge upon the policymaking vacuum following a disaster. This chapter is 
a more focused investigation of disaster capitalism and aims to locate it within the 
context of global supply chains, business conflict, and enduring US national economic 
interests. Emphasis is placed on investigating the US textile and apparel industry and the 
evolution of trade policy towards the developing world, Haiti in particular. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Despite a systematic dismantling of protectionist regimes in the global textile and 
apparel industry over the last 60 years, US-based textile and apparel manufacturers have 
used a combination of political influence and US national interest imperatives to align 
regional trade policy with their preferences. Specifically, these firms have routinely 
sought the help of US trade policy to enforce sourcing arrangements favoring the 
competitiveness of US produced textile products. By exploiting the vestiges of Cold War-
based US foreign policy, nationally-oriented manufacturers were able to carve out 
regional production sharing arrangements despite growing liberal trade regimes. 
US textile and apparel manufacturers have responded to structural and national 
constraints by promoting regional trade agreements that both conform to the logic of 
global supply chains and protect their domestic industries. On its face, this is in accord 
with the logic of corporate restructuring over the last 40 years. That is, higher value-
added operations remaining in the developed country, while labor-intensive activities are 
outsourced to production facilities around the globe. In this particular case, US regional 
trade agreements have encouraged a more hierarchical model where lead firms located in 
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the US closely coordinate the production process through a series of subsidiary 
arrangements. 
Binding this system are provisions in bilateral agreements that require core 
material input used in production to originate in the United States, also referred to as the 
“yarn forward” rule. In exchange for duty-free access to US markets, foreign assembled 
apparel must be made with materials produced in the US. This policy has been stridently 
supported by Congressional members from fiber producing states, as well as the regional 
apparel producers who benefit from trade preferences free of customs duty. These 
sourcing-restrictive agreements, however, have often conflicted with the desires of 
transnationally-oriented businesses. This faction, which includes large purchasing 
retailers and branded apparel manufacturers, often seek flexible production networks and 
cost-effective apparel sourcing locations. 
Haiti’s post-disaster policy vacuum represented a continued erosion of 
protectionist policies and the advance of these globally-oriented textile and apparel 
manufacturers. Haiti is where a share of the spoils from competing business interests was 
apportioned to the transnational faction and their disaggregated production processes. 
Along with liberal calls for true economic integration, these processes found meaning in 
the resurgence of a developmental strategy focused on export-oriented industrialization 
(Collier 2009). Since 2006, US bilateral trade agreements with Haiti have begun to 
weaken the policy preferences of the protectionist coalition. Responding to the latest 
natural disaster, the 2010 Haitian Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act represents further 
policy opening for a transnational coalition of large US retailers, Asian suppliers, and 
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advocates of industrial upgrading. What they all share is a preference for flexible, 
decentralized production networks and global sourcing arrangements. 
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section 
positions this work within the larger literature on business conflict and the global 
commodity chain framework while also giving a brief sketch of the US textile and 
apparel sector. Emphasis is placed on modes of policy influence and the changing 
relationship between domestic textile producers, large apparel manufacturers, and large 
purchasing retailers. For example, because the textile industry has the capacity for 
automation, it has evolved into a capital-intensive industry. Their proclivity towards 
protectionism stems from their vertical integration with producers of fibers (cotton, wool, 
silk, or ramie) from a number of Southern states. The apparel industry, however, is labor-
intensive and more susceptible to the globalization of production processes and the 
emergence of developing countries as significant cut, make, and trim sites. For this 
reason, large apparel manufacturers and purchasing retailers were more receptive of trade 
liberalization, corporate downsizing and the outsourcing of garment assembly. 
The second section outlines the geo-strategic structure in which the Caribbean 
Basin emerged and the specific free trade agreements as it pertained to Haiti. Not only 
did bipolarity rationalize the aggressive militarization of the Caribbean and Latin 
America, it also informed the broadening of US sphere of influence via foreign economic 
policy. I explore trade policy between the US and the Caribbean Basin, paying particular 
attention to policies pertaining to the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the trade 
preferences outlined in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). A 
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significant portion of this section outlines the “yarn forward” rules as a tool of protection 
for US textile producers. Moreover, as these rules have begun to weaken under the 
Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE I & II) Act 
of 2006 and 2008, and the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010, post-
disaster Haiti has emerged as a key battleground between a faction of nationally- and 
globally-oriented interests. 
The final section will evaluate this developmental pattern going forward. To 
foreshadow, it is unclear how either policy response will help to alleviate Haiti’s 
economic malaise, especially since both feature labor exploitation via wage suppression. 
While promised to enhance Haiti’s integration into the global economy, this development 
does not assure Haiti’s success in supporting aspirations for export-oriented 
industrialization. Ultimately, this chapter intends to demonstrate that an interconnection 
between commercial and political exigencies has been responsible for the economic 
trajectory of Haiti over the last few decades. The 2010 Haitian earthquake represents a 
redefinition of the country’s role in the apparel commodity chain; a role within a global 
network defined by locationally fluid, sweatshop production. 
 
Business Conflict and the Globalization of the US Textile & Apparel Industries 
Harold D. Lasswell (1936) famously defined politics as “who gets what, when, 
and how”.50 Policy decisions—the substantive consequence of politics—creates a set of 
(sometimes fluid) winners and losers, determined more often by variations in the 
                                                      
50 For a more nuanced conceptualization see: Olson, Richard Stuart. 2000. “Towards a Politics of 
Disaster: Losses, Values, Agendas, and Blame.” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and 
Disasters 18 (2): 265 – 287. 
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competing groups’ size, level of organization, lobbying power, and access to decision-
makers (Almond 1958; Dahl 1961; Olson 1965; Duverger and Wagoner 1972; Lindblom 
1977). Stemming from the observation that business interests have a privileged 
relationship with the state, political economists began to explain US foreign policy as 
resulting from struggle between powerful business groups. Scholars of the business 
conflict school determined that varying business interests compete in a pluralist fashion 
(based on organizational structure, capital endowments, and political coalitions) to affect 
policy outcomes. In terms of foreign economic policies, these varying interests are often 
moderated by the exigencies of US national interests, the structure of global capitalism, 
and changing conditions in affected developing countries (Gibbs 1991; Cox 1994; 
Nowell 1994). 
Within this framework, institutions play an important role in arbitrating inter- as 
well as intra sectoral preferences; none more important than the changing power-sharing 
dynamics between the legislative and executive branches of government. These 
relationships are determined by separation of powers and institutional checks and 
balances. For example, because the president must often take a wider view of the national 
interest than must Congress, globally-oriented firms use this regularity to forge 
relationships with the executive branch. In return, nationally-oriented firms, defined by 
their protectionist preferences, often appeal to the provincial nature of Congress. As a 
result, globally-oriented businesses have had greater influence on the executive branch in 
the formulation of liberal trade regimes. Alternatively, the composition of Congress 
makes it more responsive to local and state pressure groups. That, and its constitutionally 
defined role of regulating commerce with foreign nations, has made Congress more likely 
75 
to listen to nationally-oriented businesses (Destler 1986 & 2005). One such intra-sectoral 
cleavage is between textile producers and apparel manufacturers. 
 
Textile and Apparel, Textile versus Apparel 
Textile and apparel production is often seen as one particular process. The 
conflation of the two is understandable given that they functionally behaved as such 
throughout the early part of the 20th century. Yet, this is admittedly a composite of an 
industry that has a more detailed diffusion of processes. The production process often 
begins with the fabrication of fibers into yarn, yarn is then processed into cloth and cloth 
is finally cut and sewn into garments.51 This represents a divide between (a) textile 
producers, whose responsibilities include the procurement and manufacturing of fibers as 
well as the dyeing, weaving, and knitting resulting in the production of fabric, and (b) 
apparel manufactures whose responsibilities include the design and assembly of fabrics 
into garments and related consumer products.52 
On the one hand, the manufacturing of textiles is both energy- and capital-
intensive. Production tends to be highly automated and clustered around relatively 
developed and politically stable countries that can assure inexpensive, if not predictable, 
access to electricity. Technological advances have encouraged both the mechanization of 
                                                      
51 Textile manufacturing begins with fiber harvested from natural resources (e.g., cotton, wool, 
silk, or ramie), manufactured from cellulosic materials (e.g., rayon or acetate), or man-made 
synthetic materials (e.g., polyester, nylon, or acrylic) (Platzer 2013). 
52 Notwithstanding this simplification, there exists a maze of intermediary functions like “product 
development, raw-material sourcing, product planning, factory sourcing, manufacturing control, 
quality assurance, export documentation, and shipping consolidation” (Abernathy et al., 2006: 
2212). These can either occur in one firm, or be carried out via several subsidiaries (Glasmeier et 
al., 1993: 23; Mittelhauser 1997: 24-25). 
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the factory floor and the development of new, synthetic fibers (Levinsohn and 
Petropoulos 2001). On the other hand, apparel production is labor-intensive, less 
malleable to automation and operated through decentralized, globally dispersed 
production networks. Save for minor advances in cutting and sewing technology, apparel 
production generally looks the same as it has for the last several decades—cheaply 
constructed buildings with rows of light manufacturing equipment operated by women 
going on about the business of cutting, sewing, and assembling fabrics. For these reasons, 
various countries in the developing world have become apparel manufacturing hubs; 
often inversely related to their level of economic development. 
Following the ruinous effects of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, Congress 
began to cede trade negotiation authority to the president.53 As described above, 
executives are more likely to link trade policies with larger geo-political goals (Keohane 
and Nye 1989; Milner and Tingley 2010). Thereby the wedding of US national interest to 
the bolstering of Japanese regional hegemony was imperative given the recent loss of 
mainland China to Communism. The embrace of commercial globalization and 
multilateral trade regimes was a boon to globally-oriented transnationals but threatened 
nationally-oriented industries like textile production. Liberalizing trade with Japan meant 
the survival and eventual diffusion of capitalism to South Korea and Taiwan as 
immediate follower nations (Cumings 1987). More significantly, it meant that US apparel 
producers would eventually have to compete with low-priced, mass-produced garment 
imports from Japans industrializing peripheries (Friman 1988). 
 
                                                      
53 The Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934. Chapter 474, section 350(a). 
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Global Apparel Supply Chains  
By the 1960s, these system-level developments in capital accumulation begged 
for a new pattern of industrial organization. With the exhausted import-substitution 
industrialization being nudged aside in favor of export-led models, developing countries 
came to the negotiating table with their most valuable assets: an abundance of cheap, 
unorganized labor. US corporations responded by consolidating around higher value-
added activities at the top of the global supply chain and contracting out the rest, 
particularly labor-intensive production processes (Cox 2013). While both industries have 
faced similar pressures from an emerging global geography of apparel production, each 
responded differently to shrinking profit margins. 
Both textile and apparel manufacturers began to transnationalize with an emphasis 
on core competencies. US apparel manufacturing with backward linkages to the domestic 
US textile industry set up “producer-driven” networks. These transnational networks have 
vertically organized value chains stretched across developing countries. Fabric and fabric 
components are made in the US, sent overseas to be assembled, then shipped back to the 
US for further processing before reaching the consumer market. A more dynamic group 
of apparel manufacturers coordinated with large retailers and branded marketers to 
develop “buyer-driven” networks. These globally decentralized production network 
devise their profitability from the design, marketing, and sales of products. No longer 
directly participating in actual product manufacturing, these transnationals were more 
likely to competitively allocate “full-package” supplier contracts to independent firms. 
These independent contractors would then organize and manage their own regional 
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production chains, from material sourcing to assembly through to the delivery to retailers 
or branded marketers (Gereffi 1999). 
 
 
The Rise of Large Purchasing Retailers and Branded Marketers 
Advances in information technology have also helped change the relationship 
between textile producers and apparel manufacturers. Customarily, US retailers made 
purchases from US apparel manufacturers, who, in turn, were purchasers of US textile 
products. Retailers then often relied on intermittent or seasonal bulk deliveries from 
apparel manufacturers to fill out their sales floor. Excess items were stored by retailers 
and periodically pulled to the sales floor per demand. Retailers had to not only warehouse 
merchandise, but also had to resort to steep markdowns to clear under-performing or out-
of-season stock. That is if they got sold at all. 
Large discount chains like Wal-Mart, K-Mart and Target, international contractors 
like Liz Claiborne, Nautica, The Limited and The Gap, and mass merchandise retailers 
like JC Penney and Sears have all been integral in shaping material sourcing networks. 
Today, orders are replenished based on instantaneous data captured from scanned bar-
codes at the final point of sales. By keeping track of all products in sales transactions, it 
was now possible for retailers to match supply to demand, reducing overstock costs. This 
computer inventory system made popular by retailers like Wal-Mart led to greater 
pressure being placed on manufacturers and suppliers to accordingly streamline their 
systems. Because products are ordered at the stock-keeping unit (SKU), retailers have 
downsized their product holding to little more than what is on the sales floor. This 
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integrative technology has allowed retailers to pass on the carrying costs and risk to 
suppliers and manufacturers (Abernathy et al. 2006: 2216). 
This new “lean retailing” model required apparel manufacturers to respond to 
almost weekly replenishment requests from large purchasing retailers (Abernathy et al., 
2000). Apparel manufacturers had to now weigh their sourcing reliance on either quick, 
more expensive production lines that may be closer to the US market (Latin America and 
Caribbean), or slower, less expensive plants that may be more distant to the US market 
(China, Hong Kong, Taiwan etc.). US-sourced and manufactured apparel products simply 
became cost prohibitive. Moreover, given the whims of fashion, the possibility of order 
cancellations, and product obsolescence, many manufacturers would prefer lower 
inventory-at-risk that is provided by sourcing to regional producers (Abernathy et al., 
2006). This development in retailing was crucial in how textile and apparel interest 
groups approached regional trade agreements and sourcing peculiarities. 
Global commodity chains has thus both influenced and conformed to 
technological and structural changes in the world capitalist system. Once primarily 
customers of US apparel manufacturers (and by extension US textile producers) until the 
mid-1970s, large retailers began to respond to value-seeking consumers by importing 
from apparel manufacturers located in South and East Asia. Nationally-oriented textile 
and apparel manufacturers, through their Congressional allies, also turned to foreign 
labor markets through the activation of trade policy like the 807/9802 production sharing 
programs. But instead of looking to the East, the newly geo-politically designated 
Caribbean Basin provided an opportunity for protectionist textile and apparel industries 
to take advantage of regionally focused foreign policy that maintained their monopoly on 
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material sourcing. In a country like Haiti, where the labor costs are globally competitive, 
the decision for some was even easier. By the late 1970s: 
[t]he decision of many large manufacturers in developed countries, 
however, [was] no longer whether to engage in foreign production, but 
how to organize and manage it. These firms supply intermediate inputs 
(cut fabric, thread, buttons, and other trim) to extensive networks of 
offshore suppliers, typically located in neighboring countries with 
reciprocal trade agreements that allow goods assembled offshore to be re-
imported with tariff charged only on the value added by foreign labor 
(Gereffi 1999: 48). 
 
  
The Political Economy of Free Trade Agreements 
In February 1982, during an address to the Organization of American States, US 
President Ronald Reagan unveiled The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).54 Divulging the 
structural context, Reagan described how price reduction in traditional exports coupled 
with increased prices for imports (particularly energy) had caused debt, balance of 
payment issues, and growing unemployment in the region. To help stave off the “the 
poverty and repression of Castro’s Cuba, the tightening grip of the totalitarian left in 
Grenada and Nicaragua, and the expansion of Soviet-backed, Cuban-managed support for 
violent revolution in Central America”, the US would help spur physical and financial 
investment in the region.55 Reagan’s plan called for an extension of products under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) eligible for duty-free imports. This was to be  
 
                                                      
54 The legislative program itself is called the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) 
and extended under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) or ‘NAFTA Parity’. 
55 Caribbean Basin Initiative, February 24, 1982 United States Department of State Bureau of 
Public Affairs Washington, D.C. President Ronald Reagan before the Organization of American 
States (OAS). 
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accomplished over a twelve-year span to ensure a longer time-horizon to incentivize 
investors.56 
 
Trade Preferences for the Caribbean Basin 
The policy vehicle for this was to be the 1963 US Tariff Code (806.30 and 
807.00) and the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (9802). These rules “permit duty exemption 
of the value of US-made components that are returned as part of articles assembled 
abroad; for the purpose of US customs duty, items are evaluated only on the bases of the 
value-added by the foreign operation”—that foreign operation being labor (Heron 2002: 
756). For duty-free eligibility under the CBERA, certain rules of origin requirements 
must first be met. Item 806.30, included articles processed in the US, exported for more 
processing, then returned to the US for further processing. Item 807.00 applied to articles 
assembled in, or whole of part, of components manufactured in the US and then imported 
into the US. Those items are subject only to duty on the foreign value-added component 
(Pelzman and Schoepfle 1988). 
Additionally, Special Access Programs (SAP) were initiated in 1987 allowing CBI 
countries to export assembled garments to the United States under the condition that 
duties were only applied to the labor value-added. This program stipulated that the fabrics 
used in said garments had to both originate and be cut in the US. This, along with 
Guaranteed Access Levels (GALs)—or unrestricted quotas for apparel products exported 
                                                      
56 The plan also included a set of “self-help measures” each country would have to negotiate 
bilaterally with the US. Specifically, the CBI called for the 1) elimination of tariffs on products, 
except for textiles, 2) tax incentives to encourage business, and 3) $350 million in private sector 
development. Caribbean Basin Initiative in Perspective. March 11 1982. United States 
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D.C. Steven W. Bosworth, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Dallas World Affairs Council. 
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to the US—satisfied not only regional players like Haiti, who saw their exports to the US 
increase, but also US-based textile mills, and specific production-sharing hubs throughout 
Southeastern United States (Heron 2002). Contrary to true trade liberalization, the spirit 
of the SAP entailed a: 
 
quasi-protectionist measure designed primarily by and for the vertically 
integrated textile transnationals. It was a market-opening initiative 
structured to increase the amount of apparel exported by developing 
countries to the U.S. market, but whose manufacture was planned and 
financed by U.S. textile and apparel manufacturers (Rosen 2002: 143). 
 
 
Protectionist US textile producers saw an advantage in the reduced tariffs under 
item 807.00. With East Asia already an established hub of apparel production dominated 
by large retailers, textile producers saw the Caribbean Basin as an opportunity to regain 
lost markets and vertically integrate apparel production. Instead of competing with East 
Asian apparel producers who already boasted a formidable textile producing capacity, US 
textile producers could turn to Caribbean Basin countries that had none, and would 
therefore be wholly dependent on proximal foreign sourcing for intermediate materials. 
Ultimately, fencing off the Caribbean Basin from Asian producers meant US textile 
companies could freely sell to US apparel producers and by extension their large-scale 
purchasing retailers. Haiti became an ideal country to set up production-sharing 
operations because it promised tax holidays, low production costs (through low wages) 
and muted union activity. 
Discussed in further detail in the following chapter, the first sign of weakening to 
the intrusion of globally-sourced textiles was the 2000 Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership 
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Act (CBPTA). Legislated as “NAFTA parity” the CBPTA extended preferences to CBI 
countries affected by the passage of NAFTA. As an extension of the CBERA it began to 
erode, however minor, strict rules of origin favoring US-formed fabrics and yarns. These 
new yarn forward rules still required that both yarn and fabrics must be formed in the US. 
Garments not cut in US, however, may still be eligible for benefits only if the thread is of 
US origin. Additionally, third country origin of material is allowed if it is demonstrated to 
be in short supply. Functionally, a T-shirt made in Haiti could qualify for duty-free access 
to the US if it was made from fabric knit in the Dominican Republic, derived from yarn 
produced in the US. If that fabric component was not available regionally, it may be 
sourced from parties outside the trade agreement. 
As the CBERA evolved throughout the 1980s and 90s, it was largely shaped by 
protectionist coalitions and the instrumental use of a rigid yarn forward rule. In the face 
of a growing transnational global production system, this ensured that regional apparel 
products were made with US fabrics. The importance of these yarn forward rules cannot 
be understated. They have been a feature of all significant US bilateral trade preference 
programs for the past four decades.57 They have also been a source of contestation in 
Haiti as new transnational coalitions emerge to contend with a confluence of political, 
economic and natural disasters. 
 
                                                      
57 807A Program CBI (1988), Andean Trade Preference Program (1988), NAFTA (1993), CBPTA 
(2000), Chile FTA (2003), Singapore FTA (2003), Australia FTA (2004), Bahrain FTA (2004), 
DRCAFTA (2004), Morocco FTA (2004), Oman FTA (2005), Peru FTA (2007), Korea FTA 
(2011), Colombia FTA (2011), Panama FTA (2011). The yarn forward rule has also been a 
contentious issue in the current Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Potential signatory Vietnam uses 
primarily Chinese-made fabrics in their garment manufacturing. China, however, is not a member 
of the TPP and thus disqualifies Vietnam products from duty-free status. 
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Haiti, from HOPE to HELP 
Made in Haiti 
Up until 1987, at any Major League ballpark, pitchers were scuffing, moistening, 
pine tarring or otherwise doctoring baseballs all made in Haiti.58 Along with sporting 
goods, Haiti’s apparel assembly sector has been a prominent supplier of goods to the 
United States. The country’s proximity, low wages, export-friendly exchange rates, and 
an abundance of low-skilled labor have made it an attractive location for the industry’s 
labor-intensive activities (Collier 2009). Geostrategic interests and cross-national elite 
linkages have also ensured that Haiti maintains favored access to US markets. The most 
prominent of these exports to the US include standardized knit T-shirts and underwear 
(5th behind Honduras, Mexico, El Salvador, and China). Haiti also has a limited capacity 
for a variety of woven products including uniforms, medical scrubs, nightwear, 
undergarments, leggings, fleece wear, performance wear, sportswear, pants, 
gloves/mittens, and tailored men’s suits. 
During the 70s and early 80s the apparel sector employed between 60,000 and 
100,000 Haitians in over 100 factories, with the US being the main destination for 
finished products.59 Only overseas remittances were responsible for more financial 
generation than the assembly industry.60 Political realities and the global economy have 
                                                      
58 Rawlings opened a manufacturing facility in Costa Rica and eventually closed their Haitian 
facility in 1990. 
 
59 “Bringing HOPE to Haiti’s Apparel Industry: Improving Competitiveness through Factory-
level Value- Chain Analysis.” Nathan and Associates. November 2009. 
 
60 “Taking Advantage of HOPE II A Strategic Plan and Roadmap by the Haitian AHFA Industry” 
Investment- Trade & Association Development Project. ADIH – I-Trade, Garment Strategic Plan. 
July 31, 2009. 
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since changed. The end of Duvalier regimes and the power struggles that ensued under 
the election of Aristide, including an extensive trade embargo, decimated Haiti’s trade 
industries. By 2009, Haiti had only 23 apparel producing factories employing 25,000 
people, with about 68% of those employed being women. Of the factories, 13 were 
owned by Haitian companies, 4 by South Korea, and the US and DR both having 3. The 
larger Haitian-owned factories were contracted to US and Canadian apparel companies.61 
These included the Apaid Group, Multi-tex and Sohacosa. All but one of these companies 
was located in the country’s capital. That lone exception is CODEVI, owned by Group 
M, located in the Ouanaminthe free trade zone near the Haiti-Dominican Republic 
border.62 
Another important factor in Haiti’s recession in industrial activity had to do with 
new multilateral rules governing inter-state trade and the changing patterns of global 
production. Along with increased trade liberalization, apparel production has become 
progressively globalized and organized around complex transnational supply-chain 
arrangements. Particularly, the end of the quota regime—signaled by the expiration of the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) on January 1, 2005—meant Haitian 
manufacturers had to compete with their Asian equivalents primed to take advantage of 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
61 Companies with subsidiary or contractor affiliations in Haiti include: Hanes (Champion, Bali, 
L’eggs), Gildan (Canadian: T-shirts, sports shorts, fleece wear), Capital Garment Co., Cintas, 
Cherokee, Fabian Couture Group International, Fishman & Tobin, Fox River, Freeze Apparel, 
The Gap and Old Navy, Grana, Great Channel Division, Hybrid Clothing, JC Penney, Jeno, Jos. 
A. Bank, Kmart, Levi’s, Mad Engine Inc., Men’s Warehouse, Neema Clothing Ltd., Paris 
Accessories, Reen manufacturing, Southpoint Sportswear, Strategy Partners, Superior Uniform 
Group, Vanity Fair Lingerie, Ventura Ltd., and Wal-Mart. 
 
62 “Development of the Industrial Park Model to Improve Trade Opportunities for Haiti.” Koios 
Associates prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank. September 2010. 
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the potential for unrestricted access to US markets. 
Competing against Asian manufacturers already integrated into buyer-driven 
networks would prove to be challenging for Haitian manufacturers. Whereas Haiti’s 
productive capabilities peaked at basic, standardized knit apparel (T-shirts and 
underwear), Asian manufacturers had already mastered simple stitching and had become 
proficient in medium and high-end fashion production. Per the arm’s length preferences 
of US retailers and branded firms, Asian manufacturers moved into the cutting, knitting, 
dyeing, and finishing of apparel products. Asian manufacturers also enjoyed greater 
autonomy in determining raw material sourcing as well as a variety of processes included 
in the assembly of apparel products. This in turn created the potential for industrial 
upgrading through backward and forward linkages and eventual full package assembly. It 
also allowed the supplying firms the possibility for ultimately upgrading into the design 
and then the sale of their own original branded products. 
 
HOPE I 
On December 20, 2006 President George W. Bush signed into US law a set of 
“special rules for Haiti” under Title V of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act. The HOPE 
Act, as it was called, was an extension of the CBERA that authorized the President to 
extend special preferences to Haiti given that the country met certain requirements as 
outlined in the legislation.63 Substantively, the HOPE Act represents more flexible rules 
                                                      
63 Basic requirements featured the establishing a market economy, reducing barriers to US trade 
and investment, poverty reduction and economic development, combating corruption, better 
record keeping and business practices, and improving rule of law. 
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of origin by easing the sourcing requirements for Haitian made apparel to have duty-free 
access to the US. It allowed substantial Dominican and other regional content to be 
included in eligible goods by setting tariff preference levels or TPLs (i.e. quantitative 
restrictions) for some garments using cheaper third-country materials (Hornbeck 2010). 
Prior to HOPE, for exports to enter the US duty-free (with some exceptions), 
CBPTA rules required raw materials used in the production of garments to either 
originate in the US or Haiti. With HOPE, Haitian-made knit apparel has duty-free access 
to US markets given that 50-60% of the material inputs originated in Haiti, the US, or any 
country currently in a free trade agreement with the US.64 Woven apparel also has the 
same duty-free exceptions for a three-year period regardless of the origins of the source 
materials. The single transformation rule permitted duty-free imports for select knit and 
woven apparel (most prominent of which were brassieres, sleepwear, luggage and 
headwear) produced from non-US fabrics as long as these items were both cut and sewn 
in the US or Haiti. The short supply rule allowed for duty-free access to specific non-US 
or regional fabrics or yarn if the material is in short supply. Finally, all apparel had to be 
shipped directly from Haiti. These preferences were extended on a year-to-year basis, for 
a period of five years.65 
                                                      
64 The 50% value content is in place until 2009. In 2010 that percentage moves to 55, in 2011 it 
increases to 60%. These beneficiaries included countries under the CBPTA, the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA). 
 
65 The Act did include overall quantitative limits as a percentage of aggregate SMEs imported into 
the US for a 12 month period. Haiti’s quantitative limit was set to 1% in 2006 and gradually 
increased by .25% until 2011 for a maximum of 2% overall. If the components of a non-
beneficiary country were used in apparel assembled in Haiti, the cost of that material would be 
deducted from the value of the product. “Implementation Information on the Haitian Hemispheric 
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE) for Certain Wiring Sets 
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Lawmakers from predominantly Southern states immediately met the legislation 
with resistance. Congressional leaders argued that any weakening of yarn forward rules 
for Haiti only created “a pass through for Chinese yarn and fabric to enter the United 
States duty free”.66 US textile producers saw the crafting of TPLs and single 
transformation rules as representing a diminution of the yarn forward rule. President of 
the National Textile Association (NTA), Karl Spilhaus declared that “the third-party 
country fabric and labor provisions will turn U.S. textile and apparel trade with Haiti 
from a two-way street to a one-way road.” National Council of Textile Organizations 
(NCTO) president Cass Johnson further added that “in its eagerness to sacrifice U.S. jobs 
to Haiti, all the U.S. Congress has accomplished is to make Haiti a transshipment point 
for apparel from China at the expense of the entire Western Hemisphere. CAFTA trade 
legislation will mean little for the textile and apparel industries if Haiti [HOPE] becomes 
law.”67 
That being said, the initial HOPE Act did little to stir up new interest in the 
country. Companies already operating in Haiti under the CBPTA used its provisions to 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Certain Apparel Products.” ENT-14 OT:TPP:TEO:TO JS. The Office of Textiles and Apparel 
(OTEXA). “Trade Preference Programs For Haitian Textile and Apparel” 
http://web.ita.doc.gov/tacgi/eamain.nsf/  
 
66 In letter signed by US Senators to House and Senate Leaders in December 7, 2006. Signatories 
include Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Elizabeth Dole (R-NC), Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Johnny 
Isakson (R-GA), Richard Burr (R-NC), Richard Shelby (R-AL), Jeff Sessions (R-AL), and Jim 
Bunning (R-KY). 
 
67 Press Release, December 8, 2006. “Textile Industry and Labor Officials Urge House and Senate 
to Reject Job-Destroying Haiti and AGOA Provisions” AMTAC, NTA, NCTO and labor group 
Unite Here! The NCTO has made efforts to foreclose this circuitous route by aligning with the 
Congressional Textile Caucus, T&A trade associations throughout the Caribbean and Central 
America, CEOs of regional manufacturers, the trade councils representing NAFTA, and CAFTA-
DR governments. 
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expand on operations and “other companies that had left Haiti chose not to return. 
Generally, U.S.-Haitian trade in textiles and apparel remain[ed] concentrated among a 
small number of U.S. firms and Haitian manufacturers with established operations”.68 
Many manufacturers who found the new law to be unnecessarily cumbersome and 
redundant opted to rely on the provisions under the established Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). Though Haiti wasn’t a beneficiary 
under DR-CAFTA, Haitian manufacturers found it easier to import fabrics from the 
Dominican Republic, assemble the garments in Haiti, then ship them back to the 
Dominican Republic to be exported to the US.69 The economic failure of HOPE I was 
further compounded by a series of natural disasters that took place during a 30 day period 
in 2008. Storms Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike led to series of floods and landslides, which 
took approximately 800 lives70 and economically disabled the country.71 
 
HOPE II 
To help encourage new investment, HOPE I was modified under the Food 
Conservation and Energy Act (“Farm Bill”) of 2008. Title XV, of the Farm Bill now 
                                                      
68 United States International Trade Commission. 2008. “Textiles and Apparel: Effects of Special 
Rules for Haiti on Trade Markets and Industries.” Investigation No. TR-5003-1 USTIC 
Publication 4016. 
 
69 “Amendments under the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement 
Act of 2008 (HOPE II Act) for Certain Apparel and Other Articles”. 
 
70 EM-DAT. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED), Université catholique 
de Louvain. Country Profile: Haiti. 
 
71 Lacey, Marc. 2008. “Meager Living of Haitians is Wiped Out by Storms.” New York Times, 
September 10. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/world/americas/11haiti.html  
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included legislation pertaining to the new HOPE II Act. Along with streamlining the 
eligibility process, HOPE II included a set of modifications to existing provisions as well 
as the introduction of new programs to spur along industrial development (see table 4). 
For starters, HOPE II expanded on the initial four tariff provisions eligible for 
preferential treatment and eased some of their quantitative restrictions. The Act also 
included a new Earned Import Allowance Program (EIAP) administered by the 
Department of Commerce. With this program, Haitian apparel producers were now 
allowed to substitute one square meter equivalent (SME) of cheaper material from any 
country for every three SME of US or regional fabrics used to manufacture a similar 
good.72 Along with incremental expansion of third-country sourcing and the removal of 
quantitative limits on the short supply rule, the HOPE II Act extended the core 
preferences to 2018.73 The Act also allowed Haiti to export its goods from the 
neighboring free trade zone in Ouanaminthe, Dominican Republic, given that both 
countries meet a set of labor standards as defined by Better Work program under the aegis 
of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Technical Assistance Improvement 
and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR). 
The unease over the weakening of yarn forward rules under George W. Bush, and 
the overall sustainability of US textile and apparel manufacturing remained a key concern 
                                                      
72 Also called the “3-for-1” rule. This provides one square meter equivalent credit to use non-US 
produced yarn or fabric for every three SMEs of woven or knit fabric produced in the US or any 
country partner to a US FTA. The apparel producer must demonstrate that the apparel was wholly 
assembled or knit to shape in Haiti. Functionally, if a Haitian company bought 30 SMEs of US 
fabric to manufacture apparel destined for US markets, they would earn credit to export 10 SMEs 
of apparel made from fabric produced in any country. 
 
73 . It also included the executive appointment of a Labor Ombudsman to oversee working 
conditions in factories. 
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for industry activists leading up to the 2008 presidential election. In a letter to the 
president of the NCTO, then presidential candidate, Barack Obama confirmed his policy 
position regarding strong yarn forward rules: 
When safeguards on textile imports from China expired in 2004, imports 
surged and thousands of jobs were lost. As President, I would use 
monitoring to help ensure that imports from China do not violate 
applicable laws and treaties. I support the requirement in the Berry 
Amendment that the Defense Department procure only textiles made in 
the United States. I also support inclusion of the yarn forward rule in free 
trade agreements, to ensure that countries with which we enter special 
trade relationships do not become conduits for source yarn outside those 
countries.74 
 
Context matters, however. The popular stance of President Obama would be tested once 
he assumed office. 
 
Crisis as Opportunity: Globalizing Haiti via the HELP Act 
The January 2010 Haitian earthquake revealed the “when” in Harold Lasswell’s 
famous adage. Calls for expanding the HOPE Act came almost immediately after the 
massively destructive earthquake. With all eyes on Haiti it was easy to mobilize a 
network of transnational actors to take advantage of a lapse in popular accountability. The 
restrictive sourcing arrangements that bound Haiti’s labor force to US textile producers 
was again in the cross-hairs. While the Haitian government made overtures to 
international investors, prominent Haitian industrialists represented by the Association 
des Industries d’Haïti (ADIH) aggressively moved to align the domestic apparel industry 
                                                      
74 http://www.ncto.org/newsroom/pr20081029.pdf  
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within global assembly networks.75 On the other end, the overwhelming support for 
action in Haiti was stoked by eager multilateral lenders, prominent economists, aid 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, Asian and US manufacturing giants, branded 
apparel firms, fashion moguls, US policymakers, including former and current US 
presidents.76 
What this network of similar interests had in mind was an expansion of low-wage 
production sites in Haiti. The problem was that established vertical production-sharing 
was inimical to global value chains. The 2010 earthquake provided the opportunity to 
enhance Haiti’s commercial accessibility by locating the country within the global 
landscape of apparel production. It was an occasion to match the region’s cheapest labor 
to more rational sourcing networks. At issue, however, was the existing yarn forward 
rules that provided only a narrow list of suitable textile suppliers. The transnationally-
oriented apparel and retail industry desired flexible rule of origins to take advantage of 
cheap, proximal labor. Touting Haiti’s comparative advantage, prominent industrialist and 
advocate of liberalized trade preferences, Georges Sassine noted that, “the availability of 
labor, the cost of labor, access to the US market [made it a] a win-win-win.”77 To work-
                                                      
75 Forero, Juan. 2010. “After Quake, Haiti Seeks Better Business Climate.” National Public Radio 
(Morning Edition), March 10. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124077512  
 
76 In the aftermath of the disaster, President Barack Obama asked President Bill Clinton and 
President George W. Bush to raise funds to help those who are most in need of assistance. As a 
result, the two Presidents established Clinton Bush Haiti Fund (CBHF). 
http://www.clintonbushhaitifund.org/pages/about/  
 
77 Beaubien, Jason. 2010. “Will 'Made In Haiti' Factories Improve Life In Haiti?” National Public 
Radio (Morning Edition), February 14; http://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/170783895/will-made-in-
haiti-factories-improve-life-in-haiti;  Mark D’Sa, a former Gap Inc. Sourcing Director now Senior 
Advisor for Industrial Development in Haiti at the U.S. Department of State; testimony given at 
March 2010 hearing on Haiti.  
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around the yarn forward rule, apparel and retail lobbyists pushed for the expansion of the 
EIAP and TPL. Both allowed for a larger share of third-country yarns in qualifying, duty-
free apparel exports. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/dsa_testimony.pdf  
Table 4: Summary of HOPE I, HOPE II and HELP Acts 
 
 HOPE I   HOPE II   HELP 
 PL 109-432, Title V, Sec 5001  PL 110-246, Sec 15401   PL    PL111-171, H.R. 5160 & S. 
3275 
Date signed into 
law  
12/20/2006  9/30/08 5/24/2010  
Duration  
 
One-year periods, 2006 
to 2011  
Extended through to 2018 
Extended through to 
2020  
 
50 – 60% value added  Remained the same but 
 
Remained the same, 
but  
Value-Added  must come from US or  reaching the 60% 
eligible apparel 
items  
Requirements  countries party to US  threshold extended to 
under 9820.61.45 
and  
 FTA firms  2018 9820.63.05 extended  
 
Earned Import 
Allowance 
Program  
 
None  3-for-1 2-for-1  
Short Supply Rule  Yes, with limitations  Yes, all fabrics and yarns 
Yes, all fabrics and 
yarns  
Tariff Preference 
Levels  
50 million SMEs for 
woven apparel  
70 million SMEs for 
woven and knit apparel 
each 
 
200 million SMEs 
for woven and knit 
apparel each  
Export Rules  
Shipped directly from 
Haiti 
 
Shipped from Haiti or 
Dominican Republic 
 
Shipped from Haiti 
or Dominican 
Republic 
Source: The Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA). “Trade Preference Programs For Haitian Textile and Apparel”  
http://web.ita.doc.gov/tacgi/eamain.nsf/  
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In February of 2010 Bill Clinton was in Haiti serving as U.N Special Envoy to 
Haiti and head of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission. During his visit Clinton 
intimated that the country could become a potential site for full package assembly 
including factories dedicated to weaving, dyeing, through to packaging. As part of the 
Clinton Foundation, and in close partnership with Korean apparel giant Sae-A, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Haitian government and apparel business elite, Clinton 
lobbied on behalf of extending trade preferences by amending the HOPE legislation. In 
an April 2010 letter to Congressional leadership, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush urged 
increasing the TPL quotas for knit and woven apparel to 250 SMEs and extending the 
length of the preferences from 8 to 15 years. Pointing to the limitations of the current 
legislation, the former presidents noted that: 
[u]nfortunately, the Korean manufacturers are reluctant to invest in Haiti. 
A single Korean firm could consume the current TPL of 70 million. In 
effect, none of the firms will commit if they believe their investment could 
be jeopardized by potential competition for TPL allocations in the future. 
Furthermore, the firms will not consider working in Haiti if their 
investments could be jeopardized by the expiration of the HOPE program 
before they are able to recover their investment. 
 
 
On May 24, 2010, now President Barack Obama signed into law the HELP Act. 
The HELP Act is a modification of both the HOPE II Act and the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule, and was positioned as necessary to help Haiti recover from the January 
earthquake. Most notably, these preferences extended special trade preferences for Haiti 
to 2020 and almost tripled the woven TPL from 70 to 200 million SMEs. It also expands 
the knit TPL and reduces the 3-for-1 earned import credit to 2-for-1 while increasing the 
list of products eligible for duty-free treatment under special assembly rules (see Table 4). 
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Duty-free provisions were also extended to specified knit and woven Haitian garments 
without regard to the origins of the fabric, fabric components, components knit-to-shape, 
or yarn.78 
Though a clear erosion of the yarn forward rule, the passage of the HELP, 
received little push-back from the industry whose interests were most harmed—the US 
textile industry. The acquiescence of the two largest industry representatives can only be 
understood if we consider the circumstances surrounding the bills expeditious movement 
through Congress. Surprisingly conciliatory of the HELP legislation, the American 
Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (AMTAC) and NCTO called the agreement an 
“acceptable compromise”. Framed by the unprecedented circumstances resulting from the 
earthquake, representatives of the US textile and apparel industry: 
recognize[d] that the devastating circumstances in Haiti produced an 
exceptional case that motivated Congress to develop a quick response and 
have worked with the Committee to develop a package that strikes an 
acceptable balance. We must stress, however, that this package does not 
set a precedent for any future trade preference legislation.79 
 
 
The Haitian earthquake created an almost unassailable position for the 
transnational faction to use to their advantage. For example, in the nine-page document 
that chronicled the Congressional debate surrounded the legislation, a search for the term 
“earthquake” uncovered 28 separate mentions of the disaster. Given the pretext of 
urgency and industry representatives considerably more muted in their opposition, HELP 
                                                      
78 “Amendments under the Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 (HELP Act) for Certain 
Apparel and Other Articles.” U.S. Customs and Border Protection. ENT-14 OT:TPP:TAPP:TO 
DL. 
79 Joint statement from Auggie Tantillo, Executive Director of AMTAC and Cass Johnson, 
President of NCTO. “Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010.” Congressional Record-House, 
May 5, 2010. H3137. In April 2013, NCTO merged with the American Manufacturing Trade 
Action Coalition (AMTAC) and the National Textile Association (NTA). 
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passed Congress quickly and easily. 
 
Implications 
The extension of preferences under HELP was an important signal to investors 
that Haiti was indeed “open for business”. Pacified by occupying UN peacekeeping 
forces, newly elected pro-business government, pro-market reforms, and special trade 
preference programs, Haiti had a unique window to exploit development opportunities 
(Collier 2009). The Haitian government, industrial elites, and transnational allies could 
now aggressively pursue the expansion of export processing zones. One such EPZ fast 
tracked following the January earthquake was the Caracol Industrial Park. 
 
Haiti’s Export-Processing Zones and the Fight for Living Wages 
Located in northeast Haiti, Caracol was a collaborative effort between the Clinton 
Global Initiative, South Korean textile giant Sae-A Trading Co. Ltd., the US State 
Department, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Costing upwards of $300 
million, the project allocated the development of over 600 acres of land to include a 10-
megawatt power plant to supply the factory and worker housing in neighboring 
communities, a water-treatment plant, and a port in nearby Fort-Liberté.80 The park 
promised to be at the center of revitalizing the economy by creating up to 65,000 jobs 
                                                      
80 Deborah Sontag. 2012. “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken.” The New York Times, 
July 5. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/world/americas/  
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while easing the pressure of urbanization taking place in Port-au-Prince.81 
While the project was largely lauded for rapid job creation in desperate times, it 
has failed to meet its own employment projections. The industrial park has also been 
criticized for its displacement of farmers, poorly built housing projects, and charges of 
workers being cheated out of their wages.82 In the defense of Caracol, President of the 
Haiti tripartite HOPE Commission, Henri-Claude Müller-Poitevien, says the park directly 
employs over 5,000 Haitians with much of those being first time employees. In addition 
to increased foreign exchange generation, these jobs provide a livable wage and 
possibility for upward mobility. Additionally, the park is responsible for a number of 
indirect jobs related to the development of the northern region of the country; most 
notable being of the expansion of the newly international Cap-Haïtien Airport (Hugo 
Chávez International Airport) and related port facilities.83 
 
Table 5: Monthly real wages for apparel workers, 2001 and 2011 
Country  2001  2011  % Change  
                                                      
81 “Haiti and its partners lay the foundation stone for the Caracol Industrial Park.” Inter-American 
Development Bank, November 28, 2011. http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2011-11-
28/caracol-industrial-park-in-haiti,9724.html  
 
82 Charles, Jacqueline. 2015. “Building permanent housing remains Haiti’s biggest challenge 
following the 2010 earthquake.” Miami Herald. January, 10. 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/; Johnston, Jake. 2014. 
“Outsourcing Haiti”. Boston Review, January 16. http://bostonreview.net/world/jake-johnston-
haiti-earthquake-aid-caracol; Katz, Jonathan M. 2013. “A glittering industrial park in Haiti falls 
short.” Al Jazeera. September, 10. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/10/a-glittering-
industrialparkfallsshortinhaiti.html; “Stealing from the Poor: Wage Theft in the Haitian Apparel 
Industry”. Workers Rights Consortium. October 15, 2013. 
83 O’Grady, Mary Anastasia. 2015. “Hillary’s Half-Baked Haiti Project”. The Wall Street Journal. 
January, 11. http://www.wsj.com/articles/mary-anastasia-ogrady-hillarys-half-baked-haiti-project-
1421018329; Müller-Poitevien, Henri-Claude. 2015. “A WSJ’s Columnist Disregarded About 
Haiti...the Facts”. Huffington Post, January, 13. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/henriclaudemullerhenriclaude-muellerpoitevien/  
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Bangladesh  $93.67  $91.45  -2.37%  
Cambodia  $161.89  $126.26  -22.01%  
China  $144.86  $324.90  +124.29%  
Dominican Republic  $293.52  $223.83  -23.74%  
El Salvador  $332.44  $294.14  -11.52%  
Guatemala  $397.62  $345.75  -13.05%  
Haiti  $104.42  $154.78  +48.22%  
Honduras  $359.47  $327.98  -8.76%  
India  $150.20  $169.67  +12.96%  
Indonesia  $134.90  $186.64  +38.35%  
Mexico  $755.14  $536.57  -28.94%  
Peru  $335.93  $393.43  +17.12%  
Philippines  $249.25  $233.39  -6.36%  
Thailand  $360.33  $337.12  -6.44%  
Vietnam  $182.43  $254.78  +39.66%  
Source: “Global Wage Trends for Apparel Workers, 2001–2011” By the Worker Rights Consortium, July 
11, 2013” Center for American Progress. Wages measured in 2001 USD, PPP. 
 
 
Data reproduced from the Center for American Progress also reveals some 
interesting wage trends for garment workers in major apparel exporting countries. Table 5 
shows that in 2001 monthly wages for Haitian workers ($104.42), when measured in 
2001 US purchasing power parity (PPP), was only ahead of apparel workers in 
Bangladesh ($93.67). In fact, the monthly real wages for Haitian apparel workers was 
well below all regional competitors and rival only to workers in South and East Asia. By 
2011 average wages increased impressively by 48% from $104.42 to $154.78. This was 
the second highest percentage of increase behind China at 124% and ahead of Vietnam at 
40%. Yet still, real wages were only ahead of apparel workers in Cambodia and 
Bangladesh, who both saw their wages erode. For regional competitors, real wages 
declined across the board. The largest such decline was in Mexico at 29%, followed by 
the Dominican Republic at 24%, Guatemala at 13%, and El Salvador at 12%. Real wages 
for Honduran apparel workers declined by only 9%. 
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      Figure 5: Haiti's Apparel Exports to US, 1989 - 2013 
 
    Source: Data compiled from The Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Office of Textile and Apparel 
 
Taken as a whole, Haiti’s trade preference programs have increased Haiti’s 
capacity for garment production. Figure 5 shows that Haiti’s apparel exports to the US 
began to substantively increase after the passage of HOPE II and again after the HELP 
Act. In 2006, exports increased from $449 million to $452 million in 2007, but dropped 
to $412 million in 2008. However, by the end of 2010 exports increased to $517 million. 
That number had grown to $803 million by 2013. In terms of exploiting specific 
advantages of the preference program, Haitian exports utilizing the EIAP have grown 
faster than non-EIAP exports. In 2012 the Department of Commerce’s Office of Textile 
and Apparel (OTEXA) reported issuing 42 million SMEs credits using the EIAP, up from 
about 8 million the previous year.84 That being said, wages have not kept up with 
                                                      
84 http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/PDFs/GAO2012ReportHaiti_Earned_Import_Allowance.pdf  
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efficiency gains in apparel production. Wage theft is prevalent throughout the apparel 
assembly sector in Haiti. A 2013 study by the Workers Rights Consortium finds that 
workers at Caracol lose, on average, 34% of their pay due to systematic errors in the 
factory’s calculations (31 – 34). 
 
Table 6: Prevailing wages compared to living wages in local currency units, 2001 and 2011 
 2001   2011  
Country   Prevailing         
Living, 
proxy 
Prevaili
ng as 
% of 
living 
Prevailing 
Living, 
proxy 
Prevai
ling as 
% of 
living 
Bangladesh 2,083.00              14,715.62 14% 4,062.00 29,624.86 14% 
Cambodia 51.00                   210.18 24% 70.00 364.51 19% 
China 480.00                 2,950.05 16% 1,363.00 3,811.25 36% 
Dominican 
Rep. 
   2,698.00                6,789.59 40% 6,435.00 21,236.96 30% 
El Salvador      162.00                  365.32 44% 210.93 518.60 41% 
Guatemala    1,414.66                2,473.31 57% 2,359.64 4,721.74 50% 
Haiti    1,014.00                6,769.50 15% 5,633.00 23,908.19 24% 
Honduras    2,514.83                4,865.92 52% 4,642.64 9,845.25 47% 
India 
   2,019.55               
10,043.14 
20% 4,422.17 19,468.31 23% 
Indonesia 
 421,958.00           
2,708,675.43 
16% 1,287,471.00 
5,814,077.
48 
22% 
Mexico    4,766.00                5,083.61 94% 5,200.00 7,805.96 67% 
Peru 487.50                 1,171.09 42% 731.25 1,499.47 49% 
Philippines 
   4,979.00               
15,530.48 
32% 7,668.00 24,237.54 32% 
Thailand 
   5,748.50               
12,318.13 
47% 7,026.00 16,270.16 43% 
Vietnam 
730,167.00           
3,167,635.39 
23% 2,306,667.00 
7,844,895.
84 
29% 
Source: “Global Wage Trends for Apparel Workers, 2001–2011” By the Worker Rights Consortium, July 11, 2013” 
Center for American Progress. Wages measured in 2001 USD, PPP. 
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For example, Table 6 is a comparison of prevailing wages to the estimated living 
wages as measured in local currency units (LCU).85 In 2001 apparel workers in Haiti 
earned a prevailing wage that was only 15% of estimated living wages. That was the 
largest gap behind only Bangladesh (14%) and slightly ahead of China and Indonesia 
(both at 16%). The only country where prevailing wages approached living wages was 
Mexico at 94%.86 A decade later, in 2011, Haitian apparel workers earned a prevailing 
wage that was one-quarter or 24% of living wages. The gap for Bangladeshi apparel 
workers remained flat at 14%. The narrowing of gap for Haitian workers moved them 
ahead of workers in Cambodia (19%), Indonesia (22%) and India (23%). 
  And while the wage increases do appear impressive, it should be noted that much 
of the increase came in 2009 following a series of protests. Haitian apparel manufacturers 
contracted to US firms pressured the government to amend a labor law that pegs Haiti’s 
minimum wage to the inflation rate.87 In 2009 the Haitian Congress agreed to adjust the 
daily minimum wage for industrial workers from 70 gourdes (or HTG) or $1.69 to 200 
gourdes or $4.82 per day. Despite protests from workers in the apparel sector, the ADIH 
and their transnational allies were able to negotiate an increase for apparel workers to 
                                                      
85 For a discussion on methodology please see: “Global Wage Trends for Apparel Workers, 2001–
2011” By the Worker Rights Consortium, July 11, 2013” Center for American Progress. pp. 27. 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/RealWageStudy-3.pdf  
 
86 That number is bolstered by the inclusion of overtime compensation. 
 
87 Title II, Chapter VI, Article 137: Code du travail, Décret du 24 février 1984 et Loi du jeudi 5 
juin 2003 actualisant le Code du travail du 12 septembre 1961.  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/135/98545/F1595767852/HTI-135.pdf  
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only 125 gourdes or $3.00 per day and a phased adjustment until October 2012.88 In a 
recent study by the Solidarity Center, Haitian workers making the 2014 minimum wage 
of 225 gourdes a day were still only making about a one-quarter of the estimated cost of 
living (1006 gourdes per day).89 For regional competitors, prevailing wages as percent of 
living wages have declined in the decade between 2001 and 2011. Workers from Mexico 
are receiving approximately 27% less, followed by Dominican Republic at 10%, 
Guatemala at 7%,  Honduras at 5%, and El Salvador at 3%. 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together this data reveals that while productivity has increased, wages have 
not kept pace. Yet, the stagnation of wages and reduction in quality of working conditions 
in assembly plants like Caracol is best understood within the context of developing 
nations trying to industrialize in an age of highly-mobile capital. Trade preferences with 
extended time horizons are important to get investors interested in exploiting the labor 
force. However, to remain competitive, countries must be able to offer the most docile 
labor force, tax exemptions and the ability to repatriate as much profits as possible. The 
Haitian government and local industrialists should be cautious about modeling 
themselves from the East Asian developmental template. This is so because the industrial 
upgrading of East Asia took place within a geo-political epoch driven by US national 
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interest imperatives. To date, Haiti still does not have a fabric mill. Transnational 
capitalists in the apparel sector have no such dogged ideological principles. The 
weakening of yarn forward rules are nothing more than a signal to investors that the 
country is more malleable to sweatshop production. This is symbolic of the current period 
of neoliberal capitalism and the domination of capital over labor. 
As a final point, following the 2010 earthquake, Haiti has arguably been the target 
of the most aggressive and extensive acts of disaster capitalism.  Profiteering individuals, 
prominent international aid agencies and multinational peacekeeping forces have all been 
embroiled in various scandals pertaining to misappropriation of disaster relief funds, 
gross negligence, and human rights abuses. In a more subtle form of capitalizing on 
catastrophe, the 2010 earthquake provided a policymaking vacuum that was filled by a 
set of transnationally-oriented capitalists aligned with the  globalization of apparel 
manufacturing.  Hoping to take advantage of Haiti’s abundance of low-skilled workers, 
this network of capitalists has hastened the dismantling of Cold War-era trade regimes 
that have routinely favored US sourced fabrics and fabric components. Favored by large 
purchasing retailers and branded apparel marketers, this faction of capitalists have been 
strident in their desire for rational production networks, particularly access to cheap 
material sourcing. Aided by a general trend towards multilateral trade regimes and the 
careful construction of transnational alliances of Haitian exporters, this globally-oriented 
faction has affected trade post-disaster trade policy designed to erode the power of a 
nationally-oriented coalition of apparel and textile manufacturers. Perhaps a precursor to 
substantive policy victories in the designs of the 2010 Haitian Economic Lift Program 
(HELP), the 2000 Caribbean Basin Partnership and Trade Agreement (CBPTA) also 
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represented a post-disaster policy opening. This time, the disaster took the form of series 
of hurricanes that affected the Caribbean and Central America. The most destructive 
being Hurricane Mitch. 
CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HURRICANE MITCH 
 
I have sent legislation to Congress, just last week before I came here, 
asking for greater liberalization of trade for the Central American and 
Caribbean nations to move closer toward parity with NAFTA in Mexico. I 
was profoundly disappointed last year that we did not pass the trade-
opening initiative. And of course, after the hurricane struck, I was even 
more disappointed. I think now, ironically because of the hurricane, we 
may have a better chance to pass a bill. And I will do everything I can do 
to that end. 
Bill Clinton 
March 9, 1999 
Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion 
On Hurricane Mitch Reconstruction 
Efforts in Tegucigalpa, Honduras 
 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the theme of explaining post-disaster policy outcomes 
through the prism of conflictual business interests. A natural disaster as a harbinger of 
neoliberal policy change is incomplete without a clearer understanding of the disposition 
of opposing interests, distribution of institutional power, foreign policy objectives, and 
the global commercial environment.  The chapter thus seeks to strengthen disaster 
capitalism as a predictor of policy outcomes by examining the positioning of actors 
surrounding a window of opportunity. This time I pivot over to Honduras, Hurricane 
Mitch, and the political and economic environment leading up to - and directly following 
- the natural disaster.  
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The neoliberal project was well on its way by the time Hurricane Mitch made 
landfall in 1998. However, its application ran into a series of problems. First, Honduras’ 
economy was still heavily state-directed and highly dependent on traditional modes of 
capital accumulation. Second, insertion into the new global economy required a coherent 
elite transnational class tied to the global circuits of textile and apparel production; 
something the country lacked as it tenuously returned to civilian governance in the early 
80s. Finally, the impetus for developing Latin American economies as a stalwart to leftist 
movements had lost considerable fervor since the passage of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) in the mid-80s. Vertically integrated apparel manufacturers and textile 
producers who had relocated production to CBI countries now found their comparative 
advantage considerably narrowed as trade concessions shifted elsewhere. The most 
potentially damaging of those concessions was the passage of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA had given Mexican apparel exports a more 
privileged path to US markets, and trade legislation that would secure similar trade 
incentives for transnationals operating in CBI countries were stalled in the Congress of 
the United States. 
After several failures between 1992 and 1998, so called “NAFTA-parity” 
legislation was rejuvenated following the disastrous events of Hurricane Mitch. 
Furthermore, partisan politics threatened to obstruct the legislation beyond the Clinton 
administration. Any move forward with NAFTA-parity was in peril due to House 
impeachment of the President in December of 1998. Yet, the disaster also created a sense 
of optimism as its supporters sought to position the bill as a trade-instead-of-aid package 
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alongside Hurricane Mitch relief.90 US Congressional members in support of parity used 
the disaster as an opportunity to advance legislation now couched in terms of 
reconstruction, development assistance, and debt relief, instead of preferential agreements 
and one-way trade. 
Following the disaster, the Honduran government immediately declared the entire 
country an export-processing zone (EPZ). In anticipation of further unchallenged 
opportunities to liberalize the economy, the government also put the country’s ports, 
airports, state-owned electricity and telephone companies on a “fast track” privatization 
process.91 There was also an  organized campaign to lobby Congress to move on 
NAFTA-parity legislation and USAID sponsored  Honduran business associations  made 
post-disaster visits to the US and used the opportunity to actively sell the virtues of the 
country’s maquiladoras to US apparel makers.  
The irony is that the Honduran maquiladoras had been mostly unscathed from the 
effects of the hurricane. Local political coalitions and private actors saw this as 
advantageous because with the industry intact, it was now an important avenue for 
immediate job creation and economic recovery. There was also a sense of urgency to get 
negotiations done, given the upcoming multilateral expiration of quotas on apparel and 
the impending ascension of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
As for national corporate interests, US-based apparel manufacturers made a series 
of policy shifts that aligned it more with the trade liberalization ethos of retailers and 
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importers. This group of actors favored the disaggregation of the production process, in 
particular, greater fabric sourcing options. NAFTA-parity for this group meant removing 
restrictive yarn forward rules favoring US textile producers. In opposition, prominent 
members of the powerful US textile lobby started consolidating the apparel supply chain 
by opening up full-package assembly plants in the Caribbean Basin, ahead of the 
perceived Asian invasion. In an effort to maintain the primacy of their fabrics in apparel 
destined for US markets, these firms adopted a strategy of integrated manufacturing, 
distribution and retail. Textile producers thus moved to use the Caribbean Basin to 
vertically integrate fabric procurement with design, marketing, dyeing, cutting, sewing, 
and warehousing. NAFTA-parity was only feasible if it accorded primacy to US 
produced yarn and fibers. 
The final passage of NAFTA-parity legislation was accordingly a convergence of 
a series of events and circumstances. New multilateral trade regimes threatened the 
benefits gleaned by US transnationals with ties to assembly operation in the Caribbean 
Basin. Yet, it was these same transnational interest groups now forced to respond to the 
consequences of their changing internal dispositions interacting with previously 
advantageous policy preferences afforded to them by CBI and USAID initiatives. The 
confluence of NAFTA competition and impending multilateral trade norms all conspired, 
with a natural disaster, to affect change in US regional trade policy.  
In the end, the disaster accorded an entrenched coalition of transnational actors to 
shape, direct, and pass NAFTA-parity. Most fervent of these interests were US textile 
producers, apparel manufacturers, large purchasing retailers and importers. Positioned 
within the post-disaster discourse of economic stimulus, rapid job creation, and 
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reconstruction aid, the 2000 Caribbean Basin Trade and Partnership Act (CBTPA) gave 
the 24 CBI beneficiary countries, including Honduras, long awaited trade preferences on 
par with Mexico. The disaster helped drive Congressional action on trade legislation that 
had roused divisions among transnational retailers and importers and protectionists US 
producers. At stake was control over the global apparel supply chain. Retailers and 
importers seeking global sourcing alternatives to help drive costs down, and US-based 
textile and apparel producers wanting to maintain the primacy of US fabric and fabric 
components in apparel destined for US markets.  
As the policymaking process took shape, what eventually emerged from 
Congressional deliberation reflected the underlying forces of the aforementioned 
interests: a continuation of 30 years of assembly-based manufacturing managed by 
vertically-integrated US transnationals. This chapter will begin to trace this policy 
process in the United States and Honduras through an examination of its key actors. Of 
primary emphasis will be the US textile and apparel industry as it responded to shifting 
US foreign policy objectives, global economic forces, its own internal inconsistencies, 
and a natural disaster in Central America.  
 
Chapter Overview 
The following section begins with an overview of the context in which trade 
developed in Central America and the Caribbean. Communism, corporate restructuring, 
and competition were the prevailing motivators for embracing the Caribbean Basin 
deeper into US sphere of influence. The third section is a brief overview of the political 
economy of Honduras. Particular attention will be paid to the growth of EPZs and the 
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transnational alliances forged between USAID and domestic business associations that 
made Honduras an ideal location for apparel manufacturing. The fourth section looks at 
the passage of NAFTA and the effect that had on CBI beneficiaries, including Honduras. 
Section 5 addresses the politics of NAFTA-parity reboot in the face of Hurricane Mitch. 
The CBTPA is analyzed in section 6. In contrast to a victory for transnational commercial 
interests that we saw in Haiti, the final CBTPA was designed to favor the vertically 
integrated protectionist bloc of the US textile and apparel industry. However, retailers 
and branded marketers, were able to get meaningful sourcing concessions elsewhere, 
namely in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The chapter closes with 
commentary on the dependency paradigm in which Honduras and other CBI nations were 
allowed to develop, with help from USAID-honed transnational alliances, quasi-free 
trade agreements and, of course, natural disasters.  
 
The US, South Korea, and Honduras and Wendy Diaz 
By the time a teary-eyed Kathie Lee Gifford testified in front of a Senate 
subcommittee it was too late. The actress, singer, and host of a widely popular morning 
show had become the derisive personification of sweatshops. Kathie Lee Gifford had 
loaned her name and celebrity to relatively affordable apparel products for the retail giant 
Wal-Mart. In an effort to satisfy value-seeking customers and maximize profits, Wal-
Mart contracted out the assembly of these products to an independent apparel 
manufacturer operating in Honduras. In turn, this apparel contractor set up shop in a 
designated export-processing zone (EPZ) where it appeared child labor, in part, was 
being used to cost-effectively bring these products to US markets.    
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For her part in delivering frugal shoppers to the final checkout line, Kathie Lee 
took home almost $9 million a year. Yet, the britches of her $19.96 pants sold at Wal-
Mart “were made by a factory with 100 children earning 25 cents a pair and enjoying a 
74-hour workweek”.92 Making that claim was Charles Kernaghan of the National Labor 
Committee (NLC), who, in his own Congressional testimony, implicated Kathie Lee 
Clothing and Wal-Mart in running Honduran sweatshops predicated on the exploitation 
of teenage girls.  
One of those teenagers, Wendy Diaz, a 15 year old who worked at a factory that 
made Kathie Lee branded apparel, had (with the help of Kernaghan) become the other 
face of sweatshop production.  At 4’9”, soft-spoken and articulate, Ms. Diaz developed 
her own form of celebrity as she made the media rounds and recalling in testimony that 
she starting working for the South Korean multinational, Global Fashions, at the age of 
13. She recounted harrowing incidences of verbal, physical and sexual abuse that took 
place at the manufacturing plant.93  
In the mid-90s, US labor unions, transnational labor activists, fair traders, 
environmentalist groups, and human rights organizations presented a case for the unseen 
results of economic globalization. Ms. Diaz’s was just another example. The oft-
categorized dictatorial regimes, who exploit their low-skilled labor force, did not operate 
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in a vacuum, but where rather legitimized by US trade laws, facilitated by US 
corporations, and financed by US consumers.  The publicity surrounding these incidences 
help set off a series of inquiries into labor practices in the United States and around the 
world.94 More importantly, Kernaghan managed to disentangle the web of contracting 
and sub-contracting buffers and draw a straight line from the likes of Global Fashions to 
Wal-Mart, from Wendy Ruiz to Kathie Lee Gifford. What was now entering public 
perception had been several decades in the making.  
 
Economic Globalization: Textile and Apparel in the Crosshairs 
Increased financialization of the American economy has led to the systematic 
offshoring of the industrial sector. Capital-intensive activities has supplanted labor-
intensive activities as a means of capital accumulation. This reality of economic 
globalization played out across US industrial sectors; none more poignant than in 
American textile and apparel manufacturing hubs, which had shrunk considerably since 
the post-War era. To provide a bit of context, in 1940 about 40% of the jobs in North 
Carolina were in textile and apparel manufacturing, by 2013 that was down to 1%.95 
Furthermore, the pattern of corporate restructuring did not affect textile and apparel 
manufacturers equally.  
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At its peak in 1948, textiles created 1.3 million US jobs. The industry has since 
seen a sharp decline, particularly in the past two decades. In 1990, the textile industry 
employed over 500,000 Americans, in 2011 that number fell to approximately 119,000.96 
Between 1997 and 2009 alone, 650 textile plants have closed up shop and more than 
200,000 jobs were lost. In spite of this, the industry has been able to recover some due 
largely to technological innovations in the production of synthetic fibers and increased 
automation at textile plants.97 On the contrary, with little prospects for a mechanized shop 
floor, apparel manufacturing has seen an even steeper decline in US operations. In 1990, 
employment in apparel manufacturing and component industries was over 900,000.  In 
2011 that number was down to a little over 150,000.98 By the close of 1996, the US 
apparel market had shed approximately 61,000 jobs from the previous year. That was 
more than any other private-sector business; the second closest manufacturer being food 
manufacturers, whose industry contracted by 22,000 workers.99  
A key force driving massive loss of jobs was retail demands for their suppliers to 
be both responsive to fashion trends, and to do so at competitive wholesale prices.100 
Apparel giants VF Corp. and Sara Lee were just two of the companies that were in the 
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midst of major restructuring during the mid-90s. VF closed 13 factories between 1995 
and 1996 and laid off 7,800 workers. The company boasted that 35%, up from 15-20%, 
of the apparel sold in the US was produced in foreign factories. VF’s Director of Investor 
Relations, Cindy Knoebel explained that “[t]here was a pressure on us to take a sharper 
look at costs…but that is still 65 percent that will remain in the U.S. We still feel like we 
need to have a strong domestic base in order to be close to our retail customers.”101 Sara 
Lee’s restructuring led to 50% of its worldwide workforce for its Champion and Hanes 
brands being laid off, much of that related to its US operations.  
Textile giant Fruit of the Loom faced similar restructuring. In 1996, the textile 
company closed two domestic sewing operations. Capturing the core of industry 
restructuring, a company spokesperson pointed out that “[i]t’s the sewing jobs that are 
still at issue here in the industry. Spinning operations, knitting and cloth finishing have all 
remained in the U.S. In many areas we’ve been hiring people at an aggressive clip in the 
U.S., like management information systems, marketing, manufacturing technology and 
production management.”102 Downsizing and closures created opportunities for skilled 
individuals participating in high value-added activities while leading to the dislocation of 
the low-skilled, under-educated, mostly female workforce. In its place, garment assembly 
plants sprung up all over the world, with promises of greater productivity and lower labor 
costs.103  
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One-Way Trade 
The ethos surrounding the Cold War did play a significant role in the geography 
of US textile and apparel corporate restructuring.  As described in the previous chapter, 
events of the late-1970s refocused US foreign policymakers’ attention on halting the 
advance of leftist movements in Latin America and the Caribbean. In response, the 
Reagan administration rolled out the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) as a regional 
program of developmental aid, trade preferences, and US private sector investment. In 
what was a deviation from the multilateralism that had dominated US trade negotiations 
since the end of World War II, the CBI represented a one-way, trade zone that effectively 
fixed the region’s abundant, low-skilled, labor-force into the manufacture of cheap 
products for the American consumer. The artificial delineation of the ‘Caribbean Basin’ 
as a free trade zone was a boon for US industries seeking to take advantage of proximity 
and lower labor rates. None more poised than the vertically-integrated US textile and 
apparel industry.  
Though seeking to expand markets, US textile and apparel groups were unhappy 
with the initial legislative form of the CBI, referred to as the Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act (CBERA). CBERA granted unilateral preferential treatment for select 
products imported from CBI beneficiaries. Due to fears of direct competition from CBI 
textile producers and apparel manufacturers, and because the industry have been granted 
designation as import-sensitive, their products were deemed ineligible and generally 
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excluded from the CBERA. Self-imposed marginalization would not last long however as 
the industry soon had another reason to worry.  
Thanks to retailers, branded marketers, and branded manufacturers, newly 
emerging economies like South Korea had developed locally autonomous, full-package 
apparel assembly operations. These retailers and large-scale purchasers had little concern 
for the origin of intermediate inputs, but rather focused on driving down costs along the 
supply chain. By breaking with US apparel producers and contracting with globally-
oriented apparel manufacturers, they were able to exert more influence on the efficiency 
of global apparel supply chains. Alternatively, left alone to resolve supply chain 
management, East Asian producers were able to link their domestic economy through the 
clustering of small- and medium-scale enterprises along the apparel production network. 
This in turn facilitated industrial upgrading, wealth creation, and the movement of the 
labor force into higher-value activities. As East Asian labor costs became more cost 
prohibitive, they developed globally dispersed production systems (Gereffi 1999). The 
abundance of cheap labor in the Caribbean Basin would help to expand their apparel 
manufacturing capabilities proximal to their end market. This was indeed the case in 
Honduras, where by 1992 there were already 19 South  Korean companies operating in 
Honduran garment assembly plants. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore also maintained 
a noteworthy presence (Norseworthy 1994: 83). Vertically integrated US apparel and 
textile producers, concerned by the encroachment of full package East Asian apparel 
manufacturers, used their political connections to erect preferential trade deals that would 
favor their fabric and fabric components in apparel products intended for US consumers.  
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This bloc of vertically integrated US producers had already influenced 
policymakers to erect a series of trade barriers including the use of quotas  and various 
other forms of restrictions on textile imports from East Asia to the US (Destler 2005; 
Gereffi 1999: 59). For East Asian producers, moving production to the Caribbean Basin 
offered a solution to these trade barriers and provided proximity advantages to the US 
market. In response, US textile and apparel manufacturers sought even more creative 
ways to increase regional insertion and mitigate further East Asian incursion. The group 
rallied to influence protectionist trade rules that took advantage of the region’s 
comparatively low labor rates, protected the higher-value added activities of the domestic 
textile and apparel industries, and required the use of threads and fabrics of US-origin in 
garments produced for the US market.  
What emerged was the Special Access Program for Caribbean Apparel Imports 
(SAP) in February of 1986.104 The core of the program was preferred access to the US of 
garments produced in CBI beneficiary countries, given they were produced from fabric 
and yarn both made and cut in the US. To help facilitate this, emphasis would be placed 
on expanding production-sharing facilities or export processing zones (EPZs) throughout 
the Caribbean Basin. These free trade zones allowed US apparel firms and branded 
marketers to offshore lower value-added activities like sewing fabrics while maintaining 
domestically, higher value-added activities like research, design, finance, and 
distribution. For US textile firms, in particular, the motivation was even simpler: preserve 
US apparel companies as purchasers of their fabrics. With pure protectionist motive, 
production-sharing entailed (1) the shipping of intermediate materials from the United 
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States to the Caribbean Basin, (2) from there, these materials were assembled, then (3) 
shipped back to US consumer markets with duties applied only to the labor value-added. 
Latin America and the Caribbean as a locale for these assembly operations would serve 
both the interest of US policy planners and textile and apparel industries. The influx of 
low-skilled jobs targeting the poor would relieve sources of popular recruitment and 
illegal migration to the US. Transnational apparel and textile manufactures could also use 
the region’s comparative advantage to downsize their relatively expensive domestic labor 
force, increase productivity, and still maintain control over a vertically integrated 
production network.  
Nevertheless, the rationale of quasi open markets was neither unassailable nor 
without losers. Small-scale manufacturers, contractors, and domestic suppliers had 
difficulty competing with economies of scale and vertically integrated supply chains. 
Large-scale US retailers also found restrictive sourcing arrangements to be unduly 
burdensome on consumers, and the bottom-line. Additionally, the processes of economic 
integration and corporate restructuring left the American worker exposed to the global 
workforce.  And for whatever gains gleaned from the assembly of imported inputs, the 
global workforce had to contend with inferior wages and working standards of those from 
job-exporting countries.105 Finally, for Caribbean Basin countries, US designed trade 
preference programs put a glass ceiling on the very promise of economic diversification 
and growth as outlined in the CBI. Vertically integrated production networks precluded 
the crucial global sourcing networks necessary for industrial upgrading and full-package 
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assembly. As with the impetus for creating the Caribbean Basin, perceived liberalization 
of the trade program would require perceived, or real, crises. 
 
Forging Transnational Alliances: Honduras 
Figure 6. Map of Honduras, Departments and Major Cities. 
 
 
About the size of Ohio, Honduras is a mountainous Central American country 
bordered by Guatemala to the northwest, El Salvador to the southwest, and Nicaragua to 
the southeast. It has access to the Atlantic Ocean via the Caribbean Sea to the north and 
the Pacific Ocean through the southwestern Gulf of Fonseca (Figure 6). Though the 
capital, Tegucigalpa, is located in the southern-central Francisco Morazán department, 
the northern port departments, particularly Cortés, Atlántida, and Colón are the de facto 
industrial base of the country. The second poorest country in the region, Honduras has an 
urbanized population accounting for over half of its 9 million people. The GDP per capita 
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is about $5,000 with a GDP growth rate of 3.5%. The country is beleaguered by 
substantial income disparities and 60% of its population living below the poverty line. 
Foreign exchange is primarily generated through the agro-export and apparel industries, 
with the United States as its chief trading partner.106  
 
Export Orientation and USAID 
US regional foreign policy had always considered unemployment and poverty 
responsible for leftist insurgencies and migrant flows to the US (Weintraub 1983). In his 
1982 speech unveiling the CBI, Ronald Reagan argued as much, saying “[e]verywhere 
[communism] has exploited and aggravated temporary economic suffering to seize power 
and then to institutionalize economic deprivation and suppress human rights.” The 
president furthered that the current “economic disaster is consuming our neighbors’ 
money, reserves, and credit, forcing thousands of people to leave for other countries, for 
the United States, often illegally, and shaking even the most established democracies.”107 
In subsequent country studies, USAID confirmed as much citing unemployment and 
underemployment as the most significant problem facing the stability and growth of 
Honduras.108 For this reason, USAID development plans would focus on fostering small- 
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and medium-scale enterprises as a source of immediate job creation, particularly for the 
poor.  
USAID decided to put significant resources into key Honduran Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that supported small- and medium-scale 
businesses. According to policy papers, the goal of USAID involvement was to 
“strengthen and expand an institutional system that will increase and improve the supply 
of credit, training, technical assistance, and services to [small-scale enterprises] SSEs; 
and improve the policy and regulatory environment in which SSEs operate.”109 This 
entailed making grant money available through local private financial institutions. To 
affect the larger policy and regulatory environment, USAID would work primarily 
through (and at times around) government officials and existing business coalitions.110  
One such coalition was the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP). 
Formed in 1966 as an alliance of industrialists, merchants, bankers and landed capital, 
COHEP was the preeminent business organization in Honduras. Though a private sector 
association, in the 1980s it was directed “by national capitalists tied to the older national 
circuits of accumulation and state-sponsored development strategies” (Robinson 2003: 
124). It is worth noting that the scope and pacing of structural reforms was always tied to 
the strategic importance of Honduras in US plans for the region. Leveraging that 
importance, nationalistic governments could persist in state-sponsored development 
strategies throughout the 80s. This protectionist alliance of government and private sector 
actors, like COHEP, hampered USAID technocrats efforts to build a transnational 
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coalition of capitalists tied to global circuits of production; if only for a brief period of 
time.  
In 1981, the same year that Honduras moved toward a return to civilian rule, 
USAID launched the Private Business Initiative in Latin America. The goal was to 
support the development of the private sector as part of the larger plans of the 
forthcoming CBI (Jackson 2005: 210-211; Rosen 2002: 132). The emergence of the  New 
Right faction into the Honduran political space by the mid-1980s was advantageous to 
the northern industrialists and financiers. As much as COHEP aligned ideologically with 
the newly elected, rightist, Nationalist Party, they did not share in a neoliberal vision 
hostile to state-sponsored developmental policies.  
Circumventing the state, USAID began channeling monies into various 
associations in an effort to create a “new guard” against economic nationalists like 
COHEP. This included financial and other support being sent to the likes of the National 
Association of Honduran Exporters (ANEXHON); the National Association of 
Industrialists (ANDI); the Honduran Management Association (GEMAH); the Honduran-
American Chamber of Commerce (HAMCHAM); the National Council to Promote 
Exports and Investments (CONAFEXI); the Federation of Agro-Export Producers 
(FEPROEXAH); and the National Development Foundation of Honduras 
(FUNDAHEH).  
These new groups, hand-picked by USAID, aligned more with the new 
Nationalist Party and the transnational project outlined by the US State. Thereupon, in 
1984, the first year the CBI went into effect, the Foundation for Research and Business 
Development (FIDE) was founded as a union between ANDI, ANEXHON, GEMAH, 
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and HAMCHAM. FIDE went operational in June of that year with much help from a 
$300,000 grant from USAID. By August, it received $4.1 million in USAID funds to be 
the key promoter of the maquiladora industry (Jackson 2005: 216). With such a windfall 
of financial resources, within a matter of months, FIDE became the most potent business 
association in Honduras.111 With its Washington backers, FIDE was now positioned to 
rapidly “promote the reorganization of the private sector, spread their influence within 
the state and civil society, foster new economic activities, and develop neo-liberal social 
and economic policies” (Robinson 2003: 124).  
Financial support was not, however, limited to Honduran NGOs. Funding also 
targeted both the public policymaking apparatus and the private transnational class. For 
example, to affect the legislative environment, $1.4 million was made available to 
government officials for activities such as observation trips to EPZs in Mexico and the 
Dominican Republic. Portions of these funds also supported training programs, export 
policy advisers, and expert services for the purpose of drafting and promoting new 
legislation. Some of these experts consulted from within the Honduran Ministry of 
Economy, Ministry of Finance, and Customs Office at rates as much as $12,500 per 
month. USAID also provided $9.2 million for a campaign to promote Honduran 
maquiladoras abroad. Monies were also funneled through The Central Bank of Honduras. 
In what amounted to low-interest loans, private sector actors had access to another $10.2 
million of foreign exchange through an Export Trust Fund (Jackson 2005: 218-219).  
                                                      
111 Even the nationalist COHEP eventually ceded power to the export-oriented group. In 1988, 
Richard Zablah, a maquiladora businessman and representative of the transnational faction of 
business interests, ascended to the presidency of the organization. Zablah also served as the 
president of FIDE and ANEXHON. 
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The amount and nature of USAID money disbursement did not go unnoticed. 
Charles Kernaghan, and the aforementioned National Labor Committee (NLC), took aim 
at what they considered the flagrant use of US public dollars to help private companies 
move their businesses overseas. In the NLCs 1992 publication, Paying to Lose our Jobs, 
Jack Sheinkman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, 
argued that: 
American workers, as taxpayers, are helping to pay to export their own 
jobs. Behind our backs, U.S. tax dollars have been used to conceive, plan, 
finance, manage and promote the development of export processing zones 
across Central America and the Caribbean. These zones house 
manufacturing industries producing goods destined for the U.S. market. 
The Administration has also used U.S. tax dollars to target, persuade, and 
provide incentives to U.S. companies to relocate production offshore (1).  
 
Also making note of the poor working conditions in these countries, the NLC charged 
that since 1983 USAID had spent 289 million of taxpayer dollars to support export 
promotion organizations in the Caribbean Basin, including $43.5 million to FIDE in 
Honduras (NLCEF 1992: 11-12).112  
In response, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1993 did a series of 
investigations including one challenging USAID’s quantitative assessments of their 
program as it pertained to monies flowing back to US economy and job creation.113  The 
                                                      
112 The other major projects went to support the Salvadoran Foundation for Social and Economic 
Development FUSADES: $102,396,000; Jamaica's Economic Development Agency JAMPRO: $ 
34,960,000; and the Costa Rican Investment and Development CINDE: $ 32,500,000. “Paying to 
Lose Our Jobs.” National Labor Committee Education Fund In Support of Worker and Human 
Rights in Central America. September 1992. 
 
113 As part of the 1961 Foreign assistance Act, USAID can “use funds for procurement outside the 
United States only if the President determined that such procurement would not result in certain 
adverse effects upon the United States”. However, procurement regulations did not apply to cash 
payments or grants and cooperative agreements. Cash payments, 40% of estimated distribution of 
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publicity of using taxpayers’ money to support the loss of US jobs also led Congress to 
make changes to the 1993-1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.  Targeting 
USAID export development programs particularly, section 547 made explicit that:   
[n]one of the funds appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended 
to provide—(a) any financial incentive to a business enterprise currently 
located in the United States for the purpose of inducing such an enterprise 
to relocate outside the United States if such incentive or inducement is 
likely to reduce the number of employees of such business enterprise in 
the United States […]; (b) assistance for the purpose of establishing or 
developing in a foreign country any export processing zone or designated 
area in which the tax, tariff, labor, environment, and safety laws of that 
country do not apply, in part or in whole, to activities carried out within 
that zone or area […]; or (c) assistance for any project or activity that 
contributes to the violation of internationally recognized workers’ rights, 
[…] including any designated zone or area in that country.114 
 
 
Export Processing Zones 
The aforementioned export-processing zones (EPZs) are labor-intensive hubs, 
streamlined for the duty-free import of machinery, equipment and materials dedicated to 
the manufacture and export of goods. The use of EPZs has always been strongly 
contested by transnational labor organizations for what should be considered obvious 
reasons.115 EPZs are generally built in poorer countries with comparatively lower labor 
                                                                                                                                                              
USAID's annual obligations, were understood “to promote US national security and political and 
economic objectives and not required to use US goods or services.” Grants and cooperative 
agreements were 14% of the budget and was “used to support or enhance the activities of 
independent organizations such as educational institutions and private voluntary organizations 
that contribute to the achievement of foreign assistance objectives.” USAID could also relax the 
procurement requirements for this type of assistance. The United States General Accounting 
Office. “The Accuracy of AID Statistics on Dollars Flowing Back to the U.S. Economy is 
Doubtful”. Foreign Assistance. GAO/NSIAD-93-196. August 1993. pg. 11-12. 
114 H.R.2295 - Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1994 103rd Congress (1993-1994). 
 
115 Ibid. 32. 
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rates and less recourse for poor labor practices. The manufacturing plants are easy to 
construct and are often wholly or partially subsidized by the host country. Companies 
enjoy full profit repatriation, tax holidays, credits for employment creation and a variety 
of other indirect and direct subsidies. Not to mention, because these are free market 
enclaves financially and physically separate from the domestic economy, investors are 
largely shielded from government interference and political turmoil.  
Because of this novelty in capital accumulation, CBI member states must orient 
their economies (read: their abundant, low-skilled labor force) to globalized circuits of 
apparel production.116 Transnational apparel assembly operations had been taking place 
in Honduras as early as 1965.117 The Honduras government began its initial foray into 
EPZs in 1976. The Free Zone Law (FZ) allowed The Honduran government, through the 
National Port Authority, to create geographical zones for foreign firms to operate 
production plants. The incentives featured a reduction of import duties, less paperwork, 
indefinite tax exemptions, and looser controls on foreign exchange. Ninety-five percent 
of annual production had to be exported, with special government approval required for 
selling the other 5% in local markets. Nonetheless, this venture failed to entice enough 
foreign investors as government rent extraction persisted through import and export 
duties and property taxes. Consequently, EPZ penetration was initially limited to only 
Puerto Cortes (Jackson 2005: 215).  
                                                      
116 World Bank. 1992. “Export Processing Zones.” Policy and Research Series Paper 20, Industry 
and Energy Department, Washington, D.C.; Madani, Dorsati. 1998. “A Review of the Role and 
Impact of Export Processing Zones.” World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
117 Sears was one of the first transnationals that took advantage of Item 807.00 under the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States - which reduced multi-country assembly tariffs - and relocated 
some sewing operations to the country. 
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To remedy this, the Regime Temporary Admission (RTA) of 1984 and the Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ) Law of 1987 opened up the possibility for private development of 
industrial parks. Benefits to private developers include easier access to capital through 
USAID funded initiatives and income taxes exemptions for a period of 20 years. 
Recipient companies were also allowed to maintain much of the benefits of the FZ law in 
exchange for meeting job creation benchmarks (5,000 jobs within five years). As a result, 
investments increased and expanded across Honduras. Between 1987 and 1993, EPZs 
sprung up throughout the north in La Lima and San Pedro Sula. They later extended to 
Tegucigalpa, Choloma, and Choluteca. 
 
Table 7: Firm and Employment Growth in the Honduran Maquiladora Sector, 1990 - 2005 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Number of Firms 24 135 218 306 
Number of Employees 
(in thousands) 
           9.0            55.0 106.5 125.2 
Source: de Hoyos et al.; Central Bank of Honduras 
  
Maquila production in Honduras grew significantly during the reform period. 
According to Table 7, in 1990 there were 24 firms employing about 9,000 Hondurans. By 
1995 that number drastically increased to 135 firms with an estimated 55,000 employees. 
Following hurricane Mitch, the entire country was designated a free trade zone. This led 
to another spike in EPZ growth. And though still heavily concentrated in the northern 
port cities, EPZs are now located throughout the country (McCallum 2011: 9). By 2001, 
total investment in Honduran EPZs was $1.4 billion, with about half, $670 million 
coming from domestic sources. The US supplied the largest source of foreign direct 
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investment at $370 million, with $146 million coming from South Korea. Additionally, 
54% of the apparel industry workforce was employed in US-owned companies, 17% 
from South Korea 17%, Honduras accounted for 15% and a variety of Asian countries 
combined for 10%. Canada made up the other 5%. In terms of employment, 90,000 
workers are engaged in apparel production with another 4,500 employed  in textile mills. 
The average salary of a maquiladora worker was $3,718, compared the average per capita 
income of $850 in Honduras. Honduras receives most of its cotton fabric and yarn from 
the United States and much of its synthetic woven fabrics from the likes of South Korea, 
Taiwan and China. The majority of Honduran apparel is basic run knit tops (T-shirts) and 
underwear produced from cotton and synthetic fibers. Between 1997 and 2002 the US 
imported $2.4 billion of these apparel products from Honduras, ranking only behind 
Mexico and China.118  
The labor-specific industrialization of Honduras, and the Caribbean Basin in 
general, correlates with the deindustrialization of textile and apparel manufacturing in the 
US. As Honduras was liberalizing their economy to fit global modes of production, US 
apparel firms were also restructuring in terms of core competencies. Low value-added 
activities like manufacturing were sent overseas in favor of maintaining high value-added 
activities like design, finance, and distribution.  The CBI became the policy instrument 
through which these US-based lead firms could manage offshore garment assembly 
operations. As the US deindustrialized and organized labor became increasingly 
marginalized, retailers and importers emerged as new a block in support of further 
                                                      
118 United States International Trade Commission Publication. 2004. Textile and Apparel: 
Assessment of the Competitiveness of Certain Foreign Suppliers to the U.S. Market. 3671.  
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disaggregation of the production process; often at odds with the protectionist disposition 
of regional production-sharing.  
The international environment had also changed considerably. Led by the 
executive office, the US had committed to multilateral trade liberalization in the Tokyo 
and Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To the 
chagrin of Congressional members from apparel manufacturing and textile producing 
states, these agreements targeted the dismantling of tariff and quota regimes. 
Additionally, the US began to negotiate a peripheral trade agreement with Andean 
countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) as well as a much larger two-way trade 
agreement with Canada and Mexico.  
 
NAFTA to NAFTA-parity 
“Just a year ago yesterday, I signed into law NAFTA, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. You can clap for that.”119 
 
Bill Clinton  
December 9, 1994 
Remarks on Goals of the Summit of the Americas  
Miami, Florida 
 
It was all Clinton could do to in an attempt to disarm a room of 34 of the 
hemisphere’s leaders. The skepticism surrounding NAFTA centered on Mexico’s new 
trade preferences with the US that threatened to divert investment away from CBI 
beneficiaries to its immediate southern neighbor. In response, CBI countries sought 
                                                      
119 William J. Clinton: "Remarks on Goals of the Summit of the Americas in Miami," December 
9, 1994. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49572. 
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NAFTA-parity legislation that, by the end of 1994, did not appear to be immediately 
forthcoming.  
In the 1992 presidential campaign, NAFTA emerged as a wedge issue. Both Bush 
and Clinton had to defend their free trade platforms, across the spectrum, against Ralph 
Nader and Ross Perot. Nader had mobilized considerable support against what he deemed 
corporate globalization embodied in GATT and NAFTA. Critical of the president’s fast-
track authority, Nader called for more debate concerning trade laws that would 
potentially hurt US labor, consumers, and the environment.120 Ross Perot, who made two-
way trade central to his campaign, famously described American job loss as “a giant 
sucking sound going South”.121 His campaign reaffirmed keeping jobs in the United 
States and reviving its manufacturing capabilities. Nader and Perot help set the agenda by 
taking a skeptical position on partially reciprocated trade deals like NAFTA.  Given that 
level cynicism during an election cycle, there was less of an appetite for the extension of 
non-reciprocal trade benefits for Caribbean Basin countries.  
 
Mexico and US Trade Agreements: Pre-NAFTA 
Mexico had always maintained a privileged position in trade relations with the 
US, even prior to NAFTA. Mexico’s size, proximity, and political stability gave it an 
advantage over the disparate CBI nations. Mexico had also developed infrastructure 
dedicated to twin-plant assembly operations. Maquiladoras had been in operation in the 
northern border regions since the 1960s. Taking advantage of Item 807.00 of the US 
                                                      
120 Herbert, Bob. 1993. “In America; Nafta And the Elite.” The New York Times, 10 November.  
 
121 “The 1992 Campaign; Transcript of 2d TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton and Perot.” The 
New York Times. October 1992. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rkgx1C_S6ls 
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Tariff Schedule, Mexico was producing a range of duty and tariff-free goods for the US 
market. These included agricultural products, furniture, electronics, and machinery. By 
1990, Mexico was the US’s third largest trading partner, totaling around $59 billion in 
trade. In that same year, Mexico was employing over 441,000 people in over 300 EPZs. 
In comparison, Honduras had only nine processing zones, employing approximately 
19,000 people. Even with a number of preferences, trade from the entirety of CBI 
countries had a negligible impact on the US economy. For example, by 1997, $3.2 billion 
worth of imports entered the US under CBERA benefits. The total value of imports under 
the CBERA accounted for only 1.9% of total US imports and 0.04% of US gross 
domestic product.122 
Despite Mexico’s relative advantages, prior to NAFTA, CBI countries enjoyed an 
advantage over Mexico in terms of trade preferences with the US. The range of product 
coverage on CBERA123 preferences were wider than that of afforded to Mexico under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).  Secondly, the rule of origin eligibility was 
more stringent under the GSP than under the CBERA. Import-sensitive items were 
excluded under the GSP, while enjoying reduced-rate preference under CBERA. For 
qualified articles produced in CBERA countries from components originating in the US, 
similar items assembled in Mexico did not enjoy duty-free treatment or a relaxation of 
quantitative restrictions. Finally, the GSP requires periodic re-enactment and had less 
permanence than the CBERA (Pregelj 2001: 4-5). As a result, NAFTA was seen as 
important in further incorporating Mexico into US-managed production networks. In 
                                                      
122 US International Trade Commision. 1997. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act Impact on 
the United States. Thirteenth Report 1997. Investigation No. 332-227. 
 
123 CBI and CBERA are used interchangeably at points.  The CBERA is the actual law 
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October of 1992, President George H.W. Bush formally agreed to enter into NAFTA. It 
passed Congress in 1993 and was later signed into law in January of 1994 by President 
Bill Clinton.124 
 
NAFTA 
NAFTA immediately reduced a number of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers to 
most product categories covered under the CBERA. For all other products, there was a 10 
to 15-year phased elimination of all tariffs, even those restricted under the now annulled 
GSP.  More importantly, textile and apparel imports under Special Regime preferences 
were extended to items that required additional processing, including bleaching and 
dyeing. Mexico would also have tariff preference levels (TPLs) for apparel made from 
cloth sourced from non-NAFTA nations. Combined, these measures were crucial because 
it appeared to encourage industrial upgrading. Mexico would have the opportunity to 
develop its own textile operations and use domestic and third-party sourcing of cloth and 
yarn in products destined for US markets (Lewis 1991: 105; Pregelj 2001: 6). What’s 
more, the peso crises and subsequent devaluation of Mexico’s currency following 1994 
had a two-fold effect in further disadvantaging CBI nations. Currency devaluation served 
to not only cheapen Mexico’s labor, but also led Mexico to ramp up its export production 
in order to service its debts. This made moot any advantage CBI countries previously had 
over Mexico (Pressler 2009: 201).  
                                                      
124 Executive Order 12889 - Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
December 27, 1993. The American Presidency Project: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=61581 
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Thereby, the table was set for a clash of conflictual business interests to affect 
new trade legislation. US labor organizations would oppose any expansion of one way 
preferences and could point to the ruinous effects of NAFTA on the domestic 
manufacturing sector.  Apparel producers who had moved their operations to CBI 
countries would now seek to capture preferences similar to NAFTA in order to justify 
continuing operations in countries like Honduras. US textile producers sought to maintain 
primacy of their fabrics in apparel produced in the region. Retailers and large-scale 
importers wanted to rationalize fabric sourcing arrangement and push production costs 
down for their myriad of contractors and sub-contractors. Without much motivation for 
compromise, the resulting NAFTA-parity negotiations persisted for several years without 
resolution. However, Hurricane Mitch provided the necessary inertia advantageous to 
transnational alliances favoring the expansion of labor-intensive assembly operations in 
Central America, and Honduras particularly. 
 
NAFTA-parity: Congress and the Executive 
Beginning as early as 1992, affected CBI countries and their US allies, began 
lobbying Congress for NAFTA parity.125 Though there have been legislation introduced 
to broaden the CBI since 1990, the first substantive measure took place in March of 1993 
when Congressman Sam Gibbons (D.,FL), Chairman of the House Trade Subcommittee, 
                                                      
125 Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, Joint hearings on North American Free-Trade Agreement and Beyond (II): 
Chile, and Caribbean and Administration Views. 102nd Congress. July 1, 1992. 
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introduced the Caribbean Basin Free Trade Agreement Act, H.R. 1403.126 In June, Bob 
Graham (D.,FL) introduced S.1155, the Senate version. The initial Congressional 
approach was to broaden NAFTA to include Caribbean-parity but that approach proved 
to be problematic. NAFTA had already stirred a good amount of controversy and the 
White House bristled at this idea out of fears that any attempt to expand the bill would 
threaten to capsize the entire deal.  
The Congressional strategy then moved to tailoring separate agreements. The 
House measure, particularly, sought to attach NAFTA-parity to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty. Nevertheless, neither the Senate nor the 
administration was eager to take up yet another contentious trade deal immediately 
following NAFTA and the GATT.127 Though a failure in its initial incarnations, the core 
of the legislation was instructive for parity legislations going forward.  
For example, the bill called for an easing of quantitative restrictions and NAFTA-
equivalent tariffs for certain textile and apparel products from fabrics formed and cut in 
the US. Additionally, the legislation sought to get CBI countries NAFTA benefits for a 
period of three years, after which, they could either join NAFTA, or have the opportunity 
to negotiate their own bilateral agreements. The agreement would also eliminate duties 
and quotas on apparel imports, tariff rate quotas for apparel made from non-conforming 
fabric, and an import surge provision, all to match NAFTA provisions. To satiate the 
                                                      
126 Initial co-sponsors included J.J. Pickle (D.,TX), Philip Crane (R.,IL), Charles Rangel (D.,NY), 
later joined by Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), Kweisi Mfume (D-MD), Estaban Edward Torres (D-
CA), Edolphus Towns (D-NY), E. de la Garza (D.,TX), Peter Deutsch (D.,FL), Jose Serrano 
(D.,NY), Tim Hutchinson (R.,AR). https://www.congress.gov/103/bills/hr1403/BILLS-
103hr1403ih.pdf 
127 Ostroff, Jim, and Joyce Barrett. 1994. “D.C. gears up for CBI parity drive.” Womens Wear 
Daily, 10 January.  
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textile industry it maintained a more stringent yarn forward rule (the Senate version) than 
NAFTA, and to help ease it through Congress, the bill sought fast-track approval 
procedures.128  
Between 1993 and 1997 the number of bills increased but the majority did not 
make it out of conference.129 The primary point of contention was how to curtail the 
potential increase of apparel imports with foreign sourced fabrics. There was also a 
noteworthy contingent of Congress concerned about the loss of budget revenues resulting 
from reduced or eliminated customs duties. Estimates of budget losses ranged from $150 
million to $1.1 billion over a five-year period (Pressler 2009: 226; Pregelj 2001: 7). 
Despite this, President Clinton included funding for CBI trade enhancement in his fiscal 
year budgets and used his 1997 State of the Union address Clinton to once again appeal 
for an expansion of trade by encouraging Congress to: 
“act to expand our exports, especially to Asia and Latin America, two of 
the fastest growing regions on Earth, or be left behind as these emerging 
economies forge new ties with other nations. That is why we need the 
authority now to conclude new trade agreements that open markets to our 
goods and services even as we preserve our values. We need not shrink 
from the challenge of the global economy. After all, we have the best 
workers and the best products. In a truly open market, we can out-compete 
anyone, anywhere on Earth.”130 
 
                                                      
128 Caribbean Basin Free Trade Agreements Act.  Subcommittee on Trade and the Subcommittee 
on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 
First Session on H.R. 1403, June 24. 1993. 
 
129 Notables include: Budget Reconciliation Act H.R.553, H.R. 2014 and H.R. 2644; United 
States-Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement Act, H.R. 1834, S. 1389; United States-Caribbean 
Basin Trade Partnership Act, H.R. 984; Trade and Tariff Act, S. 2400; Central American and 
Caribbean Relief Act, S. 371; Trade Benefits for Caribbean Basin, H.R. 434. 
 
130 William J. Clinton: “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union.” February 4, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53358. 
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The Republican controlled House was, however, skeptical of the administration’s 
simultaneous regionalism and multilateralism. NAFTA and GATT, which led to the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), was still fresh on lawmakers’ minds. 
Speaker of the House, Newt Gringrich made it clear that “[i]f there are going to be 
continuing [international trade] bodies around the world, then [the House] has to get in 
the habit, I think, of a kind of aggressive oversight, reporting to the nation on whether or 
not our interests are being protected”.131 A part of that oversight extended to denying 
fast-track authority to the administration.  
In trade bills initiated from the Executive, fast-track authority limits Congress’ 
ability to amend proposed legislation by forcing a simple yes-or-no vote. Presidents have 
routinely been awarded this authority since 1974. However, following its expiration after 
NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay Round in 1994, Congress had been reluctant to grant 
that authority. The primary sticking point was the inclusion of negotiating authority 
concerning labor and environmental standards. This measure -- supported by the 
administration, labor, watchdog groups, and even Mexico132 -- was concerning for 
apparel manufacturers and their Congressional allies in the House. As a result, the 
administration was denied fast-authority and any new trade deals or amendments to 
NAFTA were essentially stalled after 1994.133  
                                                      
131 Barrett, Joyce. 1997. “New Congress starts moving on trade issues.” Womens Wear Daily, 9 
January. 
  
132 Mexico would also not be pleased by being undercut almost immediately by CBI competitors, 
given that it was reciprocal and Mexico had to live up to greater environmental and labor 
standards than some CBI countries. 
 
133 Ibid. 42. 
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Industry Position on Trade Legislation: Textile and Apparel  
The mid-1980s was a crucial time for textile and apparel interest groups. As the 
Executive branch pursued the liberalization of international trade, traditional protectionist 
business associations began to fracture and transnational dispositions began to emerge.  
One such fracture came between and within the American Textile Manufacturers Institute 
(ATMI) and the American Apparel Manufacturers Association (AAMA).134  
Vertical production networks that had US-made fabric as the key component in 
US-made apparel defined the mutually dependent relationship between ATMI and 
AAMA. However, as the production process disaggregated, the traditional union between 
textile producers and apparel manufacturers grew tepid. East Asian full-package 
assembly operations, catering to large-scale purchasing US retailers and branded 
marketers, threatened to dislodge US-textiles as the key component in apparel goods 
destined for US consumers. Moreover, many Asian competitors were also producing or 
locally sourcing their own fibers and expanding apparel-manufacturing to EPZs in the 
Caribbean Basin. As individual AAMA members moved their production to the 
Caribbean Basin to take advantage of preferential trade agreements, US-based textile 
producers sought to cordon off the region in an effort to protect its sourcing hegemony.  
                                                      
134 ATMI and AAMA came under the Fiber, Fabric & Apparel Coalition for Trade (FFACT) in 
1985. This coalition also included, among others, the International Ladies Garment Workers 
Union (ILGWU), Amalgamated Clothing and the Textile Workers Union (ACTWU). 
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In a common show of solidarity, both associations also opposed the 1986 Special 
Access Program (SAP)135 considering it a “Trojan horse” for East Asian penetration into 
US markets.136 Yet, this opposition did not decrease the amount of goods entering the US 
under SAP accreditation. In fact, individual members within both associations benefitted 
the most from the SAP. This ultimately led to internal splits on policy direction. By 1989, 
ATMI reversed its position on the SAP, even though it would open up the possibility of 
full duty-free treatment to apparel made from short supply fabrics sourced elsewhere.  
The duty-free movement of apparel assembled in CBI nations using U.S. made-and-cut 
fabric was too much to pass up. In a matter of a few years the opposition to trade 
liberalization had shifted to measured support. For ATMI “[t]he extension of the CBI was 
no longer perceived as a new opening for foreign producers but rather as a measure to 
guarantee sales of American cloth at a time when the traditional customer base – the US 
garment industry – was continuing its steady decline” (Pressler 2009: 192). 
As the US deindustrialized, production-sharing continued to grow within AAMA 
membership. On the one hand, a number of AAMA members began operating in the 
Caribbean, Central America and Mexico. These members supported the SAP. Others that 
moved production to East Asian countries were against measures to attach quotas to their 
imports. Subsequently, AAMA was internally torn between East Asian liberalizers, CBI 
protectionists, and an increasingly marginalized group of strict domestic protectionists 
(Rosen 2002: 144-45). ATMIs biggest concern, on the other hand, was the loss of their 
                                                      
135 US Government and Accountability Office. 1989. The Special Access Program for Caribbean 
Apparel Imports 
NSIAD-89-122. 
 
136 Milliken, Roger. 1986. “Textile-Fiber-Apparel Industry Opposes Caribbean Proposal.” New 
York Times, 2 December.  
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primary customers to East Asians markets.  In addition to reduced labor costs, East Asian 
assembly hubs also had a formidable textile industry available at a fraction of the price. 
As opposed to mass produced, low-to-mid-end products produced regionally, East Asian 
full-package assembly could support short-run, high-end fashion production.  
A faction of AAMA members also began to support exemptions for cloth and 
yarn in short supply or not produced in the US. Apparel manufacturers sourcing textile 
from outside the US threatened the viability of the domestic textile industry.  US textile 
producers thus saw their comparative advantage in sourcing to CBI countries, who 
neither had a nationally-integrated apparel structure nor a competitive textile industry.  
Consequently, the US textile industry supported trade legislation that would protect 
apparel manufacturers that moved their production to Latin America and the Caribbean, 
so long as they were purchasers of US-produced yarn and fabrics (Rosen 2002: 141).   
In terms of the passage of NAFTA, The conflict between textile and apparel 
lobbies also began to heat up. Both associations supported the legislations for different 
reasons. ATMI supported NAFTA based on a strong yarn-forward rule. AAMA 
supported it because of the opportunities for expanded production-sharing. These 
dispositions often made the associations rivals on Capitol Hill. 
For example, as part of NAFTA negotiations, brassieres are accorded duty free 
status given it is assembled in one of the three signatory countries (Mexico, Canada, and 
US) without regard for the origin of the fabric. In 1995, ATMI’s international trade 
director, Charles Bremer lobbied the administration to impose restrictions on these bras 
and change the rule of origin to a yarn-forward rule – as in the fabric would have to be of 
US origin. Bremer warned that “with a single-transformation rule, Asians will put plants 
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in the Caribbean countries and not use one inch of U.S. fabrics and export bras to the 
U.S. duty-free.”  He furthered that “[i]mporters of brassieres assembled in Mexico and 
reimported under NAFTA...have not paid any duty on these imports since Jan. 1, 1994,”  
adding, that amounts to “56 million brassieres that duty has not been paid on. This 
represents a serious amount of money saved, certainly far more than it would cost to 
comply with the yarn-forward rule of origin.” In response to Bremer, AAMA President 
Larry Martin said “[Bremer] has no right to have a voice in how our profits are spent 
and...there’s absolutely no evidence that the fabric suppliers are suffering because of 
NAFTA’s single-transformation rule for bras,” further cautioning Bremer and Congress 
that “[b]ecause of Section 807 and NAFTA, the cutting operation in bra manufacturing 
remains in the U.S. If the burden becomes too onerous, those cutting operations also 
could be moved offshore and with them would go any incentive to buy U.S. fabrics.”137  
While splits between the industries became more common throughout the 90s, 
ATMI also had to deal with dissension among its ranks. By the beginning of 1997, 
several of the prominent members within ATMI, like Fruit of the Loom and Milliken & 
Co., voiced disapproval of NAFTA-parity. Specifically, they were in disagreement with 
the phasing-out of tariffs on wool and cotton products from CBI countries on the same 
schedule as NAFTA. That was in addition to their core opposition to duty-free treatment 
of apparel imports not containing US fabric components.138 
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Though the organizations had been at odds about the details of the legislation, 
there had been a great deal of industry optimism about the passage of NATA-parity.139 
As a result, both the AAMA and ATMI became supporters of quasi-trade liberalization 
for the Caribbean Basin. For the textile lobby, it meant an increased market access for 
their fabrics. For the apparel lobby, it reflected their production shift and efforts to gain a 
foothold in proximal CBI countries. For both it meant vertical integration along the 
supply chain and a substantive protectionist buffer against Asian competitors. Their tepid 
reunification was necessary as they faced an upcoming fight from an increasingly 
powerful group of retail and importer associations.140  
 
Retail and Importers 
Retail and Importer associations like the Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition 
(RITAC), National Retail Federation (NRF), and Textile and Apparel Group of the 
American Association of Exporters and Importers (AAEI-TAG) have always supported 
greater trade liberalization. As opposed to ATMI and AAMA backing of one-way trade 
agreements that ensured the use of US made textile in the production of apparel goods for 
the US market, retailers and importers have been supporters of multilateralism and 
reciprocal trade agreements. This group has routinely favored global sourcing 
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arrangements, with the idea to purchase fabrics and components from wherever in the 
world they are the cheapest.141 
Retail and importer groups have been stridently critical of the textile industry’s 
use of political clout to deflect from much needed technological and product innovations. 
US-produced textile would be the largest beneficiaries under the status-quo rules. To 
them, not only does the US textile industry represent a stalled stage of economic 
development, its obstinacy is ultimately costly to the American consumer. Often 
purchasers of ready-made apparel products from full-package manufacturers in places 
like Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, retailer and importer associations have 
regularly called for the veto of legislation that would impose tighter restrictions on textile 
imports (Robalt 1991; Gereffi 1999; Rosen 2002: 141).142  
A major point of contention has been the yarn-forward rules of origin attached to 
bilateral trade agreements over the last 30 years. Retailers and importers did not want 
parity legislation to go the way of NAFTA. Making a case for liberal sourcing to be a part 
of NAFTA-parity, Robert Hall of the NRF argued that “if [parity] comes with restrictive 
rules, this could make it more difficult for them to source from CBI countries.” Stating 
their position, ATMI executive vice president Carlos Moore claimed that without parity 
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legislation “demand for U.S. fabrics in that region would slow down because of NAFTA 
and because the large quota holders in the Far East who benefited from the Uruguay 
Round would be in a position to take away markets from U.S. companies producing in 
the CBI region.”143  
This was a key juxtaposition of the competing groups. It was also the narrow 
space in which CBI countries found there development opportunities. On the one hand, 
textile and apparel manufacturers sought to erect trade regimes to sustain domestic 
industries while simultaneously exploiting regional wage disparities. On the other hand, 
retailers and importers had little interest in propping up national circuits of production, 
rather seeking a more rational division of labor and a reduction of costs along the global 
supply chain. Ultimately, disagreements of NAFTA-parity came down to just how liberal 
the fabric and fabric component sourcing rules would be. Movement on these 
disagreements came down to a hurricane stirring in the Atlantic. 
 
Hurricane Mitch144 
 On October 26th, Hurricane Mitch reached its peak intensity of 180 miles per hour 
as a Category 5 storm. Mitch moved over Guanaja Island and the island chain Islas de la 
Bahia along the northern coast of Honduras. At about 60 miles north of Trujillo, the 
storm slowly drifted southward. During that time, it agitated storm surges, causing waves 
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to reach an estimated 44 feet. After battering the coastline, the hurricane made landfall on 
the 29th of October, east of La Ceiba, with winds of 98 mph. By October 30th it lingered 
over Tegucigalpa as a tropical storm drenching the mountainous interior of the country. 
Both the Grande Choluteca and Chiquito rivers flooded. Additional flooding of the 
coastal plain led to massive land and mudslides that destroyed housing in the Aguán 
valley, San Pedro Sula, La Lima and infrastructure networks, including airports, 
highways, and bridges. By the October 31st Mitch shifted course from its southern path 
into the Gulf of Fonseca, and instead swung west along the border of El Salvador into 
Guatemala (see figure 1). By November 2nd it again changed direction and headed north 
into Mexico by the Isthmus of Tehuantepec before heading back northeast over the Gulf 
of Mexico making landfall once more then back out into the Atlantic.  
 The Emergency Events Database estimates that the death toll from the storm was 
about 14,600 with another 2.1 million affected. Mitch caused significant damage to the 
agricultural sector, where an estimated 70% of all Honduran crops were destroyed. The 
total economic damages were estimated at $3.8 billion.145 Social dislocation also led to an 
increase in the flow of immigrants to the United States.146 However, overall damage in 
the maquiladora sector was limited. One plant in La Ceiba was destroyed while another 
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six reported some material damage. The main losses in production came in the form of 
absenteeism, directly following the storm, caused by the flooding of roads and bridges.147  
 
Honduras 
Following Hurricane Mitch, all the relevant actors began to take their positions. 
The Honduran government had already made moves towards a host of post-disaster 
privatizations, including the airports and the telecommunications company. As part of the 
omnibus legislative overhaul to increase foreign investment following the storm, the 
Honduran government officials carried out a two-pronged strategy of seeking increased 
trade benefits through NAFTA parity and an expansion of the main port through which 
apparel products are shipped.148 
FIDE also played an integral role in lobbying for NAFTA-parity legislation. 
Through their Honduran and Miami offices, and in coordination with the Caribbean-
Central American Action (CCAA), they organized a campaign to send emails, faxes, and 
phone calls to Senators urging them to pass CBI enhancement. Because of this activity 
approximately 2,963 American companies were contacted. In addition, Honduran 
maquilas made a special promotional tour to the 1999 Bobbin Show in Atlanta 
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Georgia.149 Honduran business associations, industry officials, and government 
representatives came to the US and made a full press to encourage the passage of 
enhanced trade preferences for the region, and the country. 
Honduran EPZ owners saw an opportunity for Honduras to be put on equal 
footing as their main rival Mexico. “These are very hard times for Honduras, and our 
people are at risk of losing their jobs, I don’t think there’s any alternative to CBI-NAFTA 
parity” said Mario Canahuati, President of the Cortes Chamber of Commerce. According 
to Jose Molina, Chairman of the ZIP Choloma, an EPZ near San Pedro Sula “Mexico has 
an advantage over us in that they don’t pay any duties on aggregate value,” Molina, 
instead would like to see NAFTA-parity address this disparity, allowing duty to be solely 
assessed on labor value-added.150 The disaster engendered confidence in the passage of 
NAFTA-parity, “right now, because of Mitch, there could be sympathy for approving the 
bill”, Molina added.151 US Ambassador to Honduras, James Creagan also voiced his 
support for parity legislation: 
“Honduran textile industry was built up through CBI benefits. They've 
done very well. In many of these plants, the work is done in the U.S., cloth 
is cut in Honduras and goes back to the U.S., providing jobs for 
Americans…In the aftermath of the hurricane, Washington wants to 
support Central America. With the banana industry destroyed and $200 
million worth of exports lost, they need foreign exchange now, and the 
best foreign-exchange earners are maquilas, and they produce jobs 
fast…CBI enhancement is good for the U.S., by the way, because it 
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prevents illegal immigration, which is a burden for the United States. It's 
best to have prosperity for Honduras, and CBI enhancement could be the 
next step on the road to free trade by the year 2005.”152 
 
Congress and the Executive 
For much as Honduras could make its country attractive for investments, passing 
trade legislation in 1999 was contingent on the interactions between apparel 
manufacturers, textile makers, importers and retailers, labor organizations and a divided 
Congress.  Congress and the administration would once again spar over details of 
legislation. This time, however, the institutional dynamics had slightly changed. First, 
President Clinton had been impeached in December of 1998 and while the Senate wished 
to put the matter to bed, the House angled for a protracted impeachment process. Second, 
both chambers were closing in on an election season, which threatened to slow the pace 
of any potentially controversial trade legislation moving through Congress. These events 
would undoubtedly affect any free-trade legislation for the upcoming year. 
Since 1993 the trend had been for parity bills to pass the House, only to get 
ensnared in the Senate by Senators from textile states and the Clinton administration. The 
administration’s support for protectionist trade deals goes against the executive’s 
theoretical penchant for internationally-oriented trade agreements. However, the loss of 
congressional support and impeachment proceedings added a new dynamic.  
Since his election, Clinton had lost a net total of 47 House and 8 Senate seats to 
Republicans. In 1995, for the first time since 1954, the Republicans controlled both 
houses of Congress. For his re-election campaign, Clinton had to rely more heavily on 
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support from traditional sources, including labor groups. Pushed by organized labor, the 
Senate version of NAFTA-parity included fast-track authority to negotiate labor rights 
and environmental issues. This would help explain the support for a protectionist Senate 
bill. The House bills were more liberal, favored by transnational corporations, and did not 
include requirements that would protect workers’ rights. This was seen as pivotal for the 
administration, democratic lawmakers and organized labor. The administration was thus 
more receptive to protecting national interests, as limited as they may have been.153  
Congress estimated that the combined economic impact of Hurricane Mitch and 
Georges amounted to $4.2 billion in combined damages (Honduras, Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala) and wiped out 50% of Honduras’ GDP 
in particular. In February of 1999 Senator Bob Graham (D., Fla.) and three cosponsors 
introduced S. 371, the Central American and Caribbean Relief Act. The legislation was 
designed to provide assistance to countries affected by the hurricanes through 
appropriations from the economic support fund, international disaster assistance, and a 
variety of humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid programs. To help contribute to the 
recovery effort, the bill proposed to extend NAFTA-like parity to Caribbean Basin 
countries. Apparel produced in the Caribbean Basin would receive duty and quota-free 
treatment if its textile origins were from the US.154 The House version, H.R. 984, was 
introduced a month later by Representative Philip Crane (R., IL). This version featured a 
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more liberal sourcing arrangement to include preferential treatment for fabrics originating 
from any CBI beneficiary country if it was made by US yarn. It also allowed for the  
sourcing of fabrics outside the CBI if the material is not readily available from US 
suppliers.155 In terms of trade breaks, the Senate bill had a US textile requisite. The 
House version provided for US, Caribbean Basin, and under specific circumstances, 
foreign fabric. Textile manufacturers and the administration supported the Senate version 
while retailers and importers rallied behind the House bill.  
In March of 1999 Congress took up H.R. 984. Early on, it appeared that 
compromise was possible. The year 2005 was going to be a crucial one for the 
governance of international trade. That was the year quotas on apparel was set to expire 
for all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was also the year China 
would become an official member. In terms of the new multilateral easing of quantitative 
restrictions, cosponsor Rep. Jim Kolbe (R. Ariz.) understood that, “the likely 
consequence will be a shift of production to the low cost producers. Most likely, this will 
be Asia”.156 He was joined by Senator Bob Graham who also conceded that “[i]f we don’t 
use these five years in a constructive way to maintain a competitive advantage, [apparel 
production would move to] the Far East”.157 The compromise sought was once again 
based on the question of rule of origin, particularly the use of some fabric sourced from 
CBERA beneficiary countries, and not entirely from the US. 
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The administration and Congressional backers were on full offensive for NAFTA-
parity. The core of their argument was to use the existing trade relations to help the 
region recover from the aftermath of the hurricane. Garment production is seen as the 
quickest way to increase economic activity between the two countries and will only help 
create jobs for both the US and Central American beneficiaries. The president used his 
1999 State of the Union Address, to once again appeal for fast track authority. The 
president also urged Congress to use their powers to help the Caribbean Basin rebuild 
from the devastation.158  
As NAFTA-parity bills circulated through Congress, Clinton visited Honduras on 
March 9th to survey the hurricane affected countries. Clinton used the occasion to 
reassure Honduran and Central American leaders in attendance that NAFTA-parity 
legislation was indeed a real possibility, particularly because of Hurricane Mitch.159 Two 
days later, on the 11th of March, Clinton became the first president since Lyndon Johnson 
to visit Guatemala. There for the Central American Summit, Clinton told the delegates in 
attendance that “[t]he damage the hurricanes left, some of which I have seen, of course, 
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has increased the urgency of our deliberations and our action.”160 In 2000, during his last 
State of the Union Address, Clinton once again called for fast-track authority to negotiate 
trade deals designed to lift “both our living standards and our values, never tolerating 
abusive child labor or a race to the bottom in the environment and worker protection.” As 
he urged Congress to finalize NAFTA-parity legislation.161  
 
Industry 
In 1998, the domestic textile and apparel industry was responsible for 42% of all 
job losses in manufacturing. Apparel manufacturers lost 77,000 workers compared to 
32,000 by the textile industry. By the beginning of 1999 the domestic industries 
employed 731,000 and 579,000 workers respectively.162 Increased Asian competition was 
a motivational force to use Hurricane Mitch as a window of opportunity to link NAFTA-
parity to the latest round of corporate restructuring. “The apparel industry is about the 
only survivor down there, and it’s the place you can create jobs quickly,” said Larry 
Martin, president of AAMA.163  
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Testifying on H.R. 984., AAMA Director of Government Relations said that 
“[a]lthough Asia is further away from the U.S. market, its access to lower priced inputs, 
especially since the onset of the financial crisis, makes it extremely competitive.”164 
China’s ascension to the WTO was also problematic. In 1997, both ATMI and AAMA 
were united in urging a 10-year phaseout of quotas on Chinese apparel and textiles 
because of fears it would affect both domestic industries and CBI manufacturers. 
However, by 1999, AAMA abandoned its previous position and now joined the NRF in 
favor of China being on accord with the quota timetable of other nations.165 It also 
supported a trade preference program for sub-Sahara Africa, in addition to NAFTA-
parity.  
All these positions put the AAMA at odds with ATMI. For disagreements on 
parity, the margin of discord was thin, but very meaningful. ATMI supported the Senate 
version and wanted duty-free and quota-free access to US markets given the garment was 
made from US yarn and fiber. ATMI was willing to acquiesce on cutting operation in the 
Caribbean Basin, but the thread of that fabric had to also be of US origin. For this reason 
ATMI had capsized previous legislations since 1993. AAMA favored similar tariff 
preferences and easing of quantitative restrictions but also wanted cutting operations to 
take place in the Caribbean or the US. In addition, the House bill, which had no US-only 
textile mandate, included provisions to allow knitted textiles produced in the Caribbean 
Basin to have preferential treatment. By July of 1999 the Senate bill was gearing up to be 
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voted on. The House bill, which had failed in 1997, had yet to be voted on and destined 
to face a difficult time passing the Seante. If both bills were passed they would have to be 
reconciled before reaching the president’s desk.  
Chairman of apparel firm Val D’or, Martin Granoff addressed the AAMA annual 
convention and in no uncertain terms declared war on ATMIs protectionism, saying 
“[t]he ATMI bill will not be accepted by our membership and will have no chance of 
passing. Our resolve is deep and we won’t allow it to happen.” Granoff added that: 
“[w]hen you hear ATMI and our adversaries say they want a bill, they 
don't want a parity bill. They want a giveaway that's totally favorable to 
the textile people. Textile manufacturers scream to the legislators that 
[parity] will devastate employment in their industry. Yet the very same 
textile companies have opened extensive, owned manufacturing in 
Mexico. Is it the Southern textile worker they are looking to protect, or is 
it their monopoly in Mexico? Talk about hypocrisy.”  
 
The latter critique had some merit. The topic of discussion at the ATMI’s 50th annual 
meeting. The message: move production to Latin America, fast!166 “The Asians are 
coming. They are not continuing to sit back and ship products out of Asia as they have in 
the past,” said Mary O’Rourke, Managing Director of the textile and apparel consulting 
firm, Jassin-O’Rourke Group. She added that “at the end of the day, we only need so 
much capacity down there. The question is who will get there first,”167 In the wake of the 
economic crisis, Asian firms ramped up production to expand beyond their local markets. 
The advice was to have a more robust presence in the region because Asian 
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manufacturers had already controlled 70% of Guatemala’s apparel industry, 15-20% of 
Mexico’s and about 35% of the entire Central America.168  
As a result, a number of textile mills began consolidating the supply chain by 
offering full-package assembly. Knit mills, like Burlington Industries, Dyersburg Corp, 
Galey & Lord where buying sewing plants in Mexico and the Dominican Republic in 
order to localize garment-production.  Filling the gap left by exiting apparel 
manufacturers. Mills sought to develop full-package assembly operation and sell directly 
to branded firms, many of which had abandoned manufacturing in favor of marketing and 
design.169 
In response to the larger criticism, ATMI’s, Carlos Moore, stated that “ATMI and 
its members have been consistent in their position that we would support the [Caribbean] 
nations joining NAFTA, and if and when this occurs, the yarns and fabrics made in these 
countries, and of course the apparel, would qualify for the same free-trade benefits as 
Mexico and Canada”. He further added that “a full free-trade agreement carries with it 
privileges and obligations -- such as the obligations relating to investment, unfair trade 
practices, intellectual property rights protection and opening markets -- while the 
[AAMA-supported Caribbean] legislation is solely a privilege, giving quota- and duty-
free access to the U.S.”170 
Adding to the calls for liberal sourcing options was Erik Autor, Vice President of 
International Trade for the NRF, who testified that prolonging a yarn-forward rule 
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“would ultimately hurt (Caribbean) producers and their workers by preventing countries 
from moving their economies to the next level of development in related, higher paying 
and more technologically sophisticated production sectors.”171 Autor, went on to 
rhetorically question the stubborn position held by the textile lobby when they would 
ultimately be winners on NAFTA-parity: 
[W]e find it ironic that one industry -- the U.S. textile industry -- that 
supported NAFTA and so strongly lauds the benefits it has received as a 
result of the textile and apparel provision of that agreement would seek 
anything less for countries in the CBI. If NAFTA has been good for the 
textile industry, why would NAFTA parity for the CBI not also be equally 
good for the textile industry?172 
 
ATMI had softened its stance on trade preferences being granted only to garments made 
form US fabric. The association now supported benefits to garments knit-to-shape from 
regional fabrics, given that it is made from US yarn. It also relented somewhat of the use 
of foreign sourced components used to make brassieres. ATMI now supported the use of 
foreign components if they did not amount to more than 25% of the item and was not 
fabric, yarn or thread.  
ATMI was not, however, ready to acquiesce to apparel and retail demands for 
CBI sourced woven fabrics to be included in parity law. By May of 2000, House 
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lawmakers called representatives from ATMI into a meeting to discuss such a 
compromise. Adamant about ATMI’s position, Doug Bulcao, Director of Government 
Relations, made it clear that “[w]e support the Senate version. Period. They said they 
wanted us to change our position, but we said we couldn't and there's no justification for 
doing so.”173 But the crack in ATMI resolve came just days later as the board offered up a 
compromise to save the bill from being shelved altogether. The industry proposed 
regionally produced knits get duty breaks, given the thread origins are the US and these 
knits are capped at 184 million square meter equivalents (SMEs).174  
In May of 2000 the House voted 309-110 in favor of the legislation, followed by a 
77-19 vote in the Senate. Passed alongside the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA), CBTPA promised to save a conservative $1.42 billion in duties, not 
including the potential gains from manufacturers who may eventually shift production 
from the US and Asia. By packaging the CBTPA with the AGOA, retailers and importers 
where able to finagle a rule of origin compromise on garments from the 48 sub-Saharan 
African states. The AGOA would allow countries to use their own textiles for up to 1.5% 
of total imports. That number would increase to 3.5% for the first 8 years of the bill. The 
poorest countries could source fabrics from anywhere with the same percent cap. For the 
CBI countries, they finally settled on 292 million SMEs for knit textile sourced from CBI 
countries. 
                                                      
173 Ramey, Joanna. 2000. “House, Senate Near Last Effort for Africa-CBI Bill Compromise.” 
Womens Wear Daily, 3 April. 
 
174 Ramey, Joanna. 2000. “ATMI Loosens Position on Africa/CBI Textiles.” Womens Wear 
Daily, 5 April.  
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The basic outline of the CBTPA/NAFTA parity began to actualize textile and 
apparel as a potential growth sector for many CBI countries, with some limitations. Much 
of the deal still kept higher value-added activities out of reach for most developing 
nations. But at its core, it created job expansion opportunities as the region became more 
competitive globally and immediately vis-à-vis Mexico. Moreover, NAFTA parity could 
be an economic boon to region suffering from a spate of disasters, including hurricanes 
Mitch and George. Finally, NAFTA parity sought to position Caribbean Basin countries 
to renegotiate a free trade agreement with the US in 2005. That is the same year China 
would be expected to join the WTO, revoking quotas on Chinese apparel and textiles. 
As per the concerns of domestic textile producers, the CBTPA maintained rather 
strict fiber and yarn forward rules for apparel products. Tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions were eliminated for apparel assembled in a CBI country from US fabric or 
yarn. CBI countries did have the opportunity to cut fabrics locally, but those fabrics also 
had to be of U.S. threads. For some knit-to-shape products originating from CBI fabrics, 
duty and quota free eligibility was granted for the first 250 SMEs, then allowed to 
gradually increase by 16% for a three-year period. Brassieres also qualified, so long as 
75% of the customs value was of US origin, if a producer did not meet that target, their 
eligibility would be renewed the year after those US components reach 85% of the 
customs value.  
The short supply rule allowed fabric, fiber, or yarn, not readily available through 
US producers, to be substituted from countries not party to the agreement. If special 
presidential permission is granted, these finished products could enter US markets duty 
and quota free. Additionally, as much as 25% of components (trimmings and interlinings) 
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could be derived from third-party countries, with transshipments and other customs 
violations warranting suspension from the trade agreement.  
A victory for watchdog groups and transnational labor, countries were also 
expected to meet international labor standards that govern working conditions, including 
those concerning child labor.175 The protection of US intellectual property rights were 
also woven into the agreement along with counter-narcotics certification and provisions 
that protected property rights and allowed US access to domestic markets.176 
Disaster, opportunity, and competition thus forced movement along entrenched 
industry positions. It also provided a legislative opening as the administration battled 
with Congress. The resulting compromise was just that. It did not reflect a ground shift in 
regional policy. Parity legislation could best be described as a continuation of the last two 
decades of regional protectionism. Any relenting was on the minor details of the 
legislation. The core framework remained. US markets were open to foreign assembled 
goods, so long as those intermediate components were of US origins.   
 
Implications and Conclusion 
 
Like many of the Caribbean Basin nations, Honduras had been affixed within a 
sphere of US trade policy that was decidedly protectionist in favor of US industries. 
Honduras, was particular important to US foreign policymakers because it was not only a 
staging ground for US sponsored counter-insurgency and regime destabilization efforts 
                                                      
175 As a way to show its teeth, Guatemala was the first country to have its compliance reviewed 
when the CBTPA became law. 
 
176 Ramey, Joanna. 2000. “Africa-CBI is a Go: Biggest Breakthrough Since 
NAFTA/WTO.” Womens Wear Daily, 12 May. 
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but, behind only Mexico, Honduras was the largest regional exporter of apparel products 
to the US. Honduras’ aid dependence throughout the 80s allowed the US far-reaching 
power to shape its economic and political dispositions. Military and economic aid as well 
as access to US markets was used in exchange for complicity in destabilization efforts in 
neighboring Nicaragua. Honduras would have to cede some economic autonomy to a 
larger neoliberal project and transnational interests seeking to exploit their abundance of 
low-skilled workers.  
The diversification and growth of the Honduran economy was tied to the 
development of its industrial sector, particularly apparel production. A departure from 
import substitution development, the move to export-oriented development became 
increasingly attractive due to its perceived successes in the newly industrialized countries 
of East Asia. USAID technocrats would take advantage of Honduran labor and 
geographical endowments to develop and sustain elite transnational class formation 
capable of advancing economic opportunities aligned with US corporate restructuring.  
By the early 1990s, the leftists had been pacified and free and fair trade became 
the mantra in the United States. As a result, Honduras, and the larger Caribbean Basin, 
had lost its strategic importance in terms of foreign economic policy. China’s entrance 
into the WTO and trends of broader multilateral trade regimes led to a decline in interest 
of one-way, preferential trade agreements. NAFTA also threatened to weaken the 
Caribbean Basin vis-à-vis Mexico. NAFTA-parity legislation, which would provide CBI 
beneficiaries tariff and quota treatment similar to NAFTA, was stalled in Congress as 
trade liberalizing forces in the House of Representatives, met resistance from textile-state 
Senators.  
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Natural disaster revitalized Caribbean Basin trade negotiations.  Following the 
devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch and Georges on Central America and parts of the 
Caribbean, NAFTA-parity legislation was coupled with disaster and reconstruction 
assistance. It should be exceedingly clear that the natural disaster was not the sole cause 
of parity legislation passing Congress, yet it was a significant motivating force to get it on 
the Congressional agenda in 1999. Other important events like trade talks for China’s 
entrance in the WTO also loomed large and there was pressure to get legislation passed 
before the abbreviated Congressional session ended. Also, as labor became cost-
prohibitive for East Asian manufacturers, they also began to offshore their assembly 
operations to Honduras. The ever-increasing Asian presence in Honduran industrial parks 
pushed US textile and apparel producers to seek legislative compromise. Nevertheless, 
Hurricane Mitch did serve to revitalize NAFTA-parity legislation. Central American 
governments and their domestic allies lobbied the US Congress relentlessly. The 
president also made a series of high profile visits to the region, originated a series of 
legislations, and used his State of the Union Address to call for action on parity 
legislation. The aftermath of Hurricane Mitch also encouraged creative ways to liberalize 
the economy through privatization, deregulation and foreign direct investment. 
Hurricane Mitch, over a decade before the Haitian earthquake, may have been the 
predecessor of this particular mode of transnational mobilization: crises as opportunity. 
The devastation wrought had a massive toll on lives, property, and the infrastructure 
network necessary for Honduras’ aged agrarian-based economy. Apparel production in 
the largely intact northern port regions was seen as convenient and necessary to create 
160 
immediate economic growth. It also matched Honduras’ abundance of low skilled 
workers, with the insolvency of US’s manufacturing capabilities.  
However, the fluidity of global apparel production networks require a progressive 
race to the wage floor among other concessions exacted on the backs of the working 
class. Transnational manufacturers, textile producers, and apparel purchasers, often in 
conflict with each other, each require increasingly generous incentives as a pre-condition 
to exploit investment opportunities. This helps explain why NAFTA-parity legislation 
was mired in deadlock for several years prior to Hurricane Mitch. The disaster revitalized 
trade negotiations, pitting trade liberalizers, economic protectionists and their 
Congressional and Executive surrogates against each other. Transnational alliances of 
Honduran exporters, US apparel producers, retailers, and importers used this natural 
disaster to advance new legislation and jumpstart stalled ones. The ultimate winners were 
regional protectionists able to maintain control of the backward and forward linkages of 
the apparel assembly network. The losers, as often is the case, the working class, at home 
and abroad. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
Revisiting Themes 
Disaster capitalism is about the fracturing of existing political, economic, and 
social structures; the disempowering of its victims, the centralization of authority and 
decision-making, and the reconstruction of society and its institutions based on the 
dominant private sector ethos. The sequential process of public disorientation, the 
concentration of power to local political and economic elites, and the arrival of 
transnational aid agencies and private actors, creates opportunities for economic re-
engineering under the banner of neoliberalism. That neoliberalism coolly operates under 
conditions of crises, should not be surprising. Since the late 1970s, it has been the 
hegemonic policy prescription to fill voids caused by wars, coup d’états, financial crises 
and natural disasters. It is evoked to attenuate the power of labor, liberalize finance 
policy, and deregulate industry. In what David Harvey (2005) calls its nature of ‘creative 
destruction’, neoliberalism harbors an abhorrence for institutional framework that do not 
embrace market-based solutions to social transactions, no matter how innocuous they 
may be. Moreover, the goal of neoliberalism has been to (1) rupture national economies 
and reorient them towards globalized circuits of accumulation, and (2) construct 
regulatory frameworks conducive to this mode of global capitalism.  
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This dissertation asked two essential questions: Can we empirically substantiate 
disaster capitalism? If so, how does it operate and who are the essential actors? Not only 
do I begin to substantiate an empirical relationship between neoliberal policy reforms and 
natural disasters, but I also identify a particular method through which it is perpetrated on 
national economies in Latin America and the Caribbean. In chapter two I operationalize 
both natural disasters and neoliberal economic reform and perform statistical tests 
through a longitudinal examination of natural disasters alongside a series of common 
explanatory variables associated with economic reform. The exploration of the paneled 
data wielded some encouraging results. Through an investigation of 30 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries for a span of 18 years, it was discovered that there does indeed 
exist a pattern of neoliberal economic reforms following a disaster. These results 
confirmed my first hypothesis and were instructive because being able to establish this 
central regularity provided a compass for deeper investigation through individual case 
studies.  
The case studies included a detailed analysis of government documents, archived 
newspaper articles, trade journals, and various speeches and presentations by political 
and business elites. These case studies were important to the overall project because it 
was simply not enough to identify the what and why, as generalized empirical studies are 
want to do. In order to complete a more persuasive account of correlated observations, it 
was important to identify the relevant actors and the mechanisms through which they 
affect change - the who and the how. Chapters three and four provided accounts of the 
(pre- and) post-disaster space in Haiti and Honduras respectively, and how they were 
filled by opportunistic trade policy designed to benefit politically rooted, US-based 
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transnationals. These case studies also had interesting, mixed results. The policy 
outcomes following the Haitian earthquake were in accord with my second main 
hypothesis, that beneficiaries of post-disaster policies would be transnationally-oriented 
capitalists who rely on the increased financialization of capital and who have more 
keenly adapted to global supply networks. Conversely, while there were concessions 
made to commercial elites plugged into the global economy, on balance, for the specific 
area of interest, the major post-disaster policy outcomes following Hurricane Mitch 
favored nationally-oriented capitalists and their vertically-oriented production networks.  
 Overall, the results paint quite a lucid picture of the post-disaster policy-making 
process and its actors. Taken together, this dissertation begins to identify the crosscutting 
linkages between neoliberalism, its agents of dissemination, US national interests, 
transnational corporations adjusting to changing modes of capital accumulation, and 
natural disasters. The globalization of production, the ubiquity of neoliberal ideology, and 
the strengthening of the Executive vis-à-vis Congress has greatly empowered globally-
oriented sectors of the US economy. A crisis of accumulation in the early 70s led to the 
fracturing of the US national economy. The disaggregation of labor from higher value-
added activities produced corporate structures that encouraged the influx of manufactured 
exports from developing countries through a variety of increasingly global production-
sharing agreements. Yet, vertically-integrated business nationalists in the textile and 
apparel industry (even amidst their own corporate restructuring) have maintained a 
measure of their commercial advantage by aligning their interests with US strategic 
interest in the Caribbean and Latin America. 
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Overview of Historical Context 
From the conclusion of World War II to the late 1970s, a number of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries had taken part in development policies predicated on 
the localization of productive capabilities. This approach entailed the discouragement of 
imports through high currency valuations, trade barriers designed to protect fledgling 
domestic industries, and government mediation of key industrial sectors. In efforts to 
support this type of industrialization, states often relied on financing from international 
capital markets. This unfortunately led to an ever-expanding debt profile. In times of 
global economic expansion, this is not such a worrisome bargain. Financing is relatively 
easy to come by. However, as the major economies began to slow in the late 1960s and 
financial crises beset the developed world in the early 1970s, access to capital dried up. 
This impinged upon not only demand from the developing world, but also access to the 
necessary capital needed to offset its current account deficits. No longer able to service 
its debts, many Latin American and Caribbean economies crashed under the pressure of 
high inflation and public sector liabilities.  
The solution was the repudiation of nationally-oriented economies and the 
political and social structures it rested on. These economies were to be made more 
outward facing, export-oriented. Designed by Washington-based technocrats, 
neoliberalism was eulogized as the cure-all for failings that beset these economies. With a 
bit of austerity, adopting market orthodoxy brought with it the promise of economic 
growth conditioned on neoliberal monetary and fiscal policy, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, shrinking of the public sector, deregulation of the labor markets, lowering of 
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trade barriers, the liberalization of rules governing foreign investments, and the 
widespread use of export-processing zones (EPZs).  
The success of export-oriented development, as evidenced by the “Asian 
miracle”, hastened the impetus to affix Latin America and the Caribbean within the 
regionalization of the global economy. These small economies had apparently bit off 
more than they could chew, demonstrated by the failings of import-substitution, or the 
domestic production of industrialized products. As an abandonment of state-directed 
development, industrial upgrading was fashioned as a way for countries to insert 
themselves in the global economy. A country could achieve economic growth by 
situating itself within a particular node of the global supply chain. Here, a nation’s labor 
force can participate in the global economy by specializing in the production of a specific 
good or input. After an unspecified amount of time, countries and workers can ascend the 
value chain to either develop new product lines, streamline the production of an existing 
product, or transfer into a new industry altogether. Coinciding with deindustrialization in 
the developed world, apparel manufacturing emerged as one such niche economic 
activity. As labor costs became cost-prohibitive and apparel assembly factories closed 
across the traditional apparel manufacturing hubs in the US, the abundant, low-skilled 
workforce of the strategically designated Caribbean Basin were granted new 
opportunities. Depending on the depth of regulatory concessions and the competitive 
wage floors willing to be approached, countries could not only to insert itself within the 
global apparel production chain, but also achieve, previously touted, rapid industrial 
upgrading.   
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Renewed US strategic interests in the Caribbean Basin coincided with corporate 
restructuring across labor-intensive industries. Suspicions of immigrants and leftists help 
hasten new trade programs designed to combat these unaccounted for effects of structural 
adjustment policies. As important policy actors, US corporate interests were able to 
influence these regional trade programs by designing and managing hierarchical 
production networks that off-shored costly labor-intensive activities to the Caribbean 
Basin, kept higher value-added activities at home, and ensured control of the entire 
production chain from material sourcing and assembly to packaging and distribution. 
This was the fundamental principle of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(CBERA), and later Caribbean Basin Partnership and Trade Act (CBPTA). 
At its core, this arrangement amounted to US lead firms afforded the opportunity 
to relocate labor-intensive, standardized production activities to the developing world 
while maintaining control over both backward and forward linkages. The fabrics, buttons, 
zippers, and packaging were to all originate in the US. US-made components were to be 
assembled in overseas processing plants and shipped back to the US for distribution, with 
duties paid only on the labor value-added. For transnational textile and apparel 
corporations, the expansion of production-sharing into Central America went hand-in-
hand with producer-driven corporate restructuring in the apparel production chain. This 
assembly-oriented production network was made possible by a series of legislative trade 
barriers reinforced by Senators and representatives from textile and apparel producing 
states. As a new mode of capital accumulation, regional trade preference programs served 
to insulate US firms from global competition in apparel production.  
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However, Executive-initiated multilateralism in conjunction with the growth of 
large-scale retail purchasers, branded manufacturers, and branded marketers challenged 
the policy dominance of vertically integrated apparel manufacturers. Policies initiated by 
the Executive increasingly favored trade liberalization and, as a consequence, capitalists 
who had taken advantage of the financialization of the American economy. Additionally, 
vertically oriented, US apparel manufacturers had difficulty keeping up with not only the 
scale, but also the diversity of apparel demand from US consumers. By retailers 
increasing their reliance on the import of assembled apparel products they have altered 
the traditional commodity chain by cutting out the intermediaries, and instead opted to 
contract with full-package assembly operations in East Asia. In turn, these largely 
autonomous agents were free to source fabric, fabric components, and labor anywhere in 
the world, so long as the final product meets the specification of the principal. This would 
explain why the South Korean-based Global Fashions had low-cost garment assembly 
operations in Honduras dedicated to supplying store-brand fashions for the US 
transnational Wal-Mart. 
Fearing the encroachment of these rationally-sourced apparel production chains 
into Latin America and the Caribbean, US industry actors have actively designed, 
constructed, and maintained 30 years of regional protectionism packaged as growth 
spurring trade preference programs. This status quo was made possible through an 
alliance of corporate executives, politicians, business associations, NGOs, the World 
Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank and USAID. And following Hurricane 
Mitch, the essential details of the CBPTA was illustrative of a tenuous continuation of 
these policies. However, the 2010 Haitian earthquake was occasion for a more robust 
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consolidation of market and political power by a group of transnationalizing corporate 
actors. Far from a localized incident, the disaster was emblematic of the continued 
fracture of national economic sovereignty, which began with the CBPTA, in favor of 
commercial globalizers. Haiti’s exceptions under the Hemispheric Opportunity through 
Partnership Encouragement (HOPE I and II) and the Haiti Economic Lift Program 
(HELP) represented an opportunity to streamline production chains in favor of cheaper 
material sourcing options. Haiti also had an abundance of low-skilled labor primed for 
exploitation by globally-oriented apparel retailers and branded manufacturers. By 
revising the rules of origin provisions, Haiti’s bilateral trade preferences meant an 
opening of over three decades of regional protectionist policies. Allowing the use of 
cheaper third-country material inputs challenged the monopoly of US textiles in Haitian-
made apparel products. 
In the end, this confluence of fear, Cold War politics and protectionist-inspired 
economic policies kept the Caribbean Basin firmly within the sphere of US influence. A 
regime of preferential trade agreements allowed the region to be artificially competitive 
by granting duty free access to US markets in return for the US dictating the terms of 
trade. The desire to move labor-intensive textile and apparel operations overseas while 
maintaining the power to decide the origins of primary inputs created the impetus for 
production-sharing arrangements codified in the CBERA, CBPTA, HOPE I and II, and 
HELP. Using reciprocal trade preference programs highlighted by strong yarn forward 
rules, US textile and apparel transnationals have ensured the use of domestic fibers and 
fiber components in apparel assembled overseas for export back to the US.  
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Nonetheless, as bipolarity has subsided so too has the power of protectionist US 
textile and apparel transnationals to dictate policies in the Caribbean Basin. International 
donors, policymakers, large-purchasing retailers, and globally-oriented transnationals 
now advance export-led developmental models emphasizing global supply chains, 
economic diversification, and industrial upgrading. Disasters, as policy windows, can 
advantage transnational capitalists best mobilized to exploit these opportunities. Capital-
importing sectors in developing countries organize and align with transnational actors to 
facilitate greater investment opportunities.    
Yet for these alliance to be successful, for the disaster to be truly capitalized, 
investments must offer positive returns. Trade preferences are key, but the environment 
must be investor-friendly. EPZs that offer tax holidays and full profit repatriation are the 
desired development model. Most importantly, however, is the required labor 
subjugation. If wages are of any indication, these preferential trade agreements can only 
serve to maintain the Caribbean Basin as an offshore assembly hub. Through every round 
of new trade preference agreement, developing countries like Haiti and Honduras bargain 
their labor, environment, social cohesion, and economic autonomy to the floor. Labor 
militancy and populist governments are bad for business and a signal to flexible 
transnational corporations to shift operations to locations that offer marginally better 
returns on investment. 
 
Implications and Future Research 
Disaster capitalism is argued here as a function of transnational processes in part 
caused by global financial integration and capital mobility. However, not all productive 
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apparatuses are equal and it would thus be erroneous to treat all capitalists as a unified 
interest group with transnational aspirations and associations. It is thereby necessary that 
future research begin to recognize sectoral-based differences between capitalists, as well 
as the role played by prominent globalizing actors to include corporate executives, 
professionals, bureaucrats, and politicians; as well as integrating agents working through 
think tanks, business associations, NGOs and leading institutions such as the World 
Bank, IMF, NAFTA and USAID.  
Liberalizing policies have varying distributional outcomes. Globalization has 
tended to disadvantage nationally-oriented businesses and, in turn, reflect the preferences 
of an internationally-oriented faction of businesses. The recognition that capitalists are a 
dominant policy actor, yet, not a uniform set of elites, is crucial to understanding the 
pace, sequence and substance of reform policies. This is so because foreign economic 
policy is determined as a function of conflicting business interests. As a consequence, the 
differences between the national and international orientation of businesses as well as the 
intensity of labor in relation to capital in the production process can be used as a 
framework to explain post-disaster state policy.  
Labor itself has been reeling from almost a century of setbacks related to its 
failure to develop into an internationalist movement, being co-opted into nationalist 
movements post-World wars, and being almost obliterated after the neoliberal turn of the 
1970s. Can labor survive, much less affect substantive change, without embracing an 
international disposition? Future research will do well to focus on just where labor fits in 
within the struggle between these two types of capitalists.  
171 
Finally, save geographic predispositions, natural disasters are chance events. Yet, 
the brunt of the effects tend to disproportionately affect poorer, vulnerable populations. 
The same can be said of the imposition of neoliberalism. If nothing else, the symbolic 
parallels are hard to ignore. Similar to an earthquake or a hurricane, an encounter with 
neoliberal reforms often includes the fracturing of primordial economies, social linkages, 
families and even entire communities. The reverberations are often most forcefully felt 
by the poor, synonymous with the working class, left struggling to survive and cope with 
the uncertainty of rapidly changing social and economic situations. 
This dissertation is a culmination of over seven years of study and observations. 
As such, it has evolved along the contours of unpredictable international events and the 
intellectual maturity of its investigator.  When I first broached the idea in 2009, I could 
not have foreseen the tragic 2010 Haitian earthquake. It would be morally disingenuous 
to ignore the irony of railing against corporate interests using a natural disaster to 
advance their self-interest, when the disaster has also provided me an opportunity to 
advance my narrow intellectual pursuits in the real-world laboratory. The irony is not lost 
on me. It has been important for me not to trivialize the people that have suffered loss of 
life, loved ones, injury, illness, displacement, and overall affected by natural disasters. I 
hope to have succeeded in that effort. Likewise, I am optimistic that this study, in any 
minor way, can do some form of good.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table . Chronology of Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement 
October 2, 2000 Presidential proclamation 7351: President Clinton authorized the 
implementation of the CBTPA by designating 24 countries as 
beneficiaries of the program, but delaying its effect with respect to 
each of its individual beneficiary countries until a determination is 
made by the USTR that the country has satisfied the customs 
requirements for such treatment. 
May 18, 2000  In South Lawn ceremony before more than 300 guests, 
President Clinton signs HR 434 into law (PL 106-200).  
Providing Caribbean Basin countries preferential trade 
treatment in parity with that of NAFTA. 
May 11, 2000  Conference agreement on HR 434 approved by Senate on a vote of 
77 to 19.   
May 4, 2000  Conference agreement on HR 434 approved by the House on a vote 
of 309 to 110.   
April 13, 2000  Breaking a months-long log-jam, Congressional leaders reach 
“agreement in principle” on CBI and Africa trade enhancement.  
Staff spend next two weeks working out details.  
February 7, 2000  FY 2001 budget includes funds for Caribbean Basin Trade 
Enhancement.   
January 29, 2000  At a World Trade Forum in Davos, Switzerland, President Clinton 
again cites his strong support for CBI trade enhancement.   
January 27, 2000  In his final State of the Union Address, President Clinton asked 
Congress to “finalize” the CBI trade enhancement legislation.  
November 3, 1999  Senate Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement legislation as Title II 
of the Trade and Development Act of 1999 (HR 434) by a vote of 
76 to 19.   
October 27, 1999 Language of S.1389 as reported included as Title II in substitute 
Senate amendment SP 2325, proposed to an expanded H.R. 434, 
renamed the “Trade and Development Act of 1999.” 
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September 16, 1999 S.1389 (United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement Act), 
reported favorably with written report. 
June 10, 1999  House Ways and Means Committee approves CBI trade 
enhancement legislation (HR 984).   
May 18, 1999  House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee approves CBI trade 
enhancement legislation (HR 984).   
March 23, 1999  House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee holds hearing on CBI 
trade enhancement legislation (HR 984).   
March 9, 1999  President Clinton pledges support for CBI trade enhancement 
during a two-day visit to the Central America region.   
March 4, 1999  The Administration transmits a CBI trade enhancement bill to the 
Congress.   
March 4, 1999  Reps. Phil Crane (R-IL), Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), Charlie Rangel (D-
NY), and Bob Matsui (D-CA) introduce CBI trade enhancement 
legislation as part of a package of relief measures for hurricane 
reconstruction.   
February 4, 1999 S.371, containing the “United States-Caribbean Trade 
Enhancement Act” as Title I, introduced and referred to the 
Committee on Finance. 
February 3, 1999  Led by the Chamber of Commerce, a broad coalition of several 
dozen business organizations and trade associations – representing, 
among other things, every element of the garment supply chain 
from cotton to consumer – call for enactment of CBI trade 
enhancement legislation as part of a package of relief measures for 
hurricane reconstruction.   
February 3, 1999  Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), joined by a bipartisan mix of 9 other 
Senators, introduces CBI trade enhancement legislation as part of a 
package of relief measures for hurricane reconstruction.   
February 2, 1999  President Clinton includes funding for CBI trade enhancement in 
his FY 2000 budget.   
January 25, 1999  Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) issues the first of 
several statements calling for passage of CBI trade enhancement 
legislation.   
January 19, 1999  President Clinton calls for measures to aid in reconstructing Central 
America and foster trade with Latin America in his State of the 
Union.   
December 11, 1998  After meeting with Central American leaders in Washington, 
President Clinton declares “We will continue to support Caribbean 
Basin enhancement legislation to make trade more free and more 
fair, and to help Central American nations restore their economies.  
I hope very much that it will pass in this coming Congress.”   
November 9, 1998  
   
Central American Presidents issue a plea for passage of Caribbean 
Basin Trade Enhancement to aid in reconstruction of Hurricane 
Mitch.   
October 24, 1998  President Clinton expresses disappointment that CBI trade 
legislation was not enacted during 105th Congress and restates his 
support for enactment during 106th Congress.   
July 23, 1998  Following Finance Committee action, President Clinton makes first 
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of several calls to urge enactment of CBI trade legislation before 
end of 105th Congress.   
July 21, 1998  Senate Finance Committee approves Caribbean trade enhancement 
legislation on a vote of 18 - 2 as part of an omnibus trade package.   
June 24, 1998  At a hearing on an Africa trade bill, Finance Committee members 
and Administration witnesses repeatedly discuss the need to 
"move" CBI trade enhancement legislation as soon as possible.   
April 6, 1998  Secretary of State Albright tells Caribbean heads of state that the 
Administration is committed to pressing for passage of CBI trade 
enhancement in 1998.   
February 2, 1998  President Clinton includes funding for CBI Trade Enhancement in 
the FY 1999 budget.   
January 25, 1998  Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) issues the first of 
several public calls for passage of S. 1278.   
November 4, 1997  House defeats HR 2264 by a vote of 182 to 234.   
October 9, 1997  House Ways and Means Committee approves by voice vote a 14-
month Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership bill (H 2264).   
October 1, 1997  Senate Finance Committee approves by voice vote a 3-year 
Caribbean Trade Enhancement bill (S. 1278).   
September 17, 1997  Senate Finance Committee holds a hearing and requests comments 
on fast track, Caribbean parity, and Africa trade legislation.   
July 31, 1997  Conferees on Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (HR 2014) file joint 
conference report without CBI parity provisions. 
June 26, 1997:  House approves Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (HR 2014).  Subtitle 
H of Title IX contains a one-year parity bill.   
June 26, 1997  Congressman Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) introduces CBTEA (HR 
2096) on behalf of the Administration.   
June 26, 1997  Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) introduces CBTEA (S 984) on behalf 
of the Administration.   
June 17, 1997  USTR Charlene Barshesfky transmits copy of draft Caribbean 
Basin Trade Enhancement Act (CBTEA) to Congress.   
May 10, 1997  President Clinton repeats the pledge to Caribbean leaders at 
Bridgetown, Barbados.   
May 8, 1997:  President Clinton pledges to Central American leaders to seek 
enactment of Caribbean Trade Enhancement provisions at San 
Jose, Costa Rica.   
February 6, 1997  President Clinton submits FY 1998 budget funding Caribbean 
Basin Trade Enhancement package.   
October 1, 1996  USTR releases Second Annual Report on Operation of the 
CBERA, noting the Administration’s intention to seek enactment 
of Caribbean trade enhancement legislation.   
March 19, 1996  President Clinton submits FY 1997 budget funding a Caribbean 
Basin parity trade package.   
October 3, 1995:  A broad coalition of textile and apparel associations express 
support for parity in a letter to Senate Finance Committee 
Chairman Bill Roth (R-DE).   
May 15, 1995:  Senate Finance Trade Subcommittee holds a hearing on pending 
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Caribbean parity legislation.   
March 10, 1995  Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) introduces The Caribbean Basin 
Trade Security Act (S. 529).  Sponsors include: Mack, Lott, 
Bradley Moseley-Braun, Hatch, Grassley, McCain, Pryor, Lugar, 
Dodd, and Gregg.   
February 10, 1995:  House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee holds a hearing on 
Caribbean parity.   
January 18, 1995:  Congressman Phil Crane (R-IL) introduces The Caribbean Basin 
Trade Security Act (HR 553).  Sponsors include: Shaw, Gibbons, 
Rangel, Towns, Deutsch, Owens, Torres, Menendez, Hastings, A., 
McKinney, Mfume, Wynn, Meek, Jackson-Lee, Tucker, Wilson, 
Johnson, E., Fattah, and Kolbe.   
January 1, 1994  NAFTA takes effect.   
December 8, 1993  President Clinton signs NAFTA Implementation Act into law.   
June 24, 1993:  House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee holds a hearing on 
Caribbean parity.   
June 24, 1993  Senator Bob Graham introduces Senate version of HR 1403 -- S. 
1155.  Other sponsors include: Sens. Durenberger and Mack.   
June 7, 1993:  House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee publishes written 
comments on Caribbean parity (HR 1403).   
March 18, 1993:  Congressman Sam Gibbons introduces HR 1403 -- The Caribbean 
Basin Free Trade Agreements Act.  Other sponsors include: Pickle, 
Crane, Rangel, McKinney, Mfume, Torres, Towns, de la Garza, 
Deutsch, Serrano, and Hutchinson, T.   
July 1, 1992:  House Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade 
and Western Hemisphere Affairs hold a joint hearing on the effect 
of NAFTA on the Caribbean.   
Source: American Apparel and Footwear Association. 
http://archive.wewear.org/LegislativeTradeNews/CBTPA.asp Pregelj, Vladimir. N. 2001. 
“Caribbean Basin Interim Trade Program: CBI/NAFTA Parity.” Congressional Research Service 
Issue Brief for Congress. 1-14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
VITA 
 
RANSFORD F. EDWARDS JR. 
 
Born, Kingston, Jamaica 
 
2007        B.A., Political Science 
Florida Atlantic University 
Boca Raton, Florida 
 
2009        M.S., Political Science 
Florida State University 
Tallahassee, Florida 
 
2012–2016       Doctoral Candidate 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
2012–2015       Graduate Assistant 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
 
Edwards, Ransford F. 2015. “Cut from the same cloth: The US textile and 
apparel industry and post-disaster designs for Haiti.” Class, Race and Corporate 
Power 3(2):1–26.
 
Panel: “The Creation and Implementation of Public Policy in the Americas.” 
Southern Political Science Association Annual Conference 
New Orleans, Louisiana, January, 2015. 
 
Panel: “United States, Africa, Caribbean, and Latin American Relations.” 
African and African Diaspora Studies Conference 
The College of Staten Island, The City University of New York, October 2014. 
 
Panel: “Curious Engagements: Outsiders Defining the African Experience.” 
Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa. 
Washington, D.C. November 2013. 
 
Panel: “Challenging State Sovereignty.” 
Florida Political Association Annual Meeting 
University of Tampa, March 2012. 
 
 
191 
Panel Chair: “Institutional Development in a post-Westphalian Reality: 
The Problematic of Supranational Integration and National Devolution.” 
Florida Education Fund 2012 Mid-Year Research and Writing Conference 
University of South Florida, February, 2012. 
 
Panel: “The Role of NGOs.” 
African and African Diaspora Studies Conference 
Florida International University, February, 2012. 
 
Panel: “Doing More With Less: Government Challenges for Mitigating Climate 
Change and Enhancing Emergency Preparedness.” 
Florida Education Fund 2011 Mid-Year Research and Writing Conference. 
University of South Florida, February, 2011. 
 
Panel: “Minimizing Disaster Risk Factors Through Sound Planning and Policy. 
The Southeastern Conference for Public Administration.” 
University of North Carolina-Wilmington, October, 2010. 
